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~he material for this thesis was collected a~d used 
for reports in the seminar on ".Kentucky During the Civil War", at the 
University of Louisville during the winter of 1924-25. Zhe subject was 
chosen becaus'e of its relation to the seminar top! c in order that the 
writer might have the benefit of the suggestions and criticisms of 
the membAl'S of the class. 
The "Kentucky Mountains" has been used as a general 
term covering the following counties situated in the eastern and 
southeastern portion of the state, namely: Breathitt, 01ay, Floyd, 
Harlan, Jackson, Johnson, Knox, Laurel, Letcher, Lincoln, Magoffin, 
Morgan, Owsley, Perry, Pike, Pulaski. Rockcastle, Waune. \vhi tle.y. 
Vlo1fe. (1) 
Because there were no definite military campaigns in 
Kentucky after 1852, the subject was limited to 1861 and 1862, when 
organized armies of both the United States and the Confederacy were 
passing through the Kentuoky mo~tains. (2) 
Introduotion 
Introd~ction. 
In the early days of lSol, Kentucky, torn between 
her allegianoe to the Federal government and her sympathy for the 
South, with her citizenry so divided that hardly a fa~ily in the 
State stood united, vainly endeavoured to carve out for herself 
a niche of security in the midst of the cha03 of war. Continuing 
her position as one of the United States, she yet attempted to as-
sume a position of neutrality towards the two belligerents, 
the United States of which she was a part, and the Confederacy. 
On May 20, 1851, Governor Beriah 1mgoffin, on his own initiative 
and without the endorsement of the Legislature, issued a proolam-
ation of neutrali ty warning both the Union and Confederate gov-
(3) 
ernments to keep their militarJ forces off Kentucky's soil. Such 
a position, unique in history, probably, in its oonception, wa. 
of course, untenable. It is not for us here to inquire into its 
causes nor even into the violations of neutr31ity except in so 
far as it effects that part of Kentucky included in this study. 
Technically, the period of neutrali ty was ended September 18th, 
1861, when the Legislature passed resolutions requiring Governor 
Magoft'in to demand the uncondi tional withdrawal of the Confederate 
foro~~ from the State.(4) 
But before this had happened two events had oocurred 
which presaged for southeastern Kentucky that its territory would 
beoome the first theatre of war in the state, in a conflict where 
neither side valued for itself the immediate territory occupied. 
These two events were the establishment of Camp Diok Robinson in 
Garrard oounty for the enlistment of Union troops, -- to which 
recruits began to flock August 6th; (5) and the entrance into the 
state via Cumberland Gap of General Zolliooffer and about 5000 Oon:" 
federate troops in September, Simultaneously with the oocupation of 
Col'J.mbus, Ky., by General Polk, September 3-12th, 1831.(6) Each 
of these happenings is considered by various authorities as the 
2. 
first violation of Kentuoky's neutrality. (7!) Believing as I do 
that the neutrality of Kentucky was violated much earlier by the 
Confederate· government in sending accredi ted recmi ting officers 
into the state(S), there will be no attempt to discuss that ques-
tion here. In passing, however, it might be interesting to oon-
sider the directions given to Lt. lTelson, who established Camp 
Dick Robinson. All of the histories refer to this camp as one 
organizod solely to recruit Kentucky men into the Federal army. (9) 
) 'l'hat this was not at all the primary object of Nelson's mission 
may be ascertained from the following instructions placed upon 
him, (10) 
Adjutant-General's Office, 
i~:ashington, D. J., July 1, 
1861. 
Lieut. William Nelson, U. S. N., Oinoinnati, Ohio: 
Sir: Your services having been placed at the disposal of the 
War Department for the performance of a special duty, the Secre-
~ 
tary of ':Iar directs me to communicate to you the following instruc-
tions: 
It being the fixed purpose of the General Government to maintain 
the Constituti on and execute the laws of the Union and to protect 
al1. loyal citizens in their copstitutional rights, the Secret2ry di-
rects that you must~r into the service of the United States five 
regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry in East Tennesseept 
and one regimpnt of infantry in West Tennessee, to receive pay when 
called into active service by this Department •••••••••••• You will 
also, at the same time, muster into the servioe, or designate some 
suitable person so to do. in Southeast Aentuoky, three regiments 
of infantry, to be oommanded and offioered in the same manner as 
herein provided for the Ten~essee regiments. 
All of the regiments aforesaid will be raised. for servioe in 
East and West Tennessee and adjaoent counties and in East ~entucky • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
L. fhomaa, 
Adjutant-General 
Thus the mountaineers were to be the first Kentuckians 
mustered into the Union army on their o~n soil. And at Barbourville, 
on September 18th, the Home Uuards of Knox county fired the first 
shots to stay the march of the Southern armies into the state.(ll) And 
from that time until the end of 1802, this southeastern section of 
Kentucky witnessed the passing and repas3ing of soldiers of both 
armies, and much of the time had its terri tory covered with Union 
or Confederate camps. 
Yet thi.s section of the state, sparsely settled, 
with scanty fields and small farms yielding a bare subsistence for 
~I 
those who ti Hed the SOil, containing no railroads or other means 
of transportation, and wi th no cities to serve as bases of supplies, 
held little that could render it valuable to the contending parties. 
It was desired by them only because for each, through it lay the 
way to the promised land. For the North, it was merely the high 
road to East Tennessee where dwelt a loyal and oppressed people, 
seeking deliverance from the Confederacy which they had opposed; 
and through which ran the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad 
carrying the products of the farmlands in the Mississippi valley 
to the armies in Virginia. For the South the mountain defiles of 
Kentucky were the gateway to the Bluegrass of Kentucky where the , 
population, it believed, was 1,oya1 to its cause; where rich farm-
lands were laden with supplios so needed by the South ac~ustomed 
to drawing its subsistence from the rich Northwest, while its own 
soil was devoted to the staple cotton; and last but by no means 
least, the road through the mountains led towards controlling the 
state for the Confederacy, thus rounding out its territory geo-
graphically and carrying the border to the Ohio river.(l2) These 
then were the objects for vmich the arnies were striving when they 
passed to and fro, or fought valiantly along the rivers or upon the 
. narrow mountain roads in southeastern Kentucky. 
Sinc~ carrying aid to the East ~ennesleans was one 
4. 
of the primary objeots of the North in these oampaigns, it will be 
neoessary to consider for a moment just what their sit~ation was. 
Briefly, the situation was this. "On the sixth of 
May, 1861, the leeislature of Tennessee passed an act of seces-
sion, subject to a vote of the people on June 8th following; and on 
the seventh of May, l8Sl, it ratified a military league, o~lve 
(13) 
and defensive, between the State and the Confederate States. 1f Dttr-
ing May, Governor Harris raised most of the troops provided for by 
the legislature and the state was overrun with soldiers. The only 
section that was not enthuSiastically for secession was East Tennes-
, 
see. Here a Union meeting was held at Knoxville on !.~ay 30tb, which 
adjourned to meet at Greeneville June 17-20. As a result bf·this 
. meet ing a memorial was presen ted to the legis 1 ature on June 18, ask-
ing that the counties of East and ~iddle Tennessee so desiring be 
allowed to form a separate state. Meanwhile on June 8th, the State 
had voted overwhelmingly for seceSSion, East Tennessee alone stand-
ing firm for the Union. Before any action was t~lken in the legisla-
ture in regard to the memorial, Governor Harris issued a proclam-
ation on June 20th declaring Tennessee a member of the Confederacy. (14) 
From this time the East Tennesseans were in open rebellion to the 
rest of the State and were constantly making appeals to the Federal 
government for aid. 
President Lincoln considered the campaign to East 
Tennessee second only to the oapture of Riohmond. (15) Over and over 
again he urged uppn the military commanders the necessi ty of this 
movement to relieve a loyal people and to control one of the great 
arteries of supplies for the Southern armies. He even urged the 
building of a railroad to faoilitate it. (16) Military leaders 
were made .and unmade, given commands and removed from them in the 
Department of the West solely on the basis of t~eir celerity in 
organizing this attack. Most of the oommanding offioers ~ailed to 
share President Lincoln's enthusiasm for the partioular objective. 
(17) They regarded his interest in the matter as springing from 
humanitarian impulses and po~~~~+ considerations. overwhelmed as 
~!.j!,""""" 
5. 
he was by constant demands from Governor Andrew Johnson and the 
Tennessee members of the national legislature. (18) They regarded 
the expedition from a military and stragetic point of view as of 
less importanoe than the line of attaok from Louisville to Nashville. 
(19) But President Lincoln was tena~ious and no commander was al-
lowedt 0 overlook it. 
Perhaps the best statement of the attitude of the 
Federal government in .this matter is found in two letters to Gener-
al Buell written by General MoOlellan and by President Lincoln. 
In a letter of instruotions to General Buell when he was placed in 
co~~d of the Department of the OhiO, November 7th, 1861, Gener-
al McClellan said: fI The military problem would be a simple one 
could it be entirely separated from political influences. Suoh is 
not the case. Were the population among whioh you are to operate 
wholly or generally hostile, it is probable that l~ashvill€ should 
be your first and principal objective point. It so happens that 
a large majority of the inhabitants of Eastern Tennessee are in 
favor of the Union. It therefore seems proper that you should re-
main on the defensive on the line from Louisville to Nashville, 
while you throw the mass of yo,ur forces by rapid marches, by C'J.l'II-
berland Gap or Walker's Gap, on Knoxville, in order to occupy the 
railroad at that pOint, and thus enable the loyal citizens of East-
ern Tennessee to rise, while you at the sa!ne time cut off the rail-
way oommunioation between Eastern Virginia and the Mississippi." (20) 
PreSident Lincoln wrote to General Buell on January 6th, 1862, "Of 
the two, I would rather .have a point on the railroad. south of Cumber-
land Gap than Nashville first, because it cuts a great artery of 
the enemy's communicati on, whioh Nash ville does not; and" secondly, 
because it is in the midst of loyal people, who. would rally around 
it, while Nashville is not. Again, 1 ca~not see why the IDQvement on 
East Tennessee would not be a diverSion in your favor rather than 
a disadvantage, assuming that a movement toward llashville is the 
main object. But that our friends in East Tennessee 
6. 
are being hanged and driven to despair, and even now I fear are 
thinking of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal protection. 
In thl's we lose the most valuable stake we have in the South." (21) 
Thus for a year southeastern KentuQky was the scene 
of conflicts and watched With varying emotions the entrance and 
I 






Mill tary Campaigns in the Mountains. 
Although the primar,y movements in both the Northern 
and Southern a~ies in the Kentuoky mountains during 1861 and 1862 
W8:re eeftee1"!Md were oono~rned on the Tennessee border, there were 
three minor campaigns in eastern Kentucky centering along the Louisa 
fork of the Big Sandy river. Since the troops in this region were 
usually aoting alone and not with any great degree of cooperation 
, 
with those on the Tennessee border, ( except during :gragg's and Kirby' 
Smith's invasion), these will be taken up under a separate topic, 
instead of ohronologioally. The military affairs on the Tennessee 
border will be considered first and then these along the valley of 
the Big Sandy and the Virginia border at Pound Gap. 
As we have seen on July 1, 1861, Lieutenant ':lillia.'Il 
!felson, U. S. N., had been placed on ~pecial duty with the Wa.r De-
partment and sent to Kentuoky. On July 14th, Lt. Nelson met with 
leading Unionists of southeastern Kentuoky and plans were made for 
reoruiting thirty companies of infantry and five of cavalry. Offi-
cers were apPOinted as follows: -
Colonel of the First Regiment of Infantry, Speed S. Fry, of Danville, 
" " " Second " " Theophilus T. Garrard, 




" " " 
Thomas E. 3ramlette of 
Adair county, 
with ~. J. Landrum and Frank L. Wolford, of Casey oounty as Colonel 
,and Lieutenant Colonel, respeotively, of the oa.valry to be raised. 
In his report of this meeting Lieutenant Nelson discusses the diffi-
oulties of transporting arms, supplies and arffiunition from Cincinna-
ti to the Tennessee border, a distance 0 f 240 miles. He further 
addsltThe gaps in the mountains are all guarded by rebel troops, but 
not in sufficient numbers to prevent my going through whichever gap 
I m8¥ select, there being seven."(22) 
, 
At the Union meeting at Greeneville, Tenn., a com-
mittee of safety had been appointed. This oommittee, impressed by 
8. 
If the loyal spirit of Lieut. Samuel P. Carter, U. S. N., a young 
Tennessean in the Navy who had written inspi ri ng let t. ers urging 
oontinued loyalty to the Union, asked President Lincoln to appoint 
him Brigadier-General and to assign him to the command in East 
Tennessee in case U. S. troops should be organized. As a result, 
on July 10th, Lieut. Carter reoeived orders from the Adjutant-
General's offioe to "prooeed to East Tennessee and organize a camp 
of instructions of United States volunteers." He consulted with 
Lieutenant Nelson at Oinoinnati and it was planned for him to go 
to the upper oounties of East Tennessee and organize a suffioient 
foroe of mountaineers armed with country rifles to maintain his 
position until Nelson oould arrive with the promised arms and equip-
age. On his way to oarry out this plan, Lieut. Carter met his 
brother, James. P. ~. Garter, at London, Ky., on August 1. He had 
he 
just esoaped from East Tennessee where had gone on a mission for 
" President Linooln and Seoretary Stanton to endeavour to make ar-
rangements for the loyal mounta.ineers to oross over into Kentuoky 
to reoeive their arms and .equipments, should that plan seem more 
practioable. The determination of the Administr2tion to hold 
East fennessee is shown by the faot that there were three people 
I 
all sent on the same mission more or less. Mr. Jane s Carter as-
sured his brother that his presence in Tennessee would only lead to 
his arrest by the Confederate forces and at his suggestion Lieute-
nant Carter established his headquarters at Barbourville in Knox 
county, just 30 miles from Cumberland Gap. A oompany of Golonel 
Garr'ard's regiment was there in oourse of organization. '3y the 
thrid of August nearly one hundred refugees from East Tennessee 
had arrived at Barbourville and Boston, Ky. Others joined then, the 
men armed with squirrel rifles, knives and stout sticks. Camp An-
drew Johnson was established for them, two miles from Barbourville 
and there the First Tennessee Infantry was organized, numbering 800 
men by the middle of August. (23) 
Meanwhile. the dlq after the eleot iOn in Kentucky, 
9.-
,August 6th, 18·31, recruits began flocking in to Camp Dick Robinson, 
in Garrard oounty, and by the middle of A~st all the companies 
were filled. Col. Landrum had turned the cavalry over to 001. 
Frank Wolford, but the infantry regiments, with the officers ap-
pointed stood ready to be mustered into the service. (24) 
Already the question of securing supplies and equip-
ment for the troops became that of paramount importance. The 1en-
nessee troops were in a destitute condition, many of them without 
shoes and ooats, to say nothing of the accoutrements of war. Lieut-
Carter, therefore, visited Lieutenant Kelson, and secured his promise 
that if Carter could send transportation, with necessary guard, he 
might have the desired supplies. But when the train arrived at 
Oamp Dick Robinson, Nelson was obliged to retain the troops for the 
defense of his o amp , so great was the feeling against it. not only 
this, but Lieutenant Nelson was obliged to request that the rest of 
the ~ennessee force join him to assist in defending Camp Dick Robin-
son should it be attacked. In the last week in August the move was 
effected much to the bitter disappointment of the East Tennesseans, 
who were 10th to move any farther away from their homes. Soon the 
Second ~ennessee regiment was organized and mustered into the service 
• 
and Oamp Dick Robinson was further augumented by the organi-zation 
of an artillery company under command of Oapt. Abram Hewett. (25) 
Such were the Union forces organized in southeastern 
Kentucky when General George H. Thomas, a trained soldier of long 
military expArience was ordered to assume the command, superseding 
(26) 
Lieut. Nelson September 10th. He found a force of raw reclluits with 
no discipline and a camp with no equipage of any kind. Somewhat 
dismayed with the task before him, he set to work to bring men and 
camp under military organization to render theforce an efficient one. 
Kniffin and 
In Battle, Perrin's "History of Kentucky", Air. Kniffin te1ls of his 1\ . 
own efforts as a member of General ~6ma3' staff, to secure supplies 
10. 
for the camp. Since ordlnar.y methods brought no results, Mr. Y~iffin 
followed General Fremont's example of makIng re~uisitlons on the de-
pots at Louisville and Cincinnati. Getting no results from this, 
the young man proceeded to Loui svi 11e and found plenty of supplies 
available if he could pay cash for them when delivered. Although 
neither General Thomas nor Col. Swords, the Oomiss:.lry officer at 
Louisville had any available funds from the government, tIr. Knif-
fin arrange~ for the purchase of the supplies, promising to pay on 
delivery. ':lithin a few days one of the Louisville merchants ap-
peared at Camp Dick Robinson with a small quantity of the goods. 
Rea.lizing that the merchants had arranged this as a test of his a-
bility to pay before sendine ~~rther orders, Mr. Kniffin resorted 
to desperti te measures, -- he gave the man a check on a LeXington 
Bank in which he had no funds. Fearful of arousing General Thomas' 
disapproval, the young man hastily l~de his way to Lexington where 
he obtained an interview with the President of the Bank ,mose 
check he had used. He explained the situation to the banker, vmo 
promised to honor the check ~~d wait until the money should be ob-
tained from the government. (27) This story is included to show 
the almost insurmountable difficulties under which the officers 1a-
bored in trying to organize the/volunteers in 1861 in Kentucky. 
While these preIlarations were being made in Kentucky 
for the Union cause, let us rest assured that the Confederates over 
in East Tennessee were no less active. On July 9th, General Leoni-
das Polk, in commrmd of Department 2 of the Confederacy, urged Pres. 
e 
Davis to crea~ East Tennessee into a sep~rate department, appoint 
Ge~eral F. K. Zolliooffer of the Tennessee Army as a brigadier of 
the PrOvisional Army of the Confederaoy, place him in command and 
give him 10,000 troops. (28) On the 11th of July, the Secretary 
of War requested Gov. Harris of Tennessee to send two regiments to 
'East Tennessee. (29) The regiments were sent on July 18th (30) 
and on the 26th, General Zollicoffer was ordered to assume oommand 
of East Tennessee to "preserve peace, protect the railroad and re-
11. 
pel invasion." (31) By August 26th Zollicoffer had 33 infantry com-
panies, almost wi thout exception raw troops,J and 6 cavalry companies 
guarding the principal gaps , patrolling the nur~rous paths leading 
across the mountains and maintaining a garrison at Oumberland Gap. (32) 
No mention is made ip any of the orders or reports of an offensi,e 
campaign in K~ntuCkyt as the attitude of the East' Tennesseans was 
so hostile as to cause much alarm. 
On September 3rd, General Polk's forces occupied Columbus, 
Ky., and on the sixth, General Grant's Union forces occupied Paduc-
&h. (33) That a concerted movement had been planned by the Oonfed-
erates is seen by the fact that on September 7th received orders from 
Richmond to "take the arms" as the neutrali ty of Kentucky had been 
broken by the oocupation of Paducah by the Federal forces. (34) On 
the 9th, General Zollicoffer replied th~t he had ordered 3 regiments 
into Kentucky and others would follow rapidly. (35) By September 12 
there ware 3 regiments at Cumberland Ford, Ky., with 3 others or-
dered up and General Zollicoffer stated that he would be ready for 
a forward movement as soon as he had strengthened his posit ion at 
Cumberland Gap and Ford and the intervening mountain passes. (36) 
Meanwhile GeneralS. B. Buckner, O. S. A. , and Governor Harris of 
Tennessee had wired General Zollicoffer urging him not to enter Ken-
tucky on the grounds that suoh a military movement would have a bad 
effect politically in Kentucky. Since this was not reoeived until 
the night of the 13th, it was too late and the invasion had ,:;lready 
been made. (37) 
On the 8th of September General Polk had addressed 
the Governor of Kentucky offering to withdraw the Oonfederate troops 
on oondition that the troops of the Gederal gover~ent would with-
draw Simultaneously and with a mutual guarantee that neither Feder-
al nor uonfederate troops would enter or occupy any part of Kent~cky 
in the i"J.ture. (38) General Zolliooffer also sent Governor Magoffin , 
the following letter on September 14th: 
,. 
Sir: The ~afety of Tennessee requiring it, I have occupied the moun-
12. 
tain passes at Cumberland Ford and the Three Log Mountains, in Ken-
tucky. For weeks I have known that the Federal commander at Hos-
kins' Cross-Roads, was threatening the invasion of East Tennessee, 
and ruthlessly urging our people to destroy their own railroad 
bridges. I postponed this precautionary measure until the despotic 
government at Washington, refusing to recognize the neutrality of 
Kentucky, had established formidable c~~s in the oentral and other 
parts of the State, with a view first to subjugate our gallant 315-
ter and then ourselves. Tennessee i'eels, and has ever felt, to-
wards Kentucky as a twin sister. Their people are as one people 
in kindred, sympathy, valor, and patriotism. We have felt, and 
still feel, a religiOUS respeot for Kentuoky neutrali ty. V.~e will 
respect it as long as our safety will permit. If the Federal forces 
will now withdraw from their menaoing pOSition, the forces under 
my oommand shall instantly be withdrawn. 
Very respectfully, 
F. K. Zoll1coffer, " 
Brigadier-General. 
(39) 
On the 15th of September, General Zolliooffer was no-
tified from Richmond that " military c onsiderat ions would cle arly 
indicate a fO~9ard movement, political conditions oonourring. (40) 
And on September 13th, Governor Magoffin, by order of the leeis1a-
ture issued a proclamation oalling for the unconditional withdrawal 
of the Confederate troops, ?!he same resolutions in the legislature 
authorized General Robert Anderson to oa.ll out volunteers in the 
state to expel the invaders and ordered the Governor to callout 
the state militia under General T. L. Crittenden. (41) To this df'l. 
mand, General Albert Sidney Johnston, who had superseded General Polk 
as oom~nder of· Department 2, O. S. A., again replied that the Con-
federate troops would withdraw only upon condition that the Federal 
forces would do the same. (42) 
W After );hese amenities had peen observed, it was evi-
k, 




Acoording to Shaler the first reoorded skirmish with the Confeder-
ate forces took place at Barbourville, Ky., on September 18th, 
where about 300 Home Guards attempted to withstand a force of 800 
of Zollicoffer's troops. (43) In the fight which took place about 
daybreak, the Federal loss was 12 killed and 2 prisoners while 
the Confederates lost 1 killed and 4 wounded. The Home Guards 
fled and left the Confederates in occupation of the town. (44) 
The Confederates retired to Cumberland Ford and on September 21st, 
General Zollicoffer reported to General A. S. Johnston that hii 
position at Cumberland Ford was not nearly so strong as he had 
imagined and could easily be turned by strategy. He asked for 
half dozen pieces for pivot guns. (45) On September 23 General 
Johnston ordered him to prooeed to fortify t~e-position at Cum-
berland Gap and Ford and the intervening passes in the 3 moun-
tains so that they oan be held by the fewest possible troops, 
thus freeing the men for other operations. He added further, 
"A forward movement from YOUl' present position at this time can-
not be made. Your advance into Kentucky and your route must be 
timed by and in its direction combined with, the movements of 
General Buokner ( at Bowling Green), now advancing into Kentuoky. 
V~en this pOSition, military and politioal, is better developed, 
you will receive full information and speoial orders." (46) 
Meanwhile, on September 20th Col. T. T. Garrard 
with his regi:nent, the Third Kentuoky, aad been sent forward to 
a position on the Rockcastle River, 13 ::;1les from London, Ky. 
He had orders to fortify the position, build huts for his men and 
repel all intruders, keeping in oommunioation with Col. Sidney 
BKrnes whose regiment, the 8th Kentucky,had been placed at Irvine 
to prevent communication between the Confederate foroes collecting 
-to 
at Hazel Green and West Libery and Cumberland Gap. Also to prevent 
It. . 
the passage of any recruits attempting to join the ~onfederate army 
at the Gap. (47) On September 16th, General Anderson, commanding 
the Department of O~berland, had requested Mr. Sa.'IlUel Glll of the 
State Military Board to reco~~end that Home Guards with their arms 
14. 
(48) 
rendezvous at le~dngton, Oamp Dick hobinson and other points. Some of 
these Guards with Oolonel Wolford's cavalry were encamped at laurel 
Bridge, 6 miles south of london. (49) On September 26th, General 
Zollicoffer sent forward to break up this camp at Laurel Bridge the 
11th Tennessee regiment, 1 b~alion of th6 15th Mississippi regi-
ment, and the First Tennessee oavalry. After driving in the Fed-
eral pickets, the Confederates advanoed and captured a part of the 
baggage of the enoampment, ohasing the retreating oavalry and Home 
Guards for several miles. Colonel Garrard, in command of Camp 
Wildcat, where the retreating forces took rescueJ reports laoonical-
ly, . "Colonel Wolford came int 0 camp bringinf' w1-th him the Home Guard 
under Colonel Brown."(50) The Confederates oaptured 2 of the pickets 
and 1 otter prisoner, 8000 oartridges, 250000 oaps, 3 kegs of pow-
der, 2 wagons and teams, 3 horses, 25 pairs of shoes and several 
guns. (51) 
At the same time a detaohment oomposed of a regiment 
of infantry with two oavalry compa!1ies(52) was sent to the salt 
works in Clay oounty, whenoe they oarried away all the salt ttere,--
200 barrels, -- returning with it to Oumberland ~'ord. This was the 
real purpose of both movements as salt was a very scarce article in 
i 
the Confederacy. The officer c'ommanding was instruoted to receipt 
for the salt with the expectation that the Confederate government 
would p~ for it at the regular price at the workS, 40¢ a bushel.(52) 
The Confederates again retired to the Ford and on 
October 3rd, General Zollicoffer wired General Johnston forpermls-
slon to meet halfWay a force supposed to be moving towards Barbour-
ville to meet him. This was given but on October 6th a reconnoitre-
ing party returned from london with the report that there has been 
no appearanoe of the enemy there. (53) Meanwhile a detachment was 
sent into Harlan county where General Zollicoffer had learned there 
were 500 or 600 organized men under arms (Home Guardst). 'Thirteen 
men in small armed parties were captured on this expedition(54) 
15. 
A detachment was also sent into ~hitley county but no further rep or. 
of their expedition was made. General Zollicoffer had expected to 
make an attack in combination with Ool,Stanton,encamped near James-
town, Tennessee but 001. Stanton was ordered to join General Buck-
ner at Bowling Green. Before his departure, however, he was ordered 
to break up Union camps at Thompkinsville and Burkesville and Albany, 
all in Kentucky. The camp at Albany consisted of some Home Guard 
companies, including those from Oasey and Lincoln counties and some 
of the 12th Infantry, U.S.V., under 001. William Hoskins. General 
Zollicoffer planned to move on the advanced force entrenched at 
Rockcastle Hills and then to move down by Somerset and Monticello 
or by Oolumbia and Burkesville in the hope of capturing any force 
at Albany. Before Genl. Zollicoffer reached the Rockcastle Hills 
pOSition, however, 001. Hoskins, unable to hold the Home Guards, 
was forced to retire to Camp Gogpin, in Pulaski county, on the Jum-
berland river. (55) General Zollicoffer was so convinced that any 
advance would be made via somerset~d Jamestown, Tenn., that on 
stores 
the 18th of October he ordered cOlDnissary to James town, 'renn. 
" On the 18th, General Zollicoffer having moved up towards London, 
there was a skirmish between p,ickets in which the Confederates lost 
1 killed and the Unionists 1 killed and 1 prisoner. (56) 
In the Federal forces at Oamp Dick RObinson, General 
Thomas had repeatedly requested re-enforcements, saying that with 
four good regiments, well-trained and well-equipped he could take 
Eac;t Tennessee. On September 30th, General Mitchel!, in command 
of the Department of the Ohio at CinCinnati, ordered 6 regiments of 
inf~~try with 2 batteries of o-pounders to report to General Thomas. 
(57) On October lat, General Thomas, writing to thank General Mitcr:-
el} for his aid, suggested that Gennral ~.Htche~(l send a column of 
about 4 regiments up the Big Sandy, move it down through Floyd, Letch-
er and Harlan counties, while his column advanced via 3arbourville. 
General Thomas believed such a movement would secure the railroad 
in East Tennessee. (58) But before any further plans could be made 
15. 
General Anderson was replaced by General Sherman as commander of the 
Department of the Cumberland on October 8th and on October 10th, Gen-
eral Mitchell received orders to proceed to Ca..'UP Dick Rovinson and 
there prepare the troops for a forward movement. General Mi tchell 
wrote to General Thomas of his assignment and asked that General 
h 
Tomas make every preparation in his power for this expedition. (59) 
" 
It was evident that the Administration would brook no delay in the 
expedition into East Tennessee, constantly urged on as it was by 
3.'l.st Tennesseans at Washington, who little understood the proi:Jlems 
attached to moving an army through a poor moantain country. Gen-
eral Thomas, who had been bending every energy to perfecting the 
arrangements for such a move, felt that he had been superseded with-
out just cause. He appealed to General Sherman, mo promised to 
do everything in his power to retain General Thomas. (60)i.1eammile, 
on October 16th, SecretarJ of '.Var Cameron visited General Sherman 
at LouisvilJe and it was decided to leave Mitchell at Cincinnati. 
Mr. Cameron be[;red General Sherman to t:1ke the offensive, to seize 
J1L'Uberland Gni> and Ford, and to ["et possession of the :::ast ?ennessee 
and ~irginia r3ilroad. (61) 
'~lhile all this ~J83 happeninG, ":cnornl '3herr.lan, ',,,;ho 
h!ld vi 3i ted Camp Dick Robinson, ordered General Thomas to move his 
com"1and to Cr~-ib Orchard or Mount Vernon in order to be nearer hi::, 
advance gtlard on the Rockcastle river. On Oct ober 19th, General ..11-
bert Schoepf was ordered to take cOlD'!1and at Camp "'iildcat from which 
Colonel Garrard had been announcing the advance of ~te Confederates. 
(62) The 17th Ohio and :':3rd Indiana had been orciered up to re-en-
force ~olonel Garrard and in addition, Jol. Wolford's cavalry,. the 
14th Ohio.., and a battery of artillery, with the '~ennessee brigade ,vIere 
now sent forward. (63) 
The expected action took place on October 2~t when 
Genera.l Zollicoffer advanced upon the naturally forti fied position 
of the Federal troops on tLe Rockcastle Hills. Camp Wildcat was 
17. 
located at the junction 0 f the Richmond, 1'lt. Vernon and London roads, 
a~d was well fortified from the front but ... could easily be turned 
by a force moving from the valley in its fron by another road passing 
Round Hill to its rear. The 33rd Indiana was placed on the Round 
EH1.(64) About 350 men were deployed around the hi 11 as skirmish-
ers. In a few minutes, the 00nfederates ""ho were hidden in the woods, 
co~~enced firing. As the firing began, 250 of ~olford's cavalry,dis-
~ounted, joined the Indiana troops. The fire was unusually severe 
v.hich caused the line of cavalrymen to waver but they rallied and 
held their ground. The advanCing Tennessee regiments, two in number, 
thou",ht the men making for the fortifications ,vere their o'\\ln troops 
and did not fire. The Union Colenel in his report says they came 
:llmost upon the fortifications with bayonets 'fixed, declaring ttem-
~d~..,...~. 
sel ves "Union men lt and "all rieht") The firing continued for over 
an hour, but as the 33rd Indiana received lar[6 :re-enfcrcements, and 
the Confederates none at all, they retired from the field and at 
two in the morning General Zollicoffer retreated towards Cumberland 
I 
Ford. Yihile this attack was being made on the Round Hill, another 
part of the Confederate force had stormed the position from the 
front but to no avail. General Schoepf had about 5000 men and Gen-
eral Zollicoffer about 5400. ~he Federal loss was 4 killed and 20 
wounded, the Confederate 11 killed and 42 wounded. Col. Coburn, how-
ever, reported 30 Confederate dead found on the battle field. (65) 
General Zollicoffer fell back to Flat Lick, Knox 
countyJand then to C:unberland Ford. Realizin~ that the rains would 
soon ronder the C~~berland Gap road impassable, and believing the 
Union advance would be via Somerset a.~d Mont icello on Jamestown, Tenn., 
he determined to strengthen the fortifications at Cumberland Gap and 
leave a small garrison there; to blockade all the pas3es through the 
mountains so that they would be impassable; aYld to move his entire 
command, if pOSSible, to a position between Monticello and Somer-
r: set on the Cumberland River, in order to obtain supplies from lIash-
~, 





cavalry scouts drove back a similar detachment of the enemy at Lau-
rel Bridge, capturing 3 prisoners. On the 30th, a small picket of 
the cavalry which was posted on the road as far back as Barbourville 
was fired at from the~shes. On chasing the attacking party, they 
(67) 
killed 1 man and captured 4 horses. On November 4th, 3eneral Zo11i-
coffer, at Cumberla:1d Ford, 1 ecei ved war. from Jamestovm, where he 
had stationed 6 cavalry companies, that the Union forces were ap-
proaching 6000 strong.' General Zollicoffer immediately started tc 
the relief of Jamestown with 5 regiments, a battery of artillery 
and some cavalry, going via Jacksboro and Montgomery. On the 8th 
he had arrived within 23 miles of Montgo:nery, havhlg covered 71 
miles in 2 d8\Vs. Receiving word by a courier that the information 
(68) 
was false, he fell back to Jacksboro. By November 17th, he had 
Iu.. 
blockaded all the mountain passes so securely that was assured the 
A 
enemy could not pass over the mountains between Pound Gap in Vir-
ginia and Jacksboro, Tennessee, a distance of about 120 miles. He 
therefore started his advance guard via Wartburg, Tenn. to Jamestown, 
Tenn., and Monticello, Ky. By November 27th, GeneralZollicoffer 
had established his camp at Mill Springs, Ky., 13 miles west of 
Monticello, on the south barik of the Cumberland River. (69) 
The battle of Qamp Wildcat was a decided victory 
for the Union and both General Schoepf and General Thomas desired 
to push their advantage by pursuing the enemy towards Cumberland 
Gap. General Schoepf moved down to within 3 miles of London with 
the 14th and 17th Ohio and the 33rd Indiana and 2 batteries, send-
ing the 3rd Kentucky and the Tennessee regiments ahead to London. 
(70) General Thomas established a supply depot at Crab Orchard, 
whence the stores came by a turnpike the 34 miles from the rail-
road. at Nicholasville; from Crab Orchard there was a narrow moun-
tain road to London. (71)On October 29th, General Sherman ordered 
General Thomas not to advance any further on the Cumberland Gap 
and 
route, 4.ma)on November 12th, ordered C:eneral Thomas to be prepared 
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for a retrograde movement as he feared that General A. S. Johnston 
was planning an advance to separate his own and General Thomas' com-
mands. (73)On the same day General Thomas ordered General Schoepf 
to fall back from London towards Crab Orchard or ~icholasvine. It 
was on this retrograde movement that the East Tennesseans almost 
mutinied. Many through down their arms by the side of the road and 
refused to march. They were dismayed a~ the prospect of no cnm-
paign for the relief of their ~beloved and suffering country. 
Fortunately, they had gone only as far as Mt. Vernon when the order 
was countermanded. (74) lleanwhile, General 3uell had superseded 
General Sherman in command and had assumed comn~~~ of the newly 
created Department of the Ohio. (75) This on November 15th. 
When General Thomas mo ved hi s headquarters to Crab 
Orchard on October 31st, he sent Col. WOlford's cavalry and Col. 
Bramlette's regiment to re-enforce Co. Hoskins at his camp-on 
the Cumberland River between Somerset and Monticello. Col. Hos-
kins continually reported that the enemy were advancing on that 
road but General Thomas did not credit the rumor. (76) However, 
the two Tennessee regiments and the 3rd Kentucky were left at Lon-
don under General Carter, while Thomas received orders on November 
17th to proceed to Columbia via Liberty. The roads were so bad 
that he was forced to proceed 'by Danville and Lebanon to reach 
Columbia. Before the move could be entirely effected, General 
Schoepf was ordered to Somer.et, where Col. Hoskins was threat-
ened with General Zollicoffer's advance, Col. Wolford and Bram-
lette having been ordered to Columbia. General Thomas' headquar-
ters were finally established at Lebanon. This put him at a base 
which could be supplied by rail from Louisville, instead of on 
the Cincinnati and Lexington line. (77) 
On November 30th a memorandum of General Thomas' com-
mand gives the distribution of his troops as follows: 
t 
Camp Dick RO#inson: 31st Ohio Infantry and Hewett's battery 
Cl'2b Orchard: 33rd indiana 
t, 
20. 
Columbia: 1st Ky infantry and 1st Ky oava1ry. 
Somerset: - Ky. infantry, 17th Ohio, 38th Ohio and Battery B, Ohio 
artillery 
London: 3rd Ky. infantry, 1st and 2!1d Tennessee infantry. 
lebanon: 10th Indiana infantry, 2nd Ky. infantry, 14th Ohio infantry, 
with Battery C, Ohio artillery, and 2 Kentucky infantry reg-
iments en route. (78) 
By November 26th, the Confederate and Federal forces 
were again faCing eaCh other, this time along the shores of the 
Cumberland River in a more fertile valley, instead of in an almost 
bare mountain oountry. The first reported skirmish in the new po-
sition took place on November 26th, between Col. Hoskin's pickets 
and General Zollicoffer's, their two oamps being 12 miles apart and 
on opposite banks of the river. 4 of the Confederates were killed. 
001. Hoskins reported that he had destroyed all the boats on the 
river for several miles above and below his camp and that General 
2:ollico ffer had only two very small boats with which to cross at 
Mill Springs. (79) On December 2nd, Gen. Zolliooffer took 4 
pieces of artillery up the river) miles to a position opposite 
Oamp Hoskins and when he opened fire, shelled the Unionists out of 
their encampment. V~hen this force retired, General Schoepf, hear-
ing the Confederates had constructed boats and were planning to 
oross the river at Mill Springs, ordered the 17th Ohio and part of 
','lolford's cavalry to take up a position opposite Mill .;)prings. 
This order was disobeyed. A small cavalry foroe of the Oonfederates 
was enoountered and the Union troops fell back to oamp on the .li'ish-
ing Creek. Fishing Creek, between Mill Springs and Somer.et, runs 
into the Oumber1and 5 miles avove Mill Springs. It is 30 miles long 
and runs in a deep ravine. It can be orossed at 2 ~laoest one 7 
miles from the junction with the Cumberland and·one 11 miles up. 
The Unionists had fortified the one higher up and had a force near 
~I the one only 7 mile~ up. On the 7th of December, the Confederate 
fi l: cavalry crossed at both planes, finding the enemy had fallon back. 
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General Schoepf, finding his position at F1shi,ng Creek untenable as 
it was flanked by 3 roads, had fallen back to a position 3 miles be-
yond ~omerset which cuuld be held by his small force and which com-
manded the roads to Stanford and Crab Orchard. (SO) 
On the 8th of December, the Oonfederate cavalry en-
countered some cavalry and infantry pickets in the fortifications 
at the Fishing Creek crossing. The oavalry picket of the Unionists 
fled in confusion and refused to aid the infantry picket (35th Ohio) 
who, being in an open field, after forming and delivering 3 volleys, 
retreated to the woods and. returned to camp in small parties. The 
Ohio company lost 1 killed, 1 wounded and 15 missing. Oonfederate 
loss was reported at·1 wounded and 2 horses killed. (81) 
Meanwhile General Z011icoffer had. cavalry patrolling 
the south side of the rive. as far as Burkesville. His forces, con-
siated of ~ infantry regiments, 18 oavalry oompanies and one 6-
pounder battery of 8 guns, and as General Sohoepf's order to ocoupy 
the ground opposite Mill Springs had failed in execution, General 
Zollicoffer now had his foroes about equally divided, some on each 
side of the river. (82) 
On Deoember 3rd,' General J. T. .3oyle had been ordered 
to Oolumbia with orders to throw out his pickets towards the Cumber-
land. On the -th (date not given in report), the Confederate pioket 
1fw"-' 
at Creelsborough was fired at across the river and by some men in 
" a boat. 2 men in the boat were killed and the Confeder~tes lost a 
horse. On the 9th and 10th, Union pickets fired from the north bank 
of the river at the Gonfedera te oav&lry patrolling Rowena, 30 miles 
below lUll Springs. On the 11th an expedi tion of Southern oavalry 
was sent to the north bank, which killed ,3 and captured 11 Home 
Guards. On the 13th a similar party of cavalry wllich had orossed 
the sOilth fork of the Oumberland were fired on, losing 1 ki lIed 
and 1 wounded (83) 
When General Sohoepf had requested re-enforcements, 
22. 
the two Tennessee regiments at London had been· sent to re-enforoe 
him. It had been almost impossible to subsist them at London, as 
the oountry surrounding oould sUP111y nothing and the roads were 
so bad that transportation from Crab Orohard was diffioult. (84) 
On Deoember 18th at sunrise, General Schoepf left 
Somerset with 3 regiments and 4 pieces of artillery, goine towards 
Mill Springs. After advanoing 3 miles the road became impassable 
for the artillery whioh was left. The infantry advanoed 6 miles 
farther to within ~ miles of Mill Springs and there met the Oon-
federate oavalry and a few shots were exohanged. General Carter, 
with 2 regiments and 2 pieces of artillery at the same time advan-
oed by a road farther south and almost parallel to the one taken 
by General Sohoepf( both were on the north bank of the Cumberland) 
He too met wi th about 80 of the Confederate oavalry but having 
only infantry, had to use his artiller,i at long ragge aoross Fish-
ing Creek to disperse the cavalry, who S oen fled. (85) 
On Decamber 16th, Major General G. B. Crittenden, 
who had been assigned to oommand of the foroes at Oumberland Gap on 
november 11th (S6), telegraphed the Confederate War Depart::rellt from 
KnOXVille that General Zolliooffer was threatened by very superior 
forces in front and on his left flank and that he had been ordered 
to recross the river.{S7) This order W83 not obeyed however, as 
General Zollicoffer's means of orossing were too limited to attempt 
~: it in face of the enemy. 
On December 27th, Col. Bramlette at Columbia re-
ported that he was threatened by a force from Jarrestown, Tenn. and 
. . 
that it was reported that the Confederate force was movinr, towards 
Burkesville. (88) Wiring General Buell for instruotions, General 
~ 
Thomas " ordered to move forward, not to re-enforoe Col. Bramlette 
but to form a oonjunotion with General Scho~pf and attack the Oon-
federates on their left flank while Genl. Sohoepf attacks in front. 
the 




·General 1'homns wa3 sone time in reachi:1C Columbia, 
but on Jan'..l"ri,r 10th, he left there en route towa;'ds Somerset. The 
rains had rendered the roads so im~)assable that in 3 days he had 
advanced only 16 miles to 1,'lebb' s Cross Roads. General Thomas sai,i the 
road was the worst he had ever seen. On January 17th, General Suell 
issued peremptory orders to General ~homa3 to proceed, not to Bom-
erset but to a position direct ly in .front of the enemy at Beech 
Grove and r.iill Springs and further t old General Thomas it was not 
enou@1 to hold General Zollicoffer in check but his forces must be 
captured or dispersed. (90) 
';.'hile the Federal troops were moving forwarJ., Gen-
eral Crittenden had arrived and ass-wmed co~nand at will Springs. 
N 
~re realized fully his orecaious posit ion. If he were attacked by 
~ A 
a superior force, te could only recross the river at great loss. 
His comrnand was so isolated that he could not hope for re-en-
forcements of any kind. On January 13th a battery of artillery had 
bel)Yl ordered to Jamestown, Ky., by Gener,1l Buell, to support General 
30yle so the possibility of supplies reaching the Confederates from 
Nashtille had disappeared. ·:-re was out of reach of the cQr:1.'Tlissary at 
Knoxville and ber,ind him lay barrAn momltain counties. On learninG 
th'1.t General Thomas had reached'Logan's Cross Roads, 10 miles north 
of Beech Grove on the night of Ja~uary 17th, Gener~l Crittenden 
called a conference of his officers. It vias decided to advance the 
next morning 'and attack Gener;ll ,Thomas before General Jchoepf could' 
join him from Somerset. The streams were so swollen from the reCe!lt 
rains that it wa, hoped Gener'll Schoepf ;'!ould be unable to cross 
Fishing Creek. (91) 
Vi'hen General Thomas encampe.d at Logan' s ~ross Roads 
the night of the l7ti:, the 4th and l&th ~:entucky, the 14th Ohio and 
the 18th U. S. regul':.rs had not come up. He decided to a'wait them at 
the cross roads and also to 'wait here to eet int 0 connnunication with 
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General Schoepf before advancing. The 10th Indiana, ~olford's cavalry 
and one battery of artillery took the most advanced position on the 
road leading to Beech Grove and Col. Manson, commanding, placed 
strong pickets 2 miles ~~rther in advance. At 2 o'clock on the morn-
ing of the 18th a few of the Confederate cavalry approached these 
pickets and opened fire but when it was returned they fell back. 
General Schoepf visited General Thomas during the day and received 
orders to send 1 battery, the 12th Kentucky and the Igt and 2nd 
Tennessee regiments to support General Thomas until his own troops 
came up. The 14th Ohio and the 10th Kentucky, on arrival, had 
been ordered forward on the"Ro~rts post and Danville road to cap-
ture a large train of forage wagons. On the same day the 4th Ken-
tucky and a battalion of Michigan engineers with another artillery 
battery joined General Thomas. ( 92) 
Such were the Union forces. At midnight, Jan. 18th, 
Geners1 Crittenden's forces moved out of Beech Grove in the following 
order: 
"1st. The brigade of General Zollicoffer, in the following order: In 
front, the independent cavalry comapnies of Captains Saunders and 
" \ 
Bledsoe; then the 15th 1fississippi regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. 
Walthall; then the 19th Tennessee, com.>nanded by Col. D. H. Cum-
mings; then the 20th ~ennessee, comnanded by Col. Battle; then the 
25th Tennessee, commanded by Gol. S. S. Stanton; then 4 guns of Rut-
ledge's bat. tery, commanded by Captain Rutledge. 
2nd." The brigade of General Carroll in this order: "in front, the 
17th Tennessee, commanded by Lt.-Col. Miller; then the 28th Tennes-
see, commanded by Col. Murr~; then the 29th Tennessee, co~~ded 
by Col. Powell; then 2 guns of 1~Clung's battery, commanded by Capt. 
McOlung. 
In retJ.r were the 16th Alabama, as a reserve, co~'Ua..'1.ded by Col. W. B. 
Wood, and the cavalry battalions of Lt.-COl. Branner and Lt.-Col. 
McClellan."(93) 
25. 
On the morning of the 19th about daybreak the pickets 
of Wolford's cavalry were fired upon by the advancing forces of tbe 
Confederates. They fell back slowly and notified Col. Manson. Col. 
Hanson· immediately formed his own regiment, the lOth Indiana, on the 
road to await theatt8ck, he then hurried to the tent of Col Frl, 
and ordered him to form BlL regiment, the 4th Kentucky, to meet the 
attack. Col. Manson then went in person to inform General Thomas of 
the advance. The General immediately ordered him back to his com-
mand and it is indicative of General Thomas' belief in discipline 
that in spite of the fact that Col. :Jc'1nson fought gallantly and 
helped to achieve a"Union victory, General lhomas afterwards had 
him arres ted for leaving hi s .command at such a time, ins t ead 0 f 
sending an aide to noti fy the commanding officer. General Thomas 
ordered the other troops to the sup)ort of the 10th Indiana and 4th 
Kentucky, leaving the engineers and 1 company of the 38th Ohio as 
• 
a guard for tie camp. Col. Fry immediately filed his regiment 
threough a hole in the fence to a high point parallel to and near 
the fence, in a field to the left of the road. The enemw were con-
cealed in a ravine immediately ahead and on the opposite hill about 
259 ye~rds aw~. The Southerners attempted to flank Col. F~Jts 
men on their left but he ordered two companies to head them off and 
continued to hold his position. A section of artillery and the 
Tennessee brigade ( 12th Ky. and 1st and 2nd Tenn.) were ordered to 
attack the Confederates on their right while the 2nd Minnesota and 
the 9th Ohio r~laced the 4th Kentucky and 16th Indiana, who were 
nearly out of ammunition. For nearly half an hour neither side 
gained while .the firing was kept up on both sides. Then the 9th 
OhiO, shouting as they ran, charged with thtir b~yonets and at that 
attack the enemy column wavered and fell back in disorder and confu-
sion. At the fence at the end of the field they rallied somewhat 
but were forced baok in great confusion and throwing away ·theire-
quipment and arms t1'ley beat a rapid and di sorderly retreat towards 
Beeoh Grove. During the battle, the forces were very close together. 
In going through the woods, 001 Fry met an officer wearing a rain-
26. 
ooat which completely covered his uniform. This man said to Col. Fry 
"Jre mustn't fire on our own menlt • Col. Fry answered, "Of course not." 
Just then the Officer's aide appeared and firing, killed Col. FrJ's 
horse. Realizing the officer was a Confederate, 001. ~'ry fired and 
his man fell. It proved to be General Zollicoffer. His death con-
tributed greatly to the confusion and dismay of the Southerners, 
who seemed at a loss without their leader. 
General Thomas' entire command pursued the retreat-
iug army and by night the artillery batteries were in posit ion shell-
ing the encampments at Beech Grove and Mill Springs. General Schoepf 
arrived the ni~t of the 19th with the 17th, 31st, and 38th Ohio. 
They had crossed F:shing Creek on a cable, each man going hand over 
hand. On advancing the next morning, the Unionists found that the 
ent ire force had crossed the ri verdllring the night and had burned 
the boars, so that pursuit was for the time being impossible. So 
pr~oipitate had been the flight that no attempt had been made to 
destroy any of the stores, the oamp or anythingelse. The fliEtlt 
was made with no semblance of order or discipline, many of the 
troops going to their homes in tennessee. The Federal loss was 
19 killed and 127 wounded. The Confederate loss as reported by 
General Orittenden was 125 killed, 309 wounded and 99 missing. 
General Thomas reported the Confederate loss so far as known as 
192 killed, 89 prisoners wounded and 68 not wounded. All the Fed-
eral cozmnanders in making their reports comment on the bravery of 
the Southerners. General Crittenden said that many of his men 
were forced to throw down their arms since many were using flint 
lock muskets which were rendered absolutely useless by the hewry 
rain which fell during part Of the engagement. The engagement lasted 
about ~. hours and represented a very real victory for the Union 
army. It was probably the most imp?rtant engagement on Kentucky soil 
before the battles of Richmond and Perryville. (94) 
General Crittenden's command was utterly demoralized. 
Some of the newspapers s.tated that many of the men reached nashville 
27. 
before they stopped retreating. General Crittenden strove to reor-
ganize his army at Gainesboro, Tennessee, the while he was subjected 
to the most severe and unjust criticism. The desire to place the 
blame on someone resulted in the most violent accusations against 
General Crit tenden, -- that he was drunk the entire time, that he 
advanced against the advice of his Officers, etc. (95) So over-
whelming was the blame heaped upon him and so vi,tuperous were the 
newspaper attacks that General Crittenden demanded and was accorded 
a Board of Inquiry which acquitted him of all blame. For had he 
failed to attack and awaited the comvined advance of Generals Thomas 
and Schoe~f, his entire force would probably have been forced to 
surrender and the loss to the Confederate army been still greater. 
But, although he was raised .in rank to a Major-Generalcy, he had 
lost the confidence 0 f the people and his men and on Feb. 26th, 
1862, General Kirby Smith succeeded him as comnander of the district 
of ~ast Tennessee. (96) 
V:i th the victory at Mill Springs and the precipitate 
flight of the defeated Confederate forces, the mountains in south-
e, "tern Kentucky were cleared of all Confederate troops e>:cept a s:nall 
garrison defending the impregnable Cumberland Gap. General Buell 
planned to operat,e into East ':'ennessee with General Garter's brig3.de 
against Cumberland Gap, and a strong force under General Schoepf 
through Monticello, Ky., and Jamestown, ':'enn. On Jamuary ~6th, Gen-
eralGarter was ordered to London, Ky., a.."1d General Schoepf to r.lont-
icello. (97) On Jan. 31st, General Buell countermanded his order 
for the movement of General Schoepf's brigade and on Feb. 6th, Gen-
eral 'Thomas , entire command, except the brigade at London, was or-
dered to Lebanon. One regiment, Col •. Landrum' s, was left to guard 
the stores at Mill Springs. (In their flight the Confederates had 
made no effort to destroy the lar,'e quant Hies of stores at Mi 11 
Springs, which represented no small part of the victory) ':'hus ended 
tJ;Je first attempt of th e Federal forces to cont roi Cumberland Gap 
and to reach ~ast Tennessee. (9a)· 
28. 
Gener:ll Buell t s reasons for ordering the abandonment 
of the movemElYlt through ~ont leo110 nre set forth in c ons id8r~ble 
length in a letter of General McClelland. w1'i tten on February 1, 186.2. 
Ee says, "The obstacles 1 have had to fight against are the W'1ut of 
transportation and the condition of the roads. The forr::1er along has 
been an insuperable obstacle to an advance into -C:ast '.:'enYlesse,e, and 
when that i's overcome I feel it my d~,lty to tell you, with the Ugh t 
of the experience T",(,: are noaw having. t:lat the latter will effect.l-
ally bar o"J.r progress in ti:at direction on a fo;,ting \":hich will 
promise anything but fC!i1urA. I will give you my reasons; yO"J. C~ln 
,judf"e what they are worth: 
It is 200 miles or thereabo"J.ts from our depots(at the terminus 
of the railroad) to Knoxville or the nearest point on the 'l'ennessee 
Railroad. A.t the best supplies are meager along the whole ro::tte, and 
if th:ey suffice for a trip or two must by that time be entirely ex-
hausted for any dist ance that we can reach a.long both sides of the 
road. 
From Bomerset to Jacksborough we will s:::arcely find any at all. 
East 'i'ennessee is al::lOst ont irely stripped of wheat by the enemy. 
In the prod',wtive region there is still a small surplus of corn and 
\':heat. We must supply tlio-thifds of tte ration from o',r depots here, 
and we must of course depend on them also for our ordnance and other 
stores. It will take 1,000 wr'gons constantly Loing to sUp[lly 10,000 
men. '.7e can judge of the effect of that amount of h3.uling on the 
dirt roads of this country by the experience we have already had. 
Forty of the 80 miles from Lebanon to Somerqet are of that sort of 
road, and it is evident that it \'!ould soon becorn impassa1)le, to ob-
viate 'Nhich 1 have fi va regiments noVi engaged in corduroyinc it 
throughout; but it is a tedious work, too much so to be undertaken 
on the i"lhole route to East ~ennessee4 If the number of troops and con-
sequently the amount of 'hauling is increased the di fficulty is in-
creased in a greater~proportion. The limited amount of forage on the 
route will be speedily exhausted, as besides provisions for our men 
to 
we must have forage for our animals; a thing that is not be thought 
" 
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In my previous letter I set down 3 divisions (s~ 30,000 ef-
fective force) as the force that wO'.lld be required for East Tennessee, 
two to penetrate the country and one to keep open communications. I 
believe that is the least force that will suffice, and it oug5t to 
be able to establish itself promptly before it can be antiCipated by 
a force of the enemy sufficient to make the result doubtful. \7ith 
railroads converging from the east, west, and south, it ought not 
to be difficult for them to get a pretty formidable force in that coun-
I 
try in te~ days. The people of EDst Tennessee are loyal~ and wi 11 
I 
I 
remain so~ though submitti~g to the power that has SUbjugated them. 
\ 
They will rise whenever they can see themselved properly supported 
and we can put arms in their hands, but not before in any efficient 
manner. It would be cruel to induce them to do so on any other c'on-
ditions. 
For the reasons 1 have stated 1 have been forced reluctantly to 
the c'onviction that an advance into East Tennessee is impract icable 
at this time on any scale which will be sufficient. I have ordered 
General Carter's brigade to move on the Gap, but I fear very much 
that even that will be compa lled to fall back for supplies, such is 
the condition of the roads over which they have to be hauled." (100) 
General Carter moved from London down to Cumberland 
Ford and on February 14th, l862,a reconnaissance was made from this 
point towards Cumberland Gap by the First Battalion Kentucky Cavalry 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Mundy. 
aIry picket, killing 5, wounding 
securing 8 horses and some arms. 
They attacked the Confederate cav-
2 and taking 2 prisoners,besides 
.. 
On avancing within range of the 
A 
artillery at the Gap, the :';onfederate guns were trained on them and 
they were forced to retreat. At this time General Car.ter had 7 reg-
iments in his camp and the Confederate garrison at the Gap consisted 
of only 2, the 4th and 11th Tennessee regiments. Col. Rains t in charge 
of the post, requested re-enforcements. He expected an immediate at-
~.,..,..~ 
tack, but a heavy snoW fall followed by constant rains kept the ~ 
from advancing. On the 18th, hearing that 3 regiments are advane.ing 
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to his supoort, he said that if they arrive before he is attacked, 
the fortification can be held against any attack from the front. He 
urged that the other mountain gaps be guarded along the East Tennes-
see border. (101) r 
L1.. 
On March 3rd, Gener:=,l Carter again plamed to advance, 
having built boats to cross the river which was not fordable. Again 
rain fell and the creeks and the river became so swollen as to ren-
der the roads absolutely impassable. The bridge over Clear Creek was 
covered and on discovering this, General Carter countermanded his 
order to advance. General Carter reported his effective force at a-
bout 3,300 men. He also said that his men were on short rations and 
if the bad weather continued it would be impo~sible to get supglies 
to them. (102 J On March9th, General Carter repol't.dthat about 1000 
East Tennesseans had arrived in the neiGhborhood of his camp and 
that most ~f them hactentered the service, -- so tha.t in a short 
wvvJ.J 
time he w*l have 2 new regiments. (103) About the same time Gen-
eral Carter wrote tc Colonel Garfield at Piketon, suggesting that he 
go through Pound Gap and attack Cumberland Gap from the rear while 
he,Carter, attacked from the front. By March 23rd, however, General 
Buell had ordered Col. Garfield, now General, to Bardsto\\'Il, Ky. He 
planned to send him with his forces to strengthen the Cumberland Gap 
expedition, of which Garfield *a."l to be placed in command. (104) 
On March 26th, however, Brigadier-General George 'H. Morgan was placed 
in command of the Seventh Division of the Army of the OhiO, to be com-
posed of the troops under Gener~ll Carter at Cclmberland Ford, the 33rd 
Indiana, 19th Kentucky and Foster's \Visconsin Battery then en route 
to Bardstown from eastern Kentucky. General Garfield wa.s ordered to 
report in person to General Buell (105) 
'ii'hile General Buell was arranging for additions to the 
force at Cumberland Ford, General Carter was bending every. effort to 
secure the success of his OOiUn1I1 and the seizure of the Gap. On :Jarch 
8th, learning of a rebel force in the vicinity of Big Creek Gap, Gen-
9ra1 Carter despatched a force conSisting of the Second East Tennessee 
and the 49th Indiana and a detachment of the First Battalion, Ky. cav-
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alry, under 001 James Carter, to disperes them. They marched via 
Boston, Ky., to Big Creek Gap. On arriving at the northern end of 
the Gap they learned that the force on the ~ennessee side was two 
companies of the First Tennessee cavalry, C. S. A. The road, block-
aded some time before by Zollicoffer's men, prevented the advance of 
the cavalry who were therefore ordered around by another road. ~he 
infantry were divided into two com~nds, and at 9 p. m. started tteir 
march across the mountains, a di stance of only 9 miles. The row.s 
were steep however, and s orne of the infantry got lost. ~\bout 1300 
l ) men arrived at the rebel camp at day break and completely surprised 
them. After a skirmish of about 5 minutes the Oonfederate cavalry 
fled. They sustained a loss of 5 killed, 15 wounded and 15 prison-
ers. The Union troops marched.on to Jacksboro, a tovm 5 miles a-
way, and after raising the Union flag, proceded to Fincastle and 
then to Woodson's Gap. In this neighborhood the troops destroyed 
a saltpeter works. destroying also 1000 pounds of saltpeter and 
11000 pounds 'of bacon. On the 19th, Col. Carter received an order 
to return as a Confederate force had been sent out to attack him. 
(106) On hearing of this advance of the Federal troops, General 
Kirby Smith had sent 2000 troops under Col Leadbetter to Clinton 
. while he himself went to Cumberland Gap, collected all the force 
that could be spared and on the 18th started for Jacksboro. Find-
ing that the enemy had retired When he reached Woodson's Gap, the 
troops were returned to the Gap while General Smith returned to 
K~ N~ville. (107) 
At Cumberland Ford, General Carter, hearing that 
part of the garrison had been withdrawn to att':ck the force be had 
placed at \'loodson' s Gap. decided to attack Oumberland Gap before 
the regiments withdrawn could have returned. Acoordinely, General 
Carter gave orders for the following force to be ready to march on 
the morning of the 21st: 1st Bast 'renn., 7th Ky., 16th 8hio. 49th 
Indiana a.'ld First Battalion of Ky. cavalry with one section(2guns 
of the Ninth Ohio Battery. When they had advanced within 2 miles of 
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the Gap, Ge~eral Carter was overtaken by a Blessenger telling him 
the 4 Confederate regiI:lent s, b/ forced I:larches, had re turned to 
the Gap. "!1ealizing the useless of an attack under those conditions, 
Gener~l Carter determinpd to remain in fron of the Gap for a day or 
so to examine the fortifications. He advanced on tlie 30utherners' 
right and bi vou~lcked for the night close to their li!1e of d.efense. 
~he next morninr the 16th Ohio \·;ere sent out as skirmishers and 
soon drove the Jonfederates from the woods into their lines. 1he 
Confederate rifle!':len ,,:ere protected by rifle pits. The two funs 
were place in position <iirectly in front of the Gap and continued 
firing all afternoon.~hree regiments of infantry occupied the 
same ridge as the runs. ~his fire was returned from seven different 
works, one on the top of the Cumberland :.lountains to the left of the 
Gap. one on the side 0 f the mountain, also to the left; one in the 
G~p and four on the right or west side of the Gap. In the after-
noon the 49th Indiana were deployed on the right where they discovered 
another battery which opened up on them but failed to do any drtlTlage. 
The Union troops again passed the night in front of the Gap but moved 
the next morning on their way bE-ck to the Ford. ~hey had encamped 
both nigh t s in the snow and sleet and had. endcU'ed nany hardships. ( 108) 
General Jarter addf~that in hiS opinion the only way to tnke the Gap 
is by a flank movement and attcck on the Tennessee side. 
1.'lhen General Iilorgan went in to Kentucky tot ake charge 
of the division at Cumberland Gap, he found the roads from Grab Orchard 
and ~ount Vernon almost impass~ble. He drove from Lexington in an oDen buggy 
in order to arrive as quickly as possible. He wrote of the trip, "At 
many places the narrow roads, walled in by the mountains, had become 
torrents and sll1!D.etimes the horses were obliged to swim." 
General !,!organ found the country around had been en-
tirely exhnusted by the occupation of Carter's Gornoand and by the pre-
vious foraging of the entew. It was necessary to haul forar;e from 
30,40,and 50 miles ~nd at last from a distance of 80 and 90 miles. 
General Morgan increased the number of ~~s from G to 22, the worth-
less arms were replaced by new ones, a supply of ammlnition secured 
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and a floating bridge was built across the Cumberland river. Means 
of supplying the troops with fresh meat were secured, since some of 
the !!len had not tasted meat for several months and were threatened 
mth ,scurvy. 
As soon as he arrived at Cumberland Ford, April 11th, 
General Morgan made a reconnaissance of the enemy's pos it ion and was 
convinced that the enemy had grouped too many of his forti fications 
on the le ft of the Gap, depending too much on the natural strength 
of the right. He disc,overed a knob to the right of one fort ification 
(Ft. Pitts) and believed that if he could but occupy that hill with 
siege guns he could take the Gap. He ordered an armed reconnaissance 
by the brigades of General Carter and Col. de Courcy. Although the 
men were ordered to avoid a skirmish if pOSSible, they Vlere attacked 
by the Confederates and lost 1 man mortally and several slightly 
wounded. General Morgan reported the Confederate loss as 7 killed 
and 8 wounded and branded as an untruth the statement in the South-
ern papers that his loss was 150 killed and 300 wounded and the 
Qonfederate loss 30. 
Morgan's plan of attacking the Rap from the ~;orth was 
never put into execution for before his Siege guns arrived, the 0on-
federate engineer constructed a strong work nrotected by ri fle pits, 
, -
on the summit to the right of Ft. Pitts, thus rendering his chosen 
hill an untenable position. General Morg,an therefore resolved to 
execute a flank movement and force the enemy to evacuate his position 
by cutting off his line of supplies and communication, or else to 
come out for a fight in the open field. This seemed and was believed 
by many to be an impossible manoeuvre. It was universal~y tho~lrht 
that the route through Cumberland Gap YlaS the only one within a range 
of 80 miles for the passing of an army with cannon. In addi tion it 
:neant putting the lOOn on half rations and letting the horses go wi th-
out for:-',"e much of the time. Nevertheles~, Genellal Morgan 'determined 
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on this attempt. The mountnins east of the Gumberland Gap 'Clere so 
impass[<,hle a:1 to be out of the question; on the west \'lere Baptist, 
Roger's and Big Cre~k Gaps, 'which were generally used only as bridle 
paths, though light wagons had be8n known to pas::> through them. All 
were at this time strongly blockaded. 
Abont the 18th of May, to divert the:::onfederate's 
attention from his real plan and to threaten his supply depot at 
Clinton, Tenn., General Morgan sent General Spears with 6 regiments 
to camp at the commencement of the 18 miles of blockade at the foot 
of Pine :'lountain, on the route to Big Greek Gap a..'1d 35 miles west of 
Bat-ton 
Cumberland Gap. Genr:ral hxH~j:U!±Xh immediately occupied the front 
of Big Creek Gap with 2 brigades of infantry, 2 regiments of cavalry 
and two batteries of artillery. General I,~orga.n planned to cross 
Pine Mountain and. go through Roger's Gap which is 20 miles west of 
C~~berland Gap, 15 miles east of Big Creek Gap and 39 miles south-
west of Cumberland Ford and which enters Powell valley immediately 
opposite the mouth of the road leading to Knoxville. This imvortant 
have 
pOint would threatened the Gap, Clinton and Knoxville. General Car-
/!It 
ter was to be left to guard the Ford, while General Morgan attacked in 
front and General Spears led the attack on the rear. But before this 
plan had gone into execut ion, ~s soon in fact as they had crossed the 
Cumberland River, General Barton withdrew from Big Creek to C'~ber-
land Gap.Foiled in this strategy also, General Morgan next determined 
to abandon entirely his position :..t:::umberland Ford and advance his 
whole force over the mountains. His first preparation for this at-
t)lck was to h.'we the sides of the Pine mountain mined to kpep the 
Southerners from attempting to strike at his line of supplies. ~hese 
mines were never sprung. 
V,'hile General Morgan was carefully laying his plans 
and bending all his energies for a forward movement, Genernl Kirby 
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Smith was not idle in preparing to counter the attack if he could 
not forestall it. ()n March 10th he reported to PreSident Davis that 
the force in East Tennessee was 'badly disorganized. There had been 
no one in command since General Crittenden left in January to join 
General Zollicoffer at ttlll Springs. Regiments and small squads of 
soldiers were acting entirely independently and without any miiitary 
organization or restrai:!it. 1ilost of the troops were only twelve 
) , 
months volunteers and particularly the East Tennesseans could not 
be ind~ced to orgapize for the war. (109) On April 15th, General 
3mi th reported th at he had under 2000 men at the Gap, 2500 at Chat-
tanooga and 2500 scattered elsewhere in his department.(llm) ~~d 
on the 17th, he wrote General Stevenson, ~no had assumed command of 
the garrison at Oumberland Gap, that as all available troops in the 
department had been sent to Corinth, he must not look for re-enforce-
ments. He assured General Stevenson that in case an attack was made 
on the rear of Cumberland Gap, he would send him every man he could 
from Knoxville. (111) On April 20th General Smith asked for re-en-
forcements, saying 7000 East Tennesseans had gone over to join Gener-
a1 :ilorgnn' s forces at Cumberland Ford and that additional troops had 
a.1so arrived there from the valley of the Sandy (Garfield's brigade). 
(112) The mxt day he wrote t,o General Humphrey Marshall at Abingdon, 
i 
Virginia, asking his cooperation in defending Cumberland Gap. (113) 
On May 28th, :jeneral 3mi th made a report of his department to the War 
Department at Richmond as follows: "My troops at Cumberland Gap and 
in Powell '5 Valley number some 7000 and this is really the effective 
force of my command. It has effectually baffled every effort made 
b7 the enemy to cross the Cumberland Range, and by bei~g kept con-
stant1y in motion has impressed him with an exaggerated idea of its 
magnitude. This command, composed of new levies from ~ennessee, 
Northern Alab~~, and Georgia troops, has been afflicted with almost 
every disease inCident to camp life. l,'lith a paper force of 17000, 
scarcely 8000 are effective; regiments 800 and 900 strong report 
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only 200 or 300 for duty. A decided improvement in the health of the 
"tPlIl'11and is now perceptible and a daily increase in the effective force 
is reported. ~he arms of the sick have been issaed,so as to keep 
every gun in service. There are still, with new troops and recruits, 
about 3000 effective men in the department unsupplied. This, with the 
sick .. IDO are returning to duty, calls for a supply of at least 5000 
anns, which should be furnished as soon as practicable. The effective 
force under. General Leadbetter at Ohattanooga is about. 900 infantry, 
400 cavalry, and 8 pieces of light artillery. ~he inadequaoy of the 
foroe at Chattanooga and my inability to re-enforce it is a matter of 
serious anxiety." (114) 
On June 6th, General Stevenson at the Gnp was informed 
that two columns 
and .that Oolonel 
of the Uniontroops were .advancing on Chattanooga 
h'ld 
Reynolds been ordered from Powell's valley to Chat-
'" 
tanooga and General Barton to Olinton. Should Chattanooe;a fa.11 and 
East Tennessee be abandoned, General Stevenson's line of retreat was 
II.,. 
to be via Abingdon, Virginia. (~) 
On the saIne day, June 6th, General George Morgan be-
gan his famous march over the Oumberland mountains, one of the most 
intere3ting and romantic happenings of the war in the west. His line 
of march placed the First Battalion, Kentucky Oavalry, Col. Munday's, 
in advanoe followed by the 3rd Ky. lnfantry, -- these as an advance 
~lard; next came the siege guns, a battery of artillery and de Courcy's 
brigade; next, another brigade of infantry ( Baird's) with Wetmore's 
battery of artillery. Carter's brigade and Lanphere's battery acted • 
as a rear guard. Heavy fatigue parties were constantly employed in 
front in making and repairing roads, which were again blockaded after 
the rear guard had passed. Gener~l Morgan said it was arn~sing to see 
the astonishment of the people at the passar,e of enormous cannon over 
roads regarded by them as difficult and dangerous for lightly-laden 
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wagons. Old men, women and children flocked to the roadside and every 
where the troops were hailed with delight. 
On the 9th, General Spears had been ordered to olear the 
blockade from the Big Creek Gap and advance b;r the Val1fY road to 
join General Morgan at Roger's Gap. He was further instructed next 
day to send 200 men unde~ a daring officer to burn the railroad 
bridge over the Tennessee river at Loudon,but thi.s undertaking failed 
as Loudon was occupied by two Confederate regiments. 
On the 10th, the brigades of de Courcy and Baird en-
oamped on the north side of the Cumberland mountains and on the fol-
lowing day they .descended into Powell's Vall ey and oamped in a dense 
forest which screened their position. 
3eneral Buell, in reply to a request from General :,Iorgan, 
telegraphed the latter that General negley was fully employed in 
Middle Tennessee and that while he was opposite Chattanooga his 
stay could not be depended upon and he oouldrender General Morgan no 
assistance. He added, "The force now in Tennessee is so small that 
no offensive operations against East Tennessee can be attempted, and 
you nr..tst therefore depend· mainly on your own resources." This was 
received by General Morgan on the 9th ~nen he was at Lambdin's, a farm 
house 21 miles southwest of Barbourviile, Ky. ~o this the General re-
plied that he had gone too far to withdraw, that a retrograde move-
ment would impair the morale of his troops and that his one hope of 
suocess lay in a bold and daring p6lioy. On the.llth, General Mor-
gan proceeded to descend tr,e south side of the mountains with his ad-
b~~ce guard, de Courcy's brigade. This passage consumed a ~hole day 
and night. The night of the 12th General !.lorgan received another tel-
egram from the commanding General which he regarded as a definite co~ 
mand to fall back. " It read: Considering your force and that o~posed 
to you, it will probably not be safe for you to ·undertake any extended 
offensive operations. Other operations v~ll soon have an influence 
upon your deSigns and it is therefore better for you to run no risk 
at present." General Morgan perforce gave up his campaign and ordered 
a countermarch to Williamsburg, Ky. 
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He himself, returned to Lambdin's to meet General Carter's column 
which had not yet passed over the mountain and he also sent a cour-
ier to General Spears to stop his advanoe. Col. de Courcy's bri-
gade had been detained 'in Powell's Valley by the f3.ct that the 
mountain road was blocked by the cannon wld soon a message came from 
him with news that Cumberland Gap was being evacuated. At the same 
time word was racei ved of the evacunti on of 3ig Greek Gap. 7/hen this 
information wa3 transmitted to General Buell, he replied with a 
rather non-commital permission to proceed, promising that General 
:.a tChell should threaten Chattanooga but warning General Morgan that 
he would have only his own command to rely upon. Upon this some-
what ambiguous statement, General Morgan again issued orders for the 
advarlce. 
General Carter was instructed to join his command-
. ing officer at Roger's Gap, via Big Greek Gap where General 3pears 
was to await him. Baird's brigade, although it had completed ~he 
retrograde movement was again ordered to cross tte mountain and in 
spi te of the h.'3rdship involved, cheerfully moved up. 
By the 15th, 3aird's and deCo'~cy's troo~s were at 
the foot of Roger's Gap and since the Powell Val Jey was full of Oon-
federate cavalry the sllp-nly trains were ordered to the rear and the 
men were forced to subsist on the country. This second advance, ac-
cording to General r.iorgan, wa3 made against the best juo.gment of 3 
of' his brigade commanders, whose opinion he valued highly. 
General Spears'brigade arrived without wagons and 
wi thout tents and as they had cleared the blockade irmnediately be-
fore marching, a day was allowed for rest; General 6arter's cO!1lJ-:land 
had also m.arched 75 miles a'ld needed ada:;' s rest. 
The final advance was made at 1 .!. M. on the morn-
ing of June 18th nlonc two parallel roads, -- tr,e old and nev: 'Tal-
ley roads. On arriv.ing at Thom"is' it was discovered that the Con-
federates had evacuated the post, their rear guard leaving at Ie 
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.1. :.!. and d.e ~ourcyt3 'brigade, the Federal advance, taking posession 
at 2 P. M. ( 116 ) 
Some of the trials experienced by the men in this 
march throu['h the mountains'lre too interesting in their portrayal 
of mou"'1.tain warfare to be overlooked. :'he reports of the officers 
f'1irly bristl~ with their pride in the way tho men withstood hnrd 
labor and many pri vations. As, these rep.orts also cO:'1tain the only 
details of the vnrious skirmishes, a few quot:::tions y;i11 be gIven. 
From the report of ::!apt. Foster, 1st ·.7iscons in 3at-
tery, :lhief of Artillery, comes the following: "Machinery for the 
movement of this battery (Parrot t siege guns), over steel) asccClts 
~nd descents consisted of about 800 feet of 1 inch, laC feet of Ii 
inch rope, 3 large and 2 small snatch blocks, 1 double and 1 sin-
c;le tackle block. :'his WaS all the tackle of any kind that could :Je 
obtained in time to be of any use to move without hindrance to the 
forces of this division.:ro move this battery a distance of 41 miles 
over the ~umberland :.~ormtains and OV0r road.s considered impassable by 
the enemy for light artilJ cry seer:lcd a Leruclean task which the 
heart \'/ould alr!lost shrink from undp.rtaking, for l:Iany of the asce::ts 
vlOuld form an ::111g18 of 30ciegrees ",:ith a horizontal gla::c and this to 
be overcome, knowinG thnt we "';E?re in many instanccs. to make a corre-
spendinr descent. 
On June 7th, Foster's Is t ','lisc ons in Bat tery, 'J.nd\;,r 
com~and of Lt. k:1derson moved forward and beine a lif-ht battcl'Y ToRt 
y:ith b".lt 11 ttle di fficulty thA firo;t few miles. 200 men from the in-
fan try were detailed to 3ssist in overcoming the steep ascents and de-
sce-.lts which was to be done by ropes and pulleys. i'he ropes and 1"11-
leys i7ere in constant ~J.se or readiness and the men Vlere obliged to be 
conJtantly on the alert for the nscents were not only steep but along 
sideling places 'where, 1':e1'e the gun carriag'es on,ce overturned, they 
would have fallen over prr:cipito".ls rocks varyinf in height ,from 100 
to 500 feet. In many instances where the turns in the road mere than 
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at right angles and this up steep sideling ascents rendering it al-
most impossible to turn with teams. At many times was the whole 
force both of men and horses, used upon the same rope. On arriving 
at the top of the 0wnbr:rland Mountains the men and horses seemed 
nearly exhausted, many of the horses being entirely broken down 
and will be '\";orthiess herp-after. 30th men and horses have been 
upon short rations and forage. It was impossible for subsiste!lCe 
and for{:ge trains to follow close u;:Jon the troops over such terd-
bly rugeed roads. l1any of my com.'nand have been the overland route 
to C~lifornia and all concede there was nothing to coml)ure with 
these steep ascents and descents on the route. 
Foster's First ';;isconsin 3attery, which had been 
obl ieed to wni t for an alO!Il1mi t i on train to precede it up th e moun-
tain, started at 5 P. 11. and after workinc hard. throueh the night, 
witb out one moment' 3 rest and part of ttl€' time in almost total d'lr}~­
ness, (the moon being eclipsed), without rations or forage for the 
last 18 hours, ani ved In Powell'.3 V0lley without serious injury 
only overtu.rning a battery wagon and breaki:1g its trail at 3.30 A. 11. 
on the morning of the 12th of June. This was the most difficult 
part of the mountG.in to overcome that we had enc ountered. :i.'he road 
was winding, narrow and very stony nnd steep and all the entire de-
scent very sideling so much so that we were constantly in imminent 
danger of being precipi tated down the almost perpendicular banks over 
. jagged rocks for several hundred feet • in which case it would have 
been sure death to man or beast. 
On the 12th of June we were ordered to countermarch, 
recross the mountain and move to '.Villiamsburg. '::ben this order was 
first known to the men they desired rather to shed their blo Id in 
Tennessee and le8ve their bones bleaching in Powell's Valley than 
to retrace their steps over the mountains; but like good soldiers 
they sadly but resolutely put their shoulders to the wheel~ literally 
and commenced the ascent of the mountain upon the southern siae. 
The 20-pound~r Parrott guns were put in the advance and started at 
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1M 10 o'clock. The raod had become much worn and rutted, loose 
stones had fallen into the track and filled it in places which had 
to be removed, and which r~ndered it almost impossible for the 
horses to get a foothold; but after 11 hours of hard labor the task 
was accomplished and at 1 o'clock, June 13th, we camped at the foot 
of the mountain on the northern side. That same evening orders were 
received to march back to Powell's Valley upon which the soldiers 
fairly yelled with delight and seemed so anxious to return that the~, 
could hardly wait for morning to come .• " 
General Spears reported that when the advance of his 
command, after having opened and removed a heavy blockade through 
Pine and Cumberland Mountains, entered Big Oreek Gap on the evening 
of the 11th, they were fired on by the pickets of the enemy, which 
resulted in a rather severe skirmish. As the troops advanced through 
the Gap the enemy's pickets lying in ambush, fired upon them from 
rocks and other places of conoealment. They were repulsed and 
driven from their ambuscade with a loss of 2 dead and several wounded. 
General Spears' comnand continued its way through the Gap, the men 
sleeping on their arms. The next morning they proceeded with the 
work of opening the blockade, while their advance pickets kept up a 
heavy skirmish with the enemy' 9 cavalry. The Federals captured 3 of 
the Confederates with their horses and equipment and 2 or :3 citizens 
who were aiding the Confederates. No sooner had General Spears ar-
ri ved in the valley than he was ordered to return to his former po-
si tion, which he re-oocupied. Learning that the Confederate cavalry 
were advancing in his rear in considerable force, Col. Spa ars kept 
his men in ambush on eaoh side of the road opposite Big Creek Ford 
and in the mountains. On the morning of the 15th, the pickets were 
attacked but were unable to draw the enemy nfter them, so General 
Spears sent Col. Houk, Cooper and Shelley to th& valley with or-
ders to advance across it and attack the enemy on the ridge, at which 
place they seemed to. be assembled in force. They did so and succeeded 
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in driving them across the Clinch River, alarming them so much that 
they filled the boats with rails, set them on fire and turned them 
loose down the river, then they retreated to Knoxville. The Unien 
soldiers captured some prisoners, some 60 tents, burned and destroyed 
57 others and destroyed about ~800 worth of camp equipage. (118) 
Col. de Oourcy's troops were led through Roger's 
Gap and he says of the fighting done, "The skirmished which took 
place betwixt the enemy's cavalry and the pickets of my brigade 
were not of sufficient importance to demand more than a passing no-
tice. 2iss troops formed the advance guard and first entered the e-
vacuated fort. They found the enemy had destroyed a cons iderable a-
mount of his stores and had thrown several cannon over the cliff, 
had spiked others and taken some away. 7 were found in position. 
The tents had been left standing but were cut into slits. A large 
quantity of stores which they had not had time to destroy were taken 
charge of by the Federals. (119) 
Brigadier-General 3aird in his report said that after 
re-cros3ing the mountains through Roger's Gap for the second time, his 
troops were almost exhausted. He wrote, "By this time the effects of 
severe labor began to be apparent; the feet of .any were blistered and 
these not naturally robust had given out. Our scanty supply of 8 days' 
rations was, moreover, exhausted; yet the men, pleased at the idea of 
moving towards the enemy did not complain. After 2 days' rest we a-
gain advanced, without bread, with coffee for a single meal, and no 
other food but fresh beef which we drove along. It General Baird also 
made this sage remark: "1 have in this connection to commend to the 
notice of the commanding general the patient fortitude with ,;,;hich my 
men, without the stimulus and eclat of successful battle, and not-
withstanding the ,discouraging effects of our countermarch, endured 
the privations they were oalled upon to encounter. 1 beg that he 




the offioers in oommand of the troops carried forward the work. Had 
the identical results whioh have been achieved been oonsequent upon 
a severe strugle, with heaVy loss of life, they would have reoeived 
a reward whioh they oan now only look for in the satisfaotion of hav-
ing done their duty." Another offioer sS¥s, "Although we all would 
have gladly entered an enoounter with the enemy, we as offioers of 
the artillery of this division, belleve that more good results will 
be derived from the bloodless victory th~~ with an encounter, and 
acknowledge that strategy displays more military skill than fields 
stained with blood." 
Such were'the events and opinions ooncerning them, 
viewed from the Northern angle. \~at of the Southerners during 
this time'? So energetio and zealous a 0 OOIl1lander as Kirby Smith 
would never abandon any post without a struggle unless he felt the 
situation so hopeless that he dared not risk his men. 
On June 6th, General Kirby Jmith was faced with a 
very serious dilemna. ~e two stragetio points in his departmmt 
were Oumberland Gap and Chattanooga, separated by 180 miles, -- with 
a diffioult line of oanmunioation. Eaoh was threatened by a foroe 
superior to the entire foroe at his command. To oonoentrate at ei-
ther pOint meant the abandonment of the other. In addition, a he~vy 
column with artillery was reported at McMinnville, Middle :':ennessee, 
threatening Kinrston. 
General Smith had disposed his troops as follows: 
General Stevenson was at the Gap with 400 troops and a good supply of 
previsions, as well as plenty of ammunition. ~he 4000 troops under 
General Barton and Co. Reynolds mo had been operating in Powell's 
Valley and who prevented Morgan's advarloe through the mount!lln passes, 
had. been wi thdrawn. 001. Reynold's brigade went to rail on the 6th 
to Chattanooga. Barton's brigade was ordered to the terminus of the 
Kentuoky railroad, 10 miles south of Jlinton, Tenn, Thus, the whole 
force, with the exoe'pt ion 0 f thegarri son at Cumberland Gap oould be 
oonoentrated by rail at any point between Ohattanoogaand ~orristown. 
~o 
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Jol. Allston's cavalry h::Jd been ordered to Kingston, leaving a small 
force in Po,,"ell 'sValley to watch the roads over the mountains. Two 
regiments had also be8n ordered to Chattanooga from Florida. (120) 
On June 7th, General Barton W3a ordered to follow 1"::01. 
Reynolds to Jhattanooga and Col. Allston wa,a given additional direct-
ions t~ watch the approaches to Knoxville, particularly the cros3ing 
. 
at theJunction of the Powell and Clinch rivers and the intersection of 
the Fincastle road with the road to Cumberland Gap from KnOXVille, 4 
was 
miles beyond Maynardsville. He xx also to watch the mountain passes 
and report any adv~,nce to General Stevenson at the Gap. He was in-
formed th at General Barton had been ordered to leave a small garrison 
at Clinton for his support and told that in case he had to fall back 
before a superior force he was to proceed to Knoxville, probably via 
Clinton (121) 2hat smne day the Unionists opened fire on Chattanooga 
and the Jonfederates apprehended a severe attack. 
On the 11th, General Bart on's com.'!land was s ti 11 at 
Knoxville awaiting transportation and when news ~as received of Mor-
gan's advance into Powell's Valley, he was ordered on the 12th to 
Clinton. He was to destroy all the boats on the Clinch River and 
then to move as rapidly as possible to Tazewell. Col. Reynolds was 
ordered to join him there. A c~valry company was ordered to Maynar'ds-
ville to observe the crossings of the Clinch river from its mouth to 
the crossing of the Knoxvil~ e road. General Barton Wt3S directed to 
leave a small cavalry force at Clinton and to see that the boat was 
kept on the south side of the river under guard so that it could be 
destroyed in case of necessi ty. (122j:;:'he 52nd Georgia regiment was 
also ordered to Tazewell. General Le~dbetter was informed by General 
" i Smith of the change in the disposal of troops due to the advance from 
~ 
~[ 
Kentucky. This left but two regiments at Chattanooga outGeneral 
Leadbetter was told he could expect no assistanc"e unless the command-
ing General were successf~ll in Powell's Valley. (.123) 
On the 12th of June, Geheral Smith asked instructions 
from Richmond as to the line of his retreat, should retreat become a 
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necessity, -- whether he sho~ld move towards Georgia or Virginia. 
President Davis decided on th e Georgia line because of the Vo;st a-
mount of stores in Georgia. On the 13th 001 Allston was ordered to 
watch the movements around Big Creek Gap and towards Clinton. To 
him fell the task of preventing a crossing of the Jlinch and of 
protecting Knoxville from any advance until the operations in the 
Powell Valley would release troops to re-enforce him. General 
Stevenson was holding the enemy in check in front of Wilson's Gap. 
'Nhi le this movement of troops was taking place, Gen-
eral lUtchell again attacked Ohattanooga and on June 14th when this 
word was received came news also of :llorgan's retirement ot Kent'.lcky. 
General Smith decided on the evacuation of Cumberland Gap. General 
Stevenson was ordered to remove all of his best guns, to render the 
others useless and to destroy his camp equipage. Ee was to remove all 
his ordnance. General Barton was to cover the retreat and Col. All-
ston was ordered to report to General Stevenson to assist in this. 
General Smith himself went to Chattanooga. (124) 
Following instructions, General Stevenson retired to 
Tazewell and General 3arton to Bean's Station. On the 19th, General 
Stevenson was ordered to prepare to make a stand at Olinch Ilountain 
and 3e,n 3t:<tion, throwing his oava1ry back on scouting expeditions 
to Powell's Valley and the Gap. General Barton wns sent to Knoxvilleo. 
(125) There they awaited an attack but a3 General 3uell had forbid-
den any fOIWard movemp-nt on a large scale, no such m~ve:nent was made. 
'rhe reasons for the evacutltion of Cumberland Gap "lere 
best stated in a letter to the Inspector General at Richnbnd from 
General 3mi the He said: " (jeneral Buell seems to be directing the 
"OV8ocnt against this depart:nent. Since the wit:01drawa1 of the army 
from Corinth they have been 1argAly re-enforced, and the enemy in OVflr-
whelming numbprs are systematically moving to the" occupation of East 
-rennessee. I can no longAr, witt my small force (5,000) mot1.1ized, de-
fend the line from O~ber1and Gap to Chattanooga; to prevent the sepp-
ration of my force one point or the other m~st be given up. During 
the withdrawal of the troops in Powell's Valley to the relief of Ohnt-
tanooga the enemy removed the obstructions from the roads leading over 
the ;:;umberland Mountains t and also obstracted and fort ified the road. 
to Cmnberland Gap from Kentucky. ~hese facts make that point compara-
tively unimpOTtant, and I have ordered its eva.cuation, concentration 
towards Jhattnnooga for the defeme of that line. Anticipating this 
movement the stores have alre::dy been almost entirely removed from the 
department. 
General Stevenson, supported by Barton, will conduct 
the l'lovem,,"nt, while, with Reynolds' am 'i1aylor's brig'1des (:',500),1 
proceed to the rtolief of Jhattanooga. 3tevenson, if not too hotly 
?ressed, will, with his com~and in hnnd, hol,i the line of the railrond 
in thp hope of oc-operation from Beauregard. This 1 hope will 300n 
be rece i ved, for the li-ne int 0 Georgia by Chattanoo£ja has always bef"n 
a favorite plan of invasion, and, with the defenseless condition of 
Georgia and Halleck's facility for transporting his army, may be made 
the most dane-erous move in their campaign. 1 have striven for an op-
portuni ty to strike a blow; the enemy h:?ve inv:-lriably retired at my 
approach and with every advantage would give me no opport'..lni ty. 1Iy 
I 
com:nand has been almos t broken 'down by cons tant ly moving from one end 
to the other of the line. Communicating by telegraph and acting in 
concert from behind nat'lral defenses of great strength .they have 
foiled every effort made by me." (126) 
As this thesis is about .Kentucky and not Tennessee, 
no account of the brief incursions into Tennessee from Cmnberland Gap 
will be made. Kirby Smith placed his forces to defend the railroad 
but }ener3l Morgan made no effort except to send out s1na11 foraeing 
parti'es or sr!1all r:roups to destroy a railroad bridce, etc. 
Col. John Morgan, Jonfederate c.'walry leaier ,tarted 
for lifentucky from Knoxville on the 4th of J,.ly, 18St, with 900 men. 
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His troops i:lcluded his own regiment, and a regiment of Georgian 
partisan rangers, ·,'.'i th a Texas sauadron and 2 companies of '..:ennessee 
cavalry. His route lay through Tompki'1sville, Glasgow, Lebanon, then 
on to Harrodsburg, Lawrencnburg, Verai lIes, Georgetown, Paris and 
',"linchester to RichmoT\d. On the way he met no organi zed troo_;s to re-
sist him. General Jerre T. Boyle, who had been appointed military 
com~ander of the State on 1~y 27th, 1802, W2S vainly trying to organ-
ize forces to resist Morgan at leXington and Frankfort. The whole 
population and the few ;nili tary officers in the state had been thrown 
into a state of paniC by the news of Morgan's raid. Jonsternation 
and confusion reigned. General George Morgan refused to come out of 
::!l:unberland Gnp as he feared. that this cavalry attack waC} merely a di-
version for General Kirby Smi th, whose forces in East Tennessee, 
laree'ly re-enforced, always thre~tened the Gap. 
By the time Morgan reached. Richmond,'T-about July 20th, 
General Boyle's efforts were bearing fruit and General Green Clay 
Smith, with Cols. '/lolford, Metcalfe and 'Nynkoop, '~!ere endeavouring to 
surround him. Learning of thiS, General Morgan, who had previously 
determined to make a stand there, decided to move on to Jrab Orchard. 
There his telegrapher attached his portable battery to the telegraph 
leadi1g from Stanford to Loutsv1l1e and learneu the exact position of 
his pursuers. ~e left Crab Orchard at 11 O'clock, reaching 30merset, 
28 miles away at sunset. The telegraph was again used, and all Gen-
er:11 Boyle's previous orders to pursue him were countermanded. After 
a night's rest without molestation, he busied hLnself with destroying 
the vast amounts of governments stores which had been collected there 
by the Federal troops who found them in Zollicoffer's camp after the 
defeat and flight of the Jonfederate army at Mill Springs. They con-
sisted of clothinf,', blankets, shoes, hats, and such things, in addi-
tion "0 the arms and am'!lcmition. Celonel Morgan also destroyed 120 
govermrnent wagons tr:ere and at Jrab Orchard. From Somerset, . Morgan 
made his way down thro,ugh Monticello in 'ilayne county, passing out of 
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state into ~ennessee, where he encamped at a place between Livingston 
and Sp arta. (128) 
By July 19th a force of 1800 was collected at Frankfort 
under Jol. Maxwell' and started towards Georgetown. ";01. ':lolford., with 
volunteer cavalry was ordered towards Richmond and ':iinchester to in-
tercept 110rgan and protect the supply trains to Oll.'Ilberland Gap. On 
the morning of the 20th, General Green Clay Smith, with a force of 
595 men, composed of 230 men of the 9th Pa. oavalry, 165 of the 18th 
Ky. infantry, 100 Cincinnati police and 100 Home Guards who had started 
with him from Lexington, and about 500 more under Col. Metcalfe ( in-
eluding part of his regiment, the 7th Ky. cavalry a..'1d some Home Guards I, 
whome he had met 6 miles from Paris, arrived in Paris only to find that 
the Southerners had mowed on. leing joined b:l Col. l1axwf,ll, General 
Smi th had ordered a forward movement when he re.cei ved information that 
Morgan had been re-enforced and wa'~ returnine- t·~ Paris. He therefore 
awaited at tack for a day and night, sending Col. Metcalfe meanwhile on 
. 
a reconnoitreing expedition. Findi~ that the report had been a false 
one, he left :::01. i::.etcalfe at Paris and pushed on to. Winchester, ac-
companied by :;apt. Wadsworth and his Home Guards. At Ric~d, he 
was further re-enforced by 5 companies of the 9th Pta. cavalry and some 
of 001. Metcalfe's men as wellF1s an additional company of Home Guards. 
Gol. !,iaxwell was left in charge of the infantry at this 
point while the cavalry pushed on. Learning that Morgan had burned the 
oridce over Diok's River on the Crab Orchard road, General Smith took 
the Lancaster and Stanford route. ~vithin 12 or 13 miles of Somerset 
word was received that Morran had passed out of the state and General 
Smith retraoed his steps to Stanford. 
General Smith explains his failure to catch the 00n-
federates a3 follows: "On the entire trip I am forced to say that I 
never received a word of intelligence as to the ~ovement or where-
abouts of the enemy save through the scouts I sent out from,my com-
mand and from intelligenoe received at and near Pari3. It was my oon-





troops had all been wi thdrawn and in pursuit of him. I was therefore 
anxious and particuV'lr to llrotect the city and the Government stores 
deposited there: hence 1 kept the woods watched until I ascertained 
the line of Morgan's retreat was through Richmond. 1 could receive 
no communication from a force anywhere in front of me until sfter I 
left Richmond and almost reaced L:omcaster, then I ascertained that 
Colonel "olford, with 300 or 400 Home Guards, was somewhere in Pu-
la3ki. I immediately dispatched him to fall in fron~ of Morgan and 
impeae him a3 much as possible. I do not know that the messenger 
reached him; but after 1 got into Pulaski 1 sent another messenger 
to him and learned for the first time his troops had been disbanded, 
with no prospect of using them under three or four days; hence 1 a-
bandoned the pursuit and returned under orders to this point." (129) 
In regard to Col. Wolford, Morgan's ·famous telegrapher, George A. 
Els\'1orth said that 001. ',Volford had telegraphed General Boyle that 
his force vms green and insufficient to attack 001. Morgan. (130) 
\'~bile the Confederate Morgan was invading Kentucky, 
The Federa.l l\lorgan at Cumberland Gap was carrying on at Jumberland 
Gap, strengthen his fortifications, sending O'.lt small foraging 
parties, and begging for re-enforcements so that he could advance. 
On the 14th of July, he appeal~d to Secretary of War Stanton, sRying 
that on May 11th he had requested that two regiments of cavalry 
should be stationed along the line of the railroad between Louisville 
and Nashville and a similar force along the line of supplies from 
Lexington to Cumberland Gap. He called attention to the fact that 
had this been done the Confederate Morgan's firs t raid could not have 
taken place. He antiCipated that Morgan would try to cut off his sup-
plies for a few days, while General Kirby Smith attacked him in front. 
But no such attack materialized. In this letter he added, "Hold~ng 
this Gap amounts to nothing if we simply remain.here to eat rations." 
(131) On the same day he wired Col. Fry that he realized ~is line of 
()ommunication vr,s in danger but that he was powerless as he had no cav-
aIry, -- or scarcely enoueft for picket duty. (132) 
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On July 15th, Lt. Oralghill of the Engineers arrived at 
the Gap to prepare temporary fortifications. He said in regard to it, 
"The importance of the position in a pOlitical and military point of 
view cannot be overestimated." (133) 
General Buell replied to Morgan's telegr~n of the 14th 
as follows: "It is hoped and expected that you will be able at least 
to convoy your trains and you should try and strengthen your posi-
tion sufficiently to spare some troops to guard your line." (134) 
:(his was not too encouraging for General Morgan, who replied that 
he had a force of 1200 men a'Nay from the post who, on their return 
would be stationed at Grab Orchard, London and Barbourville. ::le ex-
plained his past failure to gUard the line as follows: "Two reasons 
have preventpd me from sending infantry to protect my line of sup-
plies. ~he line is 150 miles in length and the roads, even at this 
season, so wretched as to render small trains absolutely necessary; 
hence it is impossible to furnish a sufficient number of infantry es-
corts to protect them, and 1 believe that infa::ltry stationed at inter-
mediate points cannot protect a long line against sudden forays of 
partisan troops who will operate by interior by-roads. But my main 
reason wa:> that 1 regarded Morgan's incursion as a probable diversion 
in favor of Smith v:hose line is on the Clinch and whose force is con-
sidernbly stronger than mine." (135) 
It may hnve been only a coincidence that on the same 
day that this letter VIas sent, General t!organ tendered his final re-
signation and requested to be immediately relieved, because of the 
serious illness of his wife. (136) A few dnys later, however, ~eneral 
Eueill ','.'rote him that his services in his present position \'Jere so es-
sential to the cause that he could not consent to his withdrawal. (137) 
Further orders sent to General 1!orgpn on the 19th of 
July directed him to construct ,as soon as pract~cable, a strong work 
for the defense of the Gap, which could be held by 1 regimE?nt of in-
f:mtry with artillern to supply the garrison for a siege of at least 
20 d'J.ys; aYlu to hold himself in readisnees to take the offensi va, the 
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while keeping himself informed of the Confederates' position. (138) 
To t his Morgan answered that the GHp could no mOre be held by one reg-
iment than by 1 man; thnt he had been trying to collect supplies but 
is very short as ';:01 ford had seized one of his trains, (doubtless for 
his volunteer c3va1ry organized to pursue the Confederate Morgan.) (139) 
':'he next day, July 24th, . Lieutenant Jraighi11 made a :repor t to Genernl 
Buell in regard to the fortifications as the ~ap, te11inf, him th~t the 
defensive system of fortificntions would have to be of considerable ex-
tent as at least 5 or 8 points must be occupied, the most distant be-
inr: not less than 2-~ or 3 .niles horizontnlly and the ereater difference 
of the line between any two of the !:Joints being 1200 or 1300 feet. (140) 
Late in July General Buell learned that most of the 
troops in East Tennessee 7:ere to be concentrated at IJhattanooga and 
he immediately wrote Morgan in regard to an advance, suw'esting Knox-
ville and inquiring '.71 en Morgan could move and how he could co-opor-
ate with him. (141) Morgan na:ned the 20th of AUGUst because by that 
time the fortifications at the G:1p would be completed, vihich would ren-
der that posi tion secure in c:lse of defeat in the Knoxville expedi-
tion~ He expected to rec'ive from 600 to 8000 ~ennes3ee recruits by 
the 15th and had agreed to se'1d an escort for them. !Us supplies were 
I 
short at they Viere cut 0 ff from Lexington for 10 d~lyS by the Jonfeder-
ate raid. (l4Z) 
','lhile General :.~orgnn was strengthening his 90sition at 
the Gap and the rest of Kentucky was eng3ged in the panic of John r,Ior-
f gan's raid, events were transpiring in Tennessee which were to affect 
, 
~ Kentucky in a very short time. On June 25th, President Davis wrote 
~ 
General Smith that General Hath had been ordered to Chatt~nooga for 
duty and that large re-enforcements had been sent to his department.9143) 
Two days later~eneral I.!cCovm with his division of the Army of the ':,'est 
left Tupelo, Mi~s., for Jhattanooga and General '3rage promised to move 
promptly on Ij.AnAra1 3uell's rear, since 3ue11 was reported' on his way 
to attrck Chattanooe-.fl., via Huntsvil1e, A1a.(144) Additional A1aba.'!la 
regiments were ordered to £ast Tennessee and two battalions and one 
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company of cavalry. (145 J General Smith sent Uorfan into Kentucky 
and Forrest into Middle Tennessee 'while he cO-r1tinued to mobilize hi3 
cOl!lJ"land so they coald move against General Morgan 2.t the Gap, or a-
gainst T-addle 'i:ennessee, in ,'!hichever place the need arose. (146) 
3y .the 7th of July, he beg<m to consider the possi biU t~T of an offen-
sive nlove against Jumberland Gap and re;uested liener"l Stevenson, in 
tr.e Jli~1ch valle;:" to secur0 information as to the possiOility of 
38ndin[, a cavalry force into southe:i3tern Kentucky to c~t off provi-
sions and am;nunition y.'hile the att~ck in front was .'nade. (147) 
:'he troops were organized into two diVisions, --
General 3tevenson with 4 brigade::> of infantr:! and ono of cavalry oc-
ciJ.pied the line of the Jlinch River while General ~:ett '.'.'ith :3 bri-
Eaes of ilfantry and General :·,:cGown v:ith :2 of inf~ :ltry a1cl 1 of csva1-
ry, held Chattanoor:a. ·.:'here ;·:e1'e about lOOOOcffective men in each 1:'-
vision. In his 'ntter to l'resident D3Vis settinc forth this orr,ani:>:u-
tion, wri tten on <.Tuly 14th, General 3mi th stated that in his c{)inion 
the Federal armips "!Quld uniert lli~e no further cmnpair;ns in the south 
·for the sum:-:lOr, but Y:o'.llcl c oncentrf-lte on secl'l.rinro East Tennessee, 'I':r"ich 
territory would prove an excellent base for extensive operations i:1 
the south d:rrinr, the c cminr: Ylirtter. (148) 
R'J.1'!lor that GeTIf~ral 3ue11 was concentr2tinr, at 3ric1ge-
:Dort a.."'1d th'1t General .:.lore-an (1"edor'11) wal moving on Z.!1oxville from 
JUl!loprland Gap, ~aused General 3r:1.[;,G to hu')ten the :novement of the 
Army of the L1ississippi under General Hardee from J:1upelo, 11iss., to 
Chat tanooga. ]~he order to move was given July Zls t. (143) About the 
same time, ,':ord having been received of Jol. John Uorgan' s .... minter-
riJ.}?tecl progress in h.ent'.lcky t Gelleral Stevenson was advised t:-.at in 
all probabli ty trle force at the Gap had been reduced a>lu :hat it Vias 
a favorable time to push operations ae'airlst the Gap or even :;0 enter 
Kent ucky. (l£iO) 
On July ~4t:J, in a letter from General Smith to Gen-
~ 




to be referred to as Ita brilliant blunder, a magnificient failure", 
was made. General Bmi th v;rote, "Gan yO:.l not leave a portion of your 
forces in observation in :Ussissippi, and shifting the main body to 
this department, t[~k.e cO!!1:and in person? ~here is yet ti:ne for a 
brilliant su:n:-:ler campaign; you. will have a Good and SeCil.re )ase, a-
bundant 3uprlies, the 2ennessee c~,n be crossed at any .t')oint by the 
aid of steam and ferr;l-' boats, and the campaign opened wi th every 
prospect of regaininG pos'ession of Midi.lle :i.'ennessec and pos:'. ibl:! 
Kentucky. 1 TIill not only co-operAte ~ith yon, but will chnerfnlly 
pla~e n;' cor:t'!land under you subject to your orders." 1his on July 
24th. (151) 
learning that General ~,:organ had nearly a month's 
supplies at o~berland Gap, General Smi th realized that it would 
take too long a time to reduce that force and release him to co-
oper:?: te with General Bragg. He there fore sugges t ed to Gener:J.l 3rar,g 
that he be allowed to march directly to Lexington ir,ste~ld of invt;:st-
ing the G8p for any lengtll of time. ~o this General Bragg replied 
that he did not consider it wise for him to move too far into Ken-
tuckY,leaving Morgan in his rea.:u until he, gragg, had fulty engaged 
Buell on the left. At this time, August 10th, no decision had been 
reached as to vlhether Bragg wo~id advance to Nashville or Lexington, 
nlthough he expressed a prrference for the move towards Lexington. 
(152) Plans Y;el'e also made for the advance of Gener~,l Humphrey Mar-
shall via Pound Gap into Kentucky to take place simultaneously 
with that of General Kirby Smith. 'fhe tv:o officers held a personal 
conference at Knoxville early in August. (153) 
3y the 11th of ~ug~st, General Smith's plans were per-
fected and cOrD.'!1unicated to Richmond. One phr..:..se of that report seemed 
significant: "My advance is made in the hope of permanently occupyinf 
Kentucky." 'rhese plans ,yere success fully carriea through. (154) 
~his campaign into .(~entucky had a three-fold' object: 
lst.~o seC:lre SUP9li!ls, -- to draw upon the rich and fertile 3luegrass 
for the stores so needed by the Confederacy; 
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2nd: ~o secure volunteers for the army and then to enforce conscrip-
tion in the 3tate. 
3rd: To hold kentucky for the 00nfederacy and carry the boundary line 
to the Ohio River. (155) 
Once again troops began marching through ·the mount ains 
to make their way through southenstern ~ .. entucky towards the 31:.<e-
grass. ~his time there was no force sufficient to detain them in the 
barren district of the Kent:.<cky mountains. General Smith left Knox-
ville on the night of August 13 th, crossing the mountains by Roger's 
Gap ~ith 4 brigades of infantry, 6000 strong, and proceeded to 3ar-
bourville, arriving on the 18th. General Morgan's force at t.r.at 
place had been called in the night before. (156) 11eanwhile another 
column, corrn:nanded by General Heth,. moved from Jlinton ttrougjl 3iG' 
Creek Gap v:ith 2 brigades of infantry, the arti llAry and subsistence 
tains, but did not arrive until the mornine of the 22nd, due to the 
almost impassable roads. On first learning that an advance against 
him was in progress, General Iflorgan assured General Buell that he be-
lieved his command could hold any force likely to 
of 
it. ~he morning of the 15th, General Morgan sent 
cavalry, 
oe brought ag~inst 
the 1st 3attalion, Ky 
Capt. ~1art in" via 
Cumberland Ford to ovserve Roger's and Big Creek Gaps. On the 17th 
/ 
0,'}~)t.hlartin was attacked withip 18 miles of Roger's Gap by Col. Ash-
ny's cavalry, 600 stronG, and UO of his men were reported. missinf. (157) 
~,reanwhile tCol._~ohll 3cott with 900 cavalry (First Louisiana), and 
a battery of mOUrltain howitzers, went up sent up fro~ KinGston , :(enn., 
Monticello and Somerset to London, Ky. Col. Houk at London, aad 180 
men from the garrison at Cumberland Gap. :rhey were able to offer some 
resistance to the advance of the Confederate cavalry, but after skir-
mishing for an hour, were forced to retire. After 5 days of nrivation 
. ~ 
and dangers, they reached. Jumberland Gap. Col. Scott captured. 75 pris-
onArs. killed and wounded about 50 and secured 40 or 50 wagons, 175 
mules, some camp equipage and abO',lt 50 vms with some 'ammunition. (158) 
During the night of~the 16th, also, General Stevenson moved upin front 
of the Gap on the ~ennessee side and drove in the pickets. There was 
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some skirmishing with slight losses on both sides. The next morninf, the 
guns from the pinnacle forts forced hi~ to withdraw his artillery but 
he remained in position. Major-General llcCown with two divisions occupied 
Cumber1~~d Ford shortly after the establishment of headquarters for Gen. 
Smith at Barbourville, so General Morgan found himself completely sur-
rounded by the Southerners. 
Unable to obtain supplies in the terri tory he occupied, 
and reali zing that it was impossible to bring them over the mo-mtains 
from East Tennessee, while he at the same time feared the psycho10rrica1 
effect of a retrograde movement, General Smith determined to proceed 
to Lexington and on the 27th of August started forward. his adva.nce guard 
via Big Hill and Richmond. On the same day, General BragG started from 
Chattanooga, but his way lay through Middle ·~ennessee and not throU€h 
the mountains. As it is the mountain counties of Kentucky that concern 
this paper, the movements of these two generals will not be followed but 
attention will again be directed to General Morgan and his Federal Gar-
rison, holding the Gap while surrounded by the Confederates. 
When General Morgan telegraphed General Boyle at LO\1is-
ville of the advance of 20000 men into Kentucky, 30yle told Secretary 
Stanton that it was physically impossible for the Confederates to have 
that many men in the field. ~he report was soon confirmed however, and 
on the 16th, General Morean sUf'gested to General Buell, either that he 
make a conjunction ,'<'ith General Boyle's forces at London and fight, or 
that he wait quietly until General Smith's army was starved out, -- for 
he knew that General Smith could not obtain subsistence for longer than 
3 weeks in the neighborhood of the Gap, while he could hold the ~ap for 
5 weeks with his present provisions. (153) General Morgan was con-
vinced that the Confederates planIl'd to starve him out, or at least, to 
try to do so, before they attempted an attack on the Gap. He suggested 
on the 19th that a force of 8000 men be sent to attack Cumberland Ford, 
while a similar ferce come up by Lambdin's, 21 miles soathwest of 3ar-
bcurvi11e and 12 miles East of Boston; such ~~ advance, te felt confi-
dent, could take the two divisions at Cumberland Gap. (160) At the 
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same time General Morgan sent a similar message to General Halleck, 
saying the Jonfederates expected him to evacuate the post. "ThiS", he 
adds, "1 shall never do. It is for you to open the road. 1:.bat you 
most want is cavalry and horse artillery, with a [)eavy column to follow 
After; but you must act at once, for our supplies are limite,i. In tte 
mean time I will not be idle. If the enemy attacks, he will be crushed." 
(101) On the 22nd, General H[·llleck wired him to "hold on firmly; you 
";ill soon be re-enforced." (162) About the same time :}eneral Boyle sent 
word to General Buell tha t he regarded Morgan's position as critical. (~03 
To save the horses from starvation and in order to pro-
vide a fUide for forces coming to his relief, on August 25th, Gener9.l 
Morgan sent out Col. T. ~. Garrard with 8 companies of his own, the 3rd 
Kentucky Infantry (400 men), mounted, and Munday's First Battalion, Ken-
tucky cavalry, (200 men), An encounter near McKee, Ky., in which they 
, 
\JO 
were success ful according to General .:.lorgan, ~ the only record. of 
this little expedition. (164) On the morning of the 31st, 275 
more men were sent out to join Col. Garrard. By this time, too, the 
garrison had been .on half rati(ms for ten days, but ha~ sufficient 
for 2 months 
beans and rice and ~ able to secure some cattle. ~he men were in 
1\ 
good spirits and pledged themselves to hold the fort if attacked. 
On the 28th, Gerleral 'I';right, the cOlIl!la.nding General of 
the newly created Department of th~ OhiO, reported to. General Halleck 
as follows: "The troops are being disposed there upon the line leading 
to Jumberland Gar> and the one to Hashville with a view to operations 
along both. 'rill today, 1 conceived the first the most important; but 
an officer( Col •. 1arrard) just in from the Gap says Morgan has supplies 
for 60 days from the 20th. Buell's case therefore seems to demand the 
first attention and I shall incrsase the force on the Nashville 1i~e as 
fast as may be possible." (165) In re·ply Halleck said that the relief 
of General Morgan at the Gap was considered of first. importance. (106) 
On September 1st, the Jonfederate forces were withdrawn 
from l.!umberland Ford. but after tbe battle of Richmond and defeat of 
the Union forces, the enemy still successfully cut off Morgan from 
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and re-enforcements. The road being clear for a short distance into 
Kentucky, Jol. de Courcy'. brigade was sent to 1~nchester, Clay county 
where General M.organ thought he could obtain supplies. On September 
10th he also sent two expeditions to blockade the gaps in the moun-
tains through which the Jonfederates had aJvanced, hoping thus to cut 
off their a~nition and line of communications. One detachment of 
200 picked men from the 1st and 2nd Tennessee regiments \vent to Roger's 
Gap and a second squad of 400 from General Spears' brigade succeeded 
in blockading Big Creek Gap. The latter :net a company of Kentucky cav-
aIry on their way to join General Kirby 3mith and succeeded in takinf" 
nearly 100 prisoners, besides killing 12. Small expeditions were also 
sent to Barbourville and London to c:o,ptureany stragglers there. In 
all about 500 prisoners were taken and about 170 of the 80nfederates 
killed or wounded. On the 10th General Morgan also sent out an aide-
J.e-camp, t.ieutF'nant Hedary, '.'.'ith a verbal message for Genernl ':!rie;ht 
that by eating the mules the garrison could hold out 60 days. ~he 
aide passed through Manchester and learning that the effort to secure 
flour had been unsuc~essful, he informed General ':;right that in his 
own opinion General Morgan could not possibly hold out longer than 20 
br 30 days. (167) 
'Nhen it bncame np longer possible to secure forage for 
on Sept. 12th, , 
the mules, "the quartermaster informed Genoral Morgan and suggested that 
they be sent towards the Ohio ri vel. by \'r,y of i.:anchester. General 
Mor6~n decided against this for 2 re2sons,' he still hoped to use them 
for food, or if became necessary he wanted to have them to harness to 
the cannon so that might not fall into the Confecierates' hands. 2he gar-
rison was comparatively secure from attack, but if they held out two 
weeks longer, it would be im[lossible to remove tte cannon. Under the cir-
cumst311ces, :md as he tad received no word from the outside sLlce the 
bat tle of Richmond, the co.1JIDanding officer fel t ~ t imperat i ve that he 
hold a council of war and without expressing his own opinio~, learn how 
his officers considered the predicament. 
Accordingly on the 14th, a council composed of Brigadier-
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Generals Spears, Baird and Carter, with Lt. Graifhill, tre engineer, as 
recorder, deliberated and unanimously ~greed upon evacuation. General 
'JartE'r delayed matters one day more waiting for some word of re-enforce-
~lents, but when none came, plans were formulated for iymnediate Avacua-
tion. 
First, the mines and cliffs were mined to prevent the 
army of General Stevenson from following. Next the 4 3Q-pounders wMch 
had to be left were spiked and hurled over the mo"mtain sides. On the 
IGth a large train was sent toward .1.1anchester under Jol. de Courcy of the 
33rd Indiana and 2 companies of the 3rd Kentucky and the ~th Ohio b:.ttery. 
At dark 0"1 the 19th, the regular pickets were withdrawn and Lt .-"::olonel 
Gallllp, Provost l'.iarshall for tte post, with 200 picked men, assumed the 
task of coverinG the retret.t. Late in the day :.!ol.Gallup went to the 
enemy'z lines with 3 letters, under a fl clg of truce. ';,hile he was on-
gaging thp officer in an hour's conversation, 30~ebody set fire to a 
part of the quartermaster's establishment. It could, of course, be 
see'1. from the meeting place of the two officers end seemed almost 
like a warning to tho Confeder:ltes of what was going on. Col.:;'allup 
satis fied the officer by ascribing the smoke and flalne to tb_c burninr 
of brClsh on the mount~in zide. Abo-lt 10 P. ~r. c~me the upsettinc ne'l':s 
I 
tl-,at a sp.nt inel had deserted, S,up[losedly to the ene!!l"J; by this time 
thp. hilb Viere abla::;!: wi th fla;':le; Japt. Patter com~!lenccd to e:~plode tte 
mines and the 00nfeucrates awoke to the situation. :.:'he :;o!1feder~;t.e 
pickets ';:0re adv"l1ced 'out were driven back by Col. Gallllp. At micl-
nigh t, Jol. Garter co:nmenceu the descent, dangerous [ud slow, -- hau 
General 3tevenson attacked in force [-,e would probably have defeated the 
Unionists. 3:lird follo";;ed:;arter, whi Ie 3pears, rihose brigR.Qe Lid oe8n 
pJnced in o'lttle formation 011 the north side of the Gap at the foot of 
the mountain to prevent any attack throuph Baptist Gap, now fell into 
line. 1he pickr:::ts were out till dawn when they burned the last of the 
stores. 
1'r-:8 ~rch did not stop until Flat Lick was reached, ::0 
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miles from the post. From there the col .. L"nn advanced by :2 parallel roads 
along Goose and Stinking 8reeks and arrived near Manchester the night 
of Sept. 19th. The next'dB¥ v,'a.3 spent at i.Ianchester. 1he retreating 
column was atto.cked in the rear by Jonfederate c'1valry (General Steven-
son's) wto wero repulsed by the 6th Ten110JSee. Mea:rnvhile, (:01. John 
H. Uorgan, the Jonfederate cavalry leader was despatched to Booneville 
to head off the Federal llorgan, and General Humphrey Marshall at i.It. 
Sterling, was urged by General Smith to co-operate in cutting off this 
retreating force. ~he Federal General sent him commissary ahead to 
Booneville , followed by Generals Garter and Baird, ~hile the com-
mands of Col. de Oourcy and General Spears went straight to Proctor. 
~he Confederate cavalry, under Morean, were now in line 
with the Federal troops and they burned the steam mill o.t Proctor be-
their 
fore }Iris: arrival, leaving however when they realized they ,','ere about 
to be 3urrounded. The march from Proctor to Hazel Green proved v;orse 
than anything yet encountered as water was scarce along the ridge, to 
be fo und only in holes dmvn 80 or 100 feet among the eli ffs. 'I'he 
Xorth Fork Road had been entirely destroyed but was_ plentifully sU[l-
plied \'iith water, so again the command was divided, Spears and de 
Jour~y eOing by the ridge, while Baird and Jarter took thf> road. :rhe 
Confeilerate t!organ, ;'Iho hld D13en attacking on the flank and rear, now 
passed in front and began blockading the narrow ridges and deep defiles 
of the well nigh impassable road. 
From Ea~el Green the Federalists adva."1ced to ".';est Lib-
erty, expecting to meet 3-eneral Humphrey .... [1.rshall there. On this 
:narch, the rear of de Jourcy's brigade was attacked by the Confederate 
cavalry and 100 head of cattle were di spersed.. I.Io rga '1 's cavalry dis-
mounted !1.lld fough t as infantrymen. 6 or 8 were reported killed and 
wounded. A two days' halt was !'!lade at '.:7est Liberty awai tine attack 
from General ~.1ar3hall's foroei. 3ut by this ti!}le, General Morgan had 
cut his line and was between his forces. Part of his force ca'ne from 
Virginia to wi thin 15 miles of '::est Liberty but learning that l.1organ 
was there, retreated. 
Col. Morgan had so obstructed till the road to Grayson 
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with heavy timber, that once the entire force was obliged to detour and 
make a nev' road. 'fhe Union troops endeavoured to act on the defensive, 
attacking the cavalry of the Southerners while the men were engnged in 
blocking the road. 1he Federalists pushed Col. Morgan so hard that 
"on three succesive nights he was forced to move on~ leaving his hot 
supper to the uJvatlcing troops of the other Morgan. On October 1st, 
the retreating garrison arrived at G~ayson and there their pursuit by 
the Jonfedera to cavalry ceased. 'The Federal loss was 80 men in killed, 
wounded and prisoners. On October 3rd, the entire force reached Green-
ups burg on the Ohio River. (158) 
2he troops under General Morgan, it seems to the writer, 
suffered more than any other forces in the Kentucky mountains, and re-
ceived less glory for their achievem8nts~ Their attack upon C~~berland 
Gap in June had involved incredible hardship and represented the use of 
strategy to a hif',h degree. no less skil1ful was this passage of over 
6000 troops through a destitute cOJmtry, undertaken in the face of and 
this retrpat, 
directly towards a victorious army. 2hat it should have been the sub-
'A 
ject of A Board of Inquiry seems incredible. Yet such was the case. 
The evidence seemed to clear General i.1organ of all blame, though Gener-
al Halleck's acquital seemed very ungracious, probably because he w~s 
somewhatrespc,nsible for the failure to send re-enforcelOOnts which ren-
dered retreat a necessity. 
On October 3rd, General Morgan's army ~ad reached its 
goal on the Ohio River and the mountains were free from his men. .tive 
days later the battle of Perryville was fought and the counties of 
southeastern Kentuc~J beca~e the theatre of another retreat, -- that of 
Generals 3ragg and Kirby Smith to East Tennessee via Cumberland Gap. 
From London, General' Smith's army passed up through 3ig 
Hill and Richmond; there a battle took place most disastrous to the 
Horthern arClS. Fron thence he proceeded to Le':ington where he estab-
lishfld headquarters to await the arrival of General 3ragc. ',':ith the 
subsequent events, -!. the arrival of Bragg, Buell's return to Kentucky, 
the inauguration of the PrOvisional Governor at Frankfort, this 
01. 
this paper is not concerned. On October 8th the 2 armies met at Perry-
ville and n battle involving heavy losses was fouGht. The \:!onfederates, 
faced by a larr;er army, were forced to turn their f~ces southward and 
on October 10th began to retreat. They were pursued fiS far as london 
by a part of General 3uell's ar~y. 
From Perryville, the forces of both General 3ragg and 
General Smith were moved to 3r~antsville and then to lancaster. At 
Lancaster they separated, the Army of Kentucky under General Smith re-
tiring via Big Hill to London, ,\hile General 3ragE's forces took the 
more direct route through Lancaster,drab Orchard and Mt. Vernon to 
lO:1don. 
O-n the night of the 13th, General Buell sent General 
\Voods' division, (6th), the remai:lder of General Jrittenden's corps, 
(2nd), and General McCook's corps,'(lst), on the Stanford road, while 
Gener~l Gilbert's, (3rd), marched on the Lancaster road. At Grab Or-
chard, General McCook's and General Gilbert's corps were balted, while 
General Crittenden, with Ge:leral • '.7. 3. Smith's division (2nd) as the 
advance guard, continued the pursuit to London, both on the direct road 
and the branch road to ManChester. (;53) 
General Joe ·.~'heeler had been put in command of all the 
Confederate cavalry wi th orders It 0 C over the retreat 0 f both wings of 
the army. On the 13th, General ':,'heeler, after leavi ng small forces to 
guard the fords on Dick's River and the Bryantsville road', crossed over 
to the roads leading from Danville to Lancaster and Stanford. His o~n 
comlnand was placed on the Lancaster road and Col. Wharton's (8th ::'ex:,s), 
on the Stanford road. The Federal troops were pressing fo~vard but when 
the cavalry would dismount and get their artillery in place , the pur-
suing infantry were ordered to deploy their lines for battle and tence 
they proceeded with tlr,eir marc!1 very s lowly. ~,Vneeler' S cOl!t'.:land arrived 
at lancaster of the afternoon of the 15th and after a figh. t prevented. tte 
Federals from approaching nearer thr:n to within 2 or 3 miles of the town. 
Learning that Col. 'hb~rton was hard pressed near Stanford, General 'libeel-
er left Col. Morgan and Col. Ashby (who had joined him at Lancaster), to 
protect the road from Lanoaster to Big Hill while he left at 10 P. M. to 
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to the assistance of Col. 'ii'harton. General Wheeler arrived at his po-
sit ion near Stanford early on the morning of the 15th (?) and allowed 
Col. ';i'harton to f!'lll back towards the main army. ;'heeler's brigade then 
engaged the enemy almost constantly, fa.lline back slowly through Jrab 
Orchard. ~he 19th 3rigade continued in puraui t and pressed fonard '.,itL-
in two miles of Mount Vernon. The next mornin~ this brigade formed the 
advance of Smith's division of the 2nd army corps. On passing 2 miles 
beyond Mount Vernon, the Confederates were found drawn up for b~lttle. 
~he 6th Kentucky went forward a3 skirmishers. Going fOr'\'Jard another 4 
mile '3 , the cavalry were found dismounted and acting as infantry and ar-
tilTory. i\ com},)any of the 2nd Indiana started the skirmish but were re-
lieved by the 6th Kentucky ,.'ho caused the Gonfederates to retire rapid-
ly after a brisk fire of half an hour. i:'he Federal loss was I killed 
and several wounded. The Confederates lost 11 killed and 2 wounded. 
7iithin another 2 mile"s, th p cwalry were found again dismounted being 
on the hill-sides opposite an open valley. The 9th Indiana were the 
engagement 
skirmishers this time, during which several of the Jonfederates were ,.. 
kilJed and wounded and a number, incluliing a captain, were made prison-
~. erSt 1he rest of the day was one continuous skirmish and from Mount 
Vernon on the cavalry purs~led its policy of 1b~ocking the road with fa11-
en timber. The Gonfederates arrived that at 3ig Rockcastle Creek, h:w-
ing 30 or 40 prisoners with them. 
On the 17th, the march wa3 cont inued to Camp Wildcat, 
skirmishing . t'1king place betweGn the two forces contin.ually and the 
Confederates keeping up their practice of cutting down trees to obstruct 
the road. General W. _So Smith, whose division, the 6th, led the ad-
vance on this day, lamented the fact that he had no ~avalry to stop this. 
~\len.nwhile, General Cmft had a sharp skirmi sh on the Madi son road with 
part of General Kirby Smith's forces, advancing townrds Goose Greek, in 
Clay county. 11 of the Confederates were taken prisoners and sever::l 
were wounded. They were in the act of driving off a lot of mules and 
20 cattle. 
On the 18th, the 41st Ohio and the 9th Indiana of the 
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19th brigade, advamed a few miles in front of Camp Wildcat a.nd ta.d a 
sharp s~irmish with the cava1rJ of the Confederates in which the latter 
lost several men and officers. The next day, the brigade having been 
ordered to Pitman's Cross Roads, the 41st Ohio was deployed as skirmish-
ers. The roads were all blocked wi th heavy ti:nber. 'rlithin5 miles of 
Pi tman' s, they caIne upon the Confederates, but as these were engaged 
in felling trees to bloc1k the road, it was only by the most strenuous 
effort of the pioneer company that they were en~lbled to come up with 
the Southerners about sundown, t mile from Pitman's. There was a sharp 
skirmish during which 1 man waq wounded on the Union side. Both sides 
then lined up in battle array, but about 10 P. M., the Confederates, 
not having been attacked as they expected, took up their march again. 
'rhe next morning a small detachment of Lhe Union troops was sent through 
London. They brought 25 prisoners. 'rhe Confederate cavalry was re-
ported 6 miles beyond. The brigade then marched to Camp Wildcat ac-
cording to instructions, arriving on the 22nd. 
Reconnaissances were also made from 6a.mp Wildcat along 
the Ro~mdstone Creek on the Madison Road and to the Paint Uck bridrs 
but only a few stragglers were found. On October 14th, Col. John 
Scott, a brigade commander in the C:onfederate cavalry, wrote to ,Jen-
i 
eral Joe TNhpeler, Qhief of Cavalz:y, asking permission to take his com-
i,: 
~. mand out vi a Somerset • He was then on the road leading from Crab Or-
f' 
" 
chard to Stanford, 2 miles from the former place. He claimed to have 
permission for this independent move from General 3rilgg, &''1d stated • 
it was nC0essary becaase of the jaded condition of his horses, -- he 
had been in front of General Kirby Smith's army since it entered Ken-
tucky in August. 'rhe next day, General 3racg's Jhief of Staff wlE1llte 
General ';]heeler that Col. Scott had been arre3ted for disobedionce of 
orders and his con."!la.nd turned over to the next in rr-,nk. Jol. '.'!harton 
-
had bepn ordered to send after the brigade and bring them back to aid 
General ',vheeler. This apparently was not done and the n,::xt report of 
them comes in connection with their passage through Kentucky from 
Somerset to Jamestown, '.2enn. On the 17th, Col. Howard reported that 
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he had bl'?en skirmishinG for three days and nights with Col. '-'I'olford' s 
cavalry. This cavalry of the Federals had started 0 lt accompanying the 
19th brigade in its pursuit from Danville on the Lancaster road. 
In the skirmish on the 16th, the Confederates lost :2 killed and 4 miss-
ing. ?hey ':-pre engaged by 50,: of (Jel. '.7olford's men. Althougr-. the 
Unionists tried to cut him off, Col Howard succeeded in gettin[!' all of 
waf':ons to J~lmesto\'m, having passed over the mountains at :Iountain Gap. 
( 170) 
rJ-eneral 3ragg's army and then :::-eneral ;3mith' s passed 
out via 3arbo~lrville, Flat tick and Cumberland Gap, the cavalry s-ustnined 
b- r t'.'Jo infantry brig3des, first from General Bragg's a:1:l then from 
General 3mith's corrr.1ands, protecting their rear. 1;0 enemy 'f:as encoun-
tored b'.lt tt p b,')d roads and limited supplies rendered the task an aru-
ons one. Gener::l 3mi th ,';ro to to :iener81 3ragg from 0umberland Ga.!? 
on October 22nd,. ":rhe ~,8ad of my co:rt"'land has just arrived r.ere. :',Iy:-nen 
have suffered on this march everything- but act-.:!al starvatio 1. ?hAre 
m~lst be not less than 10,000 of them 3catterrd through th,e country try-
inC' to find sompthing upon \'.'hich to live. Of the ~rovisions left for 
., . 
me at Cumberland Ford all were taken by General 0hen tham' s com'1land. ex-
cepting 40 barrels,and all Cllonr, my route r8~)Orts reach :ne of the ilro-
I 
visioD3 1e ft for -rTJ men being seized by the .trmy of the :;.ns3issi~:}pi. 
UnlesJ some :provision is made for me a~ead the remaining 6000 Clen now 
lp.ft in the r~.nk3 ':iill abo live to sc!.:tter throuf'h thE' country to Ilie]<: 
up 30::1f'thi ng to eat." (171) 
General 3uell explains the failure of his troo~~ to con-
tin'..1e the pur'nit beyond London as follo",';s: "It wa3 not expedient to 
contin~le the pur:Dit beyond London, partly beca-lsc it '.va:, iml)rnctic' .. le 
V3'ltr;ge, it tool.;: the troops o,lt of the Viay "",'hen they \','er'c lij.:ely to ~)e 
l'O-,Ites tov,"-:rd -:.'ennessee." (172) 
federates :lid not realize their hopes of holding t.be 3tntE', but th0~i 
;:::.;:; .. 
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did secure some supplies and reoruits. Both Bragg and Buell were secere-
ly oensored for their conduct 0 f their oa.>npaigns. 'l'his movement into 
Kentucky seems to me to have been so daring an undertaking that it re-
sembles D. magni £lcient gesture in a. lost cause. ';lha·tever i tsaspeots 
from a military point 0 f vie", it contains a roma..'1tic apI)eal that wi 11 
always 'win sympathy for its gallant leaders. 
The mount ains of Kentucky suffered no more from inva-
sions through Cumberland Gap, though that fortress remained in the 
hands of n,e 00nfederates for abO'lt a year. vm en it vns again ta~en 
by the Federals in Burnside's East Tennessee campaign. (173) 
66. 
Operations in Eastern Kentucky. 
:,rhe operations in Eastern Kentucky have been considered 
separately as they were separate campaigns, e:-::cept for the co-operation 
during Bragg's invasion. They affected o~erations in the southeastern 
part of the State, however, as we shall see. 
VI1ten General Thoma::; superseded General ~lelson as com-
:nander of Jamp Dick Robinson, Sept. 10th, l8Gl, the Ee~ltuckian was 
sent to ~':ays:vil1e, Kentucky, to recruit Union treops alIlonp- the nei[:h-
bors of his boyhood. ~hese troops ,,:ern :Joon to be used agai'lst a Jo~-
federate force which hnd been ~ollecting, in the eastern mou'ltainous 
district of l~entucky since the early days of September. (174) 
·~wo of the Jonfeder2te le2.ders 'with a lare;e followin!" 
were ;Jumphrey :.:arshall and the ~:on •. Tolm J. 3reckenrid[e. 1hey were 
early reporte9- as recruiting troops for the Jonfederacy. General :.:ar-
shall, who conducted the campaigns in ~~a3tern ·'entucky for the 00:1-
federates, wa:; a character deserving of a biography by himself. Per-
haps '10 man '\"lhose life was linked with the ~\:entucky mountains at this 
time was 50 L)icturesque. An enormously fat man, ..,,,,ho had a b"bit. of 
goin£" to sleep stauding up, he was little suited to the arduous earn-
pailjlls in the moant::<ins in the winter. His size and r.is wit presented 
Falstaffian aspects that were not over-loOked by his contemporaries on 
both sides. Particularly :.rr. Prentice of the louisville Jour~'lal, poked 
fun at hi!ll in season and out. Raving no small estimate of his o,,:n im-
portarlCe and !l.')ility, General Marshall somet imes l!resented di fficult ies 
to the President and JO!U'l1anding General of the 80nfederate 3ta~es. ~~e 
was found one time by Col. 17i lliam Preston, secnrely hidden i:1 the '1l0"J..'l-
tain fastnesses.:::ol. Preston complained of the difficulty in locatinG 
him and asked if he had fone to such lengths to hid from the Yankees. 
General Marshall replied tha t he was not running away from thf' Yankees 
but from l"IaJor-Generals in the Jonfederate army. '.rhat presents very 
well his attt.tude durinG the wart expressed in lone;-cirai':n out letters 
to Pres~dent Davis and General Lee. (175) 
3ut to return to that fateful Fall of 1861 in Kentucky. 
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On September 16th, John Fisk, Speaker of the Senate in the Kentucky 
Legislature and Robert Buokner, Speaker of the nouse, wrote General 
'f 
1homa.s at Camp Dick Robinson that on the following Saturday the State 
Guards from the neighboring counties would assemble in Lexington. 
Their purpose ostensibly, was to drill but it was feared they would 
make a demonstrntion and General Thomas was asked to send a reeiment 
to protect the town and government stores there. General Anderson, to 
whomth~ request had also been presented, authorized the movement and 
Col. Bramlette with the 7th Kentucky and some of Col. '.'.Iolford's caval-
ry were sent to,Lexington. (176) On the 22nd, 001. 3ramlette wrote 
to General Thomas, "Brecka.nridge and others fled the night we reached 
here and in advance of our arrival, having been wm'ned by a scamp by 
the name of Smith from Nichol';~sville. They are notfar I learn today, 
from Mount Sterling, at a little place called Hazel Green and it is 
thought are concentrating forces in that vicinity. ,,( 177) An amu§inr, 
but unverified story appeared in a letter to the Louisville JOUDnal 
to the effect that Mr. Breckinridge made his way through the moun-
tains disguised in a woman's skirts. (178) Col. Bramlette's appe,~)r-
ance disconcerted the Oonfederates so that there was no further d~~on-
stration in Lexington. 
His report refeered to above, was made to General Thoms 
on the same day that Speaker Fisk wired the Hon. Robert Buckner that 
Humphrey Marshall was assembling a.force at Drennan Springs in Henry 
County. (179) On the 23rd, Major E. L. Dudley ( of the State Home 
Guards), received a despatch from Frankfort saying tha t Hum~jhrey Mar-
shall at the head of 1000 cavllry was in Owell county supposedly'mov- ' 
ing towards Frankfort. !larshall, finding himself forestalled, moved 
over towards Caney Creek, on the border between Owen and Scott coun-
ties. His intention seemed to be to make a iash for Hazel' Green, where 
Breckinr1dge was encamped. Col. Bramlette was of the opinion that 
from Hazel Green they would to down through Breathitt, Perry, a~d Clay 
'. , 
counties to join Gen: Zollicoffer at, Ou;obe.rland Ford •. It 1s evident 
that this force dil1,aI-9 ~t.'W.~1 to Hs,.wel Green though no official 
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record was found. (180) 3reckinridge and Marshall made their way to 
Virginia and both entered the Confederate Army. General Marshall 
was assigned the command in Eastern Kentucky on November 1, 1861. (181) 
The Jonfederate sympathizers colleoted at Hazel Green 
were in sufficient aumbers to continue to attraot at tent ion. The 
O!3IIIp for recruiting was moved to Prestonburg. On COt. 7th, at the rfl-, 
quest of General Nelson, the 2nd Ohio regiment went to Olympian Springs 
20 miles east of :'1t. Sterling to keep out the small bands of recruits 
going to join the camp at Prestonburg. (182) 
On Ootober 8th, the very day he assumed command of the 
Department of the Cumberland, General Sherman wrote General Nelson to 
t~J to surprise the oamp at Prestonburg, either by a sudden march or 
by chartering a steamboat and going up the Sandy. Becuase he was aware 
of the 1aok of arms and munitions, he did not order the expedition, 
but left it entirely with General Nelson. (183) On the 10th, Nelson 
received a letter from Col. HarriS, 2nd Ohio,eol. Grisby and Major 
Hurt (Kentucky Militia), saying the forces at Prestonburg were plan-
ning to move forward on the 12th and asking for re-enforoements. Nel-
son, who ap llied to Sherman, was referred to Thomas at Camp Dick Rob-
ins on. The 33rd Ohio and the 21st Ohio were sent to him. 
':ihen General Nelson reached Olympian Springs he ordered 
Col. Grigsby's militia and the 2nd Ohio to move to MCCormick's Gap,at 
the point where Menifee, Powell and Wolfe counties meet. Col.Harris was 
ordered to move at daylight and the State troops at 8 o'clock. The mil-
itiarefused to move forward and all but 120 broke up~ turned in their 
arms and marched home. This left Col. Harris unsupported. Helson wrote 
that there were Z:-important gaps in the mibuntains, -- McCormiok's '. Bet-
ty's Gap and Yooum', the Confederates at this time controlling the latter 
two. If they got McCo,rmiokts also, they would be able to oome down to 
the Bluegrass whenever they ehose. If Nelson held it, he could flank 
the other two and move to Prestonburg. (184) 
. 
On the 22nd, the 2nd OhiO, 1 section of KOnkle's light 
battery and 1 co!!!.l?Ji'll~ on West Liberty from ~Cor~ 
mick's Gap. The Confederates, several hundred, strong, under Capt. 
Jack May, resisted, but they were eaiily driven out of the town and 
Col. Harris was in control by 8.30, having reached the town at day 
break. (185) 
That night, Major Robinson of the 33rd Ohio marched on 
Haze'l Green with two companies and arriving at 4 A. M., surprised the 
town and oaptured some of the best-known Southern symDathizers. The 
next day, Nelson with the rest of the 33rd Ohio and the 21st OhiO, 4 
guns and a wagon train moved up. Being thus in possession of the two 
roads leading to Prestonburg, he moved. forward as rapidly as possible. 
On November 5th, Uelson occupied Prestonburg, which Col. 
Williams( of Mexican ~ar fame), was forced to abandon since he had 
only 2 r01L~ds of ammunition and his troops were in an unorganized con-
dition, for the most part unarmed. Col. Williams retired to Piketo!1 
to meet his anrnunition and Nelson followed fairly closely. 
On the 7th, Col. Sill, with his own regiment, the 33rd 
OhiO, a company of each of the :::nd, 33rd and 59th,under Ma.jorHurt, 
2 Kentucky aompanies and 142 mounted men (from ~he wagon teams) under 
Col. Metcalfe, and 36 gentleman volunteers, probably the laat of the 
Knight Errant s, under Col. Apperson, accompanied b~r a section of ar-
tillery started up John's Cree~ to approaoh Piketon from the east and 
'. 
cut off the:. Confederates or "turn them". At daybreak the following' 
day, Nelson: himself marched on the State road direct to Piketon, 28 miles, 
-- in command of the 2nd, 21st, and 59th Ohio regiments, a battalion 
of Kentucky volunteers under Col Ohas. A. Marshall, and 2 sections of 
artillery. 
The Confederat'es had Oaptains Thomas and Clay wi th cav-
aIry as outposts on the river road. They met ,the advance gvard of !~el-
son's column about 15 miles from Piketon and were fired. on but not pur-
t 
sued as NelSon had no oavalry. On their return t'o headquarters, t,hey 
were again sent out with 2 companies of infantry and 20 mounted men. 
This force were stat~oned near Ivy Creek, where Capt. Thomas had al-
ready burned---tne-tlridge. They hid the horses in a mountain o~'ve and 
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the entire foroe, 250 strong, took up a position one half mile in front 
of the burned bridge. General Nelson describes the situation very vivid-
ly, tIThe mountain is highest along the river and very preoipitous and 
thiokly oovered with timber and undergrowth ,- and the road, which is 
but 7 feet wide, is cut along the side of it about 25 feet above the 
river, whioh is olose under the road. The ridge descends in a rapid 
curve .and very sharp to th~ creek, or rnther gorge, where it makes a 
complete elbow." The Confederates were soattered along the mountain 
side in ambush. They did not fire until Col. Marshall's men, the ad-
va~ce of the column, were right upon them around the ourve. They then 
opened fire with shotguns and rifles, killing 4 and wounding 13 of 
Col. Marshall's men. At this, the Federal column wavered and fell 
back, Tlje cannon were put in position in the road and the Kentucky 
troops ordered to oharge but this was wi thout effect. Meanwhile the 
2nd and 21st Ohio regiments made their way up the mountain side, 
thus gradually forcing the Oonfederates back. Oonfederates on the 
hills across the river also annoyed Nelson's comman~ u In an hor and 
20 minutes, the Oonfederates had retreated, leaving a number of dead 
and wounded upon the field and 6 prisoners unwounded. General l~el-
son reported his loss as 6 killed and 24 wounded, saying .that he haa 
been told the Confederates left 32 dead on the field. 001. Williams 
rep0rted his loss as 10 killed,~15 wounded and 40 missing, (of these, 
some returned to their' homes and some made their way to Williams' 
camp at Pound Gap). Williams optimistioally reported Nelson's loss at 
300 killed with "the usual proportion of vlOunded lt • His men made a 
st3nd at the burnt bridge, but the Unionists didn't nursue. The Fed-
. ~ 
eral troops mivouacked 4 miles beyond Ivy Creek that night and the 
next day made their way very slowly towards P1keton. Their progress 
was slow because of the heavy rains, mud, fallen trees across the 
road, bridges bur-ned by the Confederates, etc. -The newspapers said 
that the Confederates overshot, being station,ed along the llery steep 
defiles, and that very few of their shots came anywhere near the Union 
troops. 
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The expedition down John'3 Creek was meanwhile advancing. 
On the night of the 8th, Jol. Williams other reconnoitreing party, un~ 
der Oapt. Holliday encountered the advance guard of the Union detach-
ment and there was a slight skirmish ~ioh resulted on the Confederate 
side in 1 man wounded and 1 horse killed. Col. Williams reported that 
Capt. Holliday killed 8 of the Federal troops but Col". Sill rilade':no 
mention of such loss. The next night another party of 159 UI1der Capt. 
Shawn of the Confederacy, ran into 10 men under ~ol. Metcalfe and ac-
cording to Col. Sill's report, the Japtain himseif was wounded. 
The oavalry returned in haste to Piketon reporting that the enemy were 
advancing in full force up John's Creek. 001. riilliams immediately 
began his retreat from Piketon. This oocupied all of the 9th. As 
Col. Sill approached the town his advance was detain&.d for an hour by 
a company of sharp shooters stationed near the ford. There was a 
"', 
skirmish,. the Federal troops being deployed on the hillsid9'flanki:r:c 
the road. The 60nfederates lost 1 man killed and 3 wounded, the 
Unionists, 1 man wounded •. Meanwhile Col. Williams !!loved his rear 
guard of 400 and when the Ohio and Kentucky troops entered the town 
they found it entirely deserted by the soldiery. 
It is an interesting cO~:lIIlentary on human nature that 
i 
~ielson, who had no cavalry rep9rted tha t if he had only had cavalry 
he could have t~en or s lain the whole of his enemy, while 1,'lllliams, 
with cavalry reported, "Infantry armed with rifles are the men for 
this country. Cavalry is almost useless except for picket duty. It 
At that tLe contest was hardly an equal one. General 
Helson had 'about 2500 men while the utmost that Col. ','/illiams could 
muster was 1100. "iJi 11 iams ' men were poorly armed, badly clothed and 
totally undi3ciplined. !,Iany of them were barefooted and ns they 
marched through the cold November rain to Pound Gap their tracks were 
'nood stained. Col. Williams retired to Pound Gap, just over the Vir-
ginia line there to a,"lait re-enforcements and the arrival of the com-
manding General befo're attmnpting another invD.sion of Kentucky. (180) 
After the bat.tle Of Piketon, General Nelson's com'1and 
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was withdra,vn. Due to the lack of supplies and the latemess of the 
season for mountain warfare, it was felt that the enemy would not be 
,able to operate in this district at this time., Ho definite order. for 
this wi thdraVlal Vias found but General 3herrnari. wrote General Irhomas on 
November 12th, "Uelson h'as succeeded in breaking up Williams' party 
and 1 will direct him to return as rapidly as possible towards Paris 
and Lexington. (187) And on December 23rd, General 3uell wrote, 
"M;7 orders, on the return of General :~elson, were for one regiment to 
tI 
remain at Prestonbure. , and that at the time was supposed to be suf-
ficient, and perhaps would have been if it had remained there; but 
it was wi thdravffi to Louisa by the State authorities, to be mastered 
in, and recently, on the appearanoe of the force at Prestonburg, re-
\. 
tired to the mouth of the Sandy." (188) 
General H~phrey Marshall assumed command of the forces ~ 
at Pound Gap on November 28th. His oommand consisted of \7illiams' 
regiment, 800; Trigg's 54th Va., 560 (stationed at a point 18 miles 
northwest of Jeffersonville, Va., to protect the salt works near Ab-
. 
ingdon; Jeffress' battery,50jllla.jor Thomp;30n';; mounted battalion, 400 
strong, raised by an order of Gen. Zoilicoffer for 12 months' special 
serVice, ~- to defend the mountain gaps in the counties of Lee, Scott 
and Wise, Va., and unwilling to' leave their OWn state; Moore's batta-
lion, 400, and Stuart's regiment, 600 ,had been ordered to him, but 
had not arrived. 
On the 10th of December, Mlirshall had advance,d to \'lith-
in 1 mile of Prestonburg with Williams' regiment ,coming up through 
7lhi tesburg, Letcher oountry. and on throufh Floyd oounty. Meanwhile 
the 54th Virginia had come up from Richlands, Va., via the Louisa Fork 
of the Sandy and by way of ~iketon. The cavalry had been ~dvanoed as 
far as 'ilest Liberty to"ins[lire our friends and to prevent the enemy 
from stripping the oountry of its stock." Paintsville was occupied by 
the 22nd, with about 1100 men; the mounted battalion was at Licking 
. 
Station, 15 miles west, oovering the roads which red from the direotion 
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of Lexington and Paris. (la9) 
The Virginia battalion (29th) joined the oamp on Deoem-
ber 30th, making a total of 2400 men. Headquarters h~d been established 
3 miles west of Paintsville on the road to Prestonburg. '1~he situation 
was a commanding one on a hill and some entrenohment s had been thrown 
up. The oavalry had been oalled in and were enoamped on Jennie's Creek, 
while one 0 ompany of ';lilliams' regiment oooupied VI'hitF'sburg, Le toher 
county and one remained at Prestonburg. 
Although General l4arshall's advance was uncontested, 
Gener~l Buell had been full awake to the situation and had made plans 
to resist him. On Deoember 2n~, the 14th Ky. Volunteers at Oatletts-
burg was ordered to Prestonburg. "with a view of giving seourity to 
\ 
. \ 
the inhabitants in the region of the Big Sandy and of punishing ma-
" 
rauding bands of the enemy who annoy that part of the state." This 
move was stopped at Louisa sinoe the Confederates had already oocupied 
the town. 
Speoial orders No. 35 were issued from General Buell's 
Headquarters on December 17th, forming a brigade for duty in Eastern 
Kentuoky, constituted as follows: 
18th Brigade 
. 001. James A. Garfield, Commanding 
42nd regiment Ohio: 001. Garfield 
40th " " " Cranor 
14th " Ky.:" Moore 
6th " It It Lindsey 
Capt. McLaugllin's squadron of Ohio cavalry and 3 sqund-
, rons of the lirst Kentucky cavalry (uol. Wolford's), were attached to 
the brigade. The order stated that the brigade was organized to bper-
ate against the "rebel" foroes threatening and indeed actually commit-
ting depredations in Kentuoky, through the valley of the Big Sandy. Col. 
Garfield was commanded totlgo first to Lexington and Paris and' to plaoe 
the 40th Otio regiment~in such position was will best give a moral sup-
-~'-' , 
,,', tff?ri("'iit+~t):~,*jRMllihi#IMi6h4:,j';l4;iftf6:;";;Ui<,bi'#:.';Lji.:,ti·\ ' ) ¥f 'f,:' :"tf' ..... ;> .1t'rZ,* 
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port to the people in the oounties on the route to Prestonburg and Pike-
ton and to oppose any further advt.noe of the enemy on that route. He will 
then proceed to the mouth of the Sandy, with the least possible delay, 
and move the force in that vicinity up the river and drive the enemy back 
or cut him off. Having done that, Piketon is probably the best place 
to occupy to guard against further incursions."(190) 
About the time that General Marshall arrived at Paints-
Ville, Gol. Garfield started to meAt him, leaving lOUisa, Ky., with 9 
companies of the 42nd Ohio, 3 oompanies of the 14th Ky., and Major Mo-
laughlin's squad of cavalry. They arrived and encamped at a place on 
George's Ureek, 18 miles trom Paintsville on the evening of the 24th of 
Deoember. Their tents and\ supplies were oarried on a flatboat as tbeir 
\ 
wagons had not arrived from\Catlettsburg. About 28 wagons, almost 
\ 
empty were forwarded to carry the supplies on from George's Creek, but 
even the e~ty wagons oould hardly get over the miserable roads. 
From this oa.mp, Col. Garfield dispatched a message to 
Jol. Cranor at Mt. Sterling, (the 40th Ohio had been placed here accord-
ing to the above order), telling him to march to Prestonburg via Hazel 
Green and' Burning Spring, send~ng a strong party of oavalry via "Nest 
liberty and licking Station to drive in the Oonfederateforces on that 
i 
route and to protect Col. Cranor4 s flank and to rejOin him before he 
. reached Prestonburg. From Prestonburg he was to move down the river and 
hold himself in readiness to attack the enemy's position or cut off his 
retreat. (191) This on Decemoer 26th. 
Three days later the force moved up George's Cr~ek 6 miles. 
All df January 2nd and 3rd were required to move the wagon trains over 
Brown's Eill to the headwaters of Tom's Oreek, a distanoe of 3 miles. 
It required" a working party of 100 men besides. Soouting parties en-
countered and drove baok 100 Confederate cavalry from Tom's Hill, 2i;" 
miles on the way to PainstvUle on the 4th and the next day drove in sev-
eral small scouting parties, killing 1 man. On the 6th, Col Garfield's 
. 
cOJm'Il3.nd moved to the mouth of Muddy Branoh. and that night Marshall 
moved 2 regiments of infantr;,[lUld some artillery trom their fortified 
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hill to the south bank of ~aint Creek. The scouts reported to Marshall 
that the Unionists were advanoing in force and upon receiving this news 
Marshall immediately broke oamp, burning many of his wagons and all 
sorts of provisions, such as corn, o~ts, sugar, rice, etc. General 
Marshall had also intercepted 001. Garfield's letter to Col. Cranor, 
and he decided to leave his cavalry on guard at Paint Creek, while 
he advanced to the Prestonburg road leading to Saylersville and at-
tacked Col. Cranor. The roads were in such condition that it took 2 
days to reach the road leading from Saylersville to Prestonburg. ~he 
cavalry mask~d the retre~t. 
Colonel" Bolles, of the 2nd. Va. cavalry, had been ordered 
by General COx, commanding the Department of the Kanawha, to co-oper-
\ 
ate .... ;1 th Garfield in view of the fact that ba.nds of eohfederates were 
coming in from the Virginia side of the Sandy, and he joined Garfield 
on the 6th at noon. Thus re-enforced with cavalry, the Federali sts 
oooupied Paintsville. The Virginia oavalry were immediately sent, 300 
strong, to attnck the Confederate cnvalry on Jennie's Creek, while the 
infantry continued its march in the direction taken by fhe Confederate 
General. ~t 8 that night they entered the Confederate camp, which was 
four miles above Paintsville. The retreat had been so hasty that the 
oampfires were still burning and", there was every evidenoe of panio and 
disorder. Having reaohed his objective, Garfield started down Jen-
nie's Creek to the relief of Col. Bolles. But before Garfield arrived, 
Col. Bolles' advance of 60 men had attaoked 200 Confederate cavalry, 
killed 6, wounded several, and sent the rest scampering back a~ong the 
hills. Col. Bolles lost 2 ~illed and 1 wounded. The Virginia cavalry 
now returned to its command, but 6 companies of Col. 'Nolford' s cavalry 
under L~.-Col. Letcher arrived, having met Col. Cranor on the road. 
Col. Cranor had construed Marshall's movement as an intended attack and 
not having suffioient torce to fight him, had coma down Paint Creek in-
stead of going on to Prestonburg. 450 cavalry under Col. Letcher went 
down Jennie's Creek t~ attack any Jonfederate oavalry that might have 
oeen lett there, while 1100 pioked men went unde~ Col. Garfield up the 
Big Sandy towards Prestonburg. 10 mUes .long the road, the Conte-derate 
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pickets fired and retreated. About 9 that night the Federalists had 
advanced to the mouth of Abbott's Creek, one mile from Prestonburg. 
The Confederates were in their camp, 3 miles up the creek, according 
to the information received by the Union commander. The next morning 
the northern troops went up Abbott's creek 1 mile, then crossed over 
to Middle Creek, mich empties into the 3ig. 3andy just opposite Pres-
tonburg. Garfield thought that this manoeuvre would cut off the Con-
'" federate retreat from Aboott's Oreek. He found, however, that the 
Southerners were encal'q)ed about 2-:- or 3 miles up the creek at its 
forks. 
::ieneral Marshall's forces were disposed as follows: 
'rhe battery was placed in the gorge of the mouth 0 f the ~eft Fork of 
Middle Creek. To the right on the ridges were Williams' regiment, 
Moore's regiment and part of the mounted battalion, dismount8d; 
Triggs' regiment occupied the height covering the batter; 2 companies 
were held in reserve in the rear of the battery; while two companies 
were on the heights commanding the other side of the creek. (Thomas' 
and Clay'S) 
Gol. Garfield's troops arrived on the scene about 10 
in the morning but he drew them up on the side of a semicircular hill 
i 
a."ld made no move until 12 O'cloc,k when he sent 20 mo~nted men dashing 
across the plain to draw the Oonfederates' fire and disclose their 
position. Two Kentucky companies were sent to pass along the same 
ridge occupied by Garfield's forces ( w!-.ere Capt. Thomas and Clay 
had their forces). One company of the 40th and one 0 f the 42nd Ohio 
waded through the creek, with the water waist high, to attack the 
forces on the opposite ridge. From their position th~se last troops 
""ere the only ones that could be reached by the :::onfederate battery's 
guns. Soon the engt1gement along the ridge across from Garfield's :903i-
tion became sharp as the major portion of General-Marshall's forces 
7Iere there. Two companies of the 14th Kentucky were sent to re-enforce 
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001. Garfield' 3 right, at 'which the Gonfederates were withdrawn across 
the creek. 90 men were nov: sent to the left and after more fight ing, 
about 2 o'clock, 001. Cranor was sent to re-enforce them with 150 men 
of the 40th and 4::;nd Ohio and the 22nd Kentucky. Meanwhile the Confed-
erate cannon was moved to a point on the ridge near Gol. Moore's regi-
~ent from which point it could fire upon ~arfield's right and upon his 
reserves. 120 men from the 22nd and 14th Kentucky were sent across 
\ 
the\creek almost oPPosite Garfield's position and stormed the ridges 
, 
from the enemy's right flank thus preventing his attempt to outflank 
the Union ists. 'Thus the troops fighting the Jonfederates on their 
front and right, forced them b~ck from the heiehts near the creek. 
At 4.30, General r,rarshall ordered a retreat. As it was dr;rk it was 
not safe to start any pursuit for fear the men would get confused in 
the darkness and fire at their own forces. Soon the sky was ablaze 
TIith the light of the Confeder~te stores being burned, as the troops 
retreated. 
001. Garfield reported,. " Twenty-five of his(Jonfederate) 
dead wero found on the fie Id and 60 more were found next day throvm in-
to a gorge. A field officer and 2 captains were found among the dead. 
Our loss was 1 killed and 20 wounded, 2 of whom ha"IE) since died. We 
took 25 prisoners, among whom was' a rebel captain." Not more than 900 
of my force were nctualJy engaged, and the enemy had not less than 
3500 men." 
On the same subject, General Marshall 'I':rote, "I think 
our loss wJ 11 amount tOll .. killed and 15 wounded; not more. '.::'he loss 
of the enemy was ve~J severe. I understand he will report· 1 killed and 
10 or 12 wounded; his usual practice. ':/e suppose his loss to be over 
250 killed and about 300 wOlll"lded. 'fr.ese arl'l the estimnte3 of the neic:h-
bors. '::e sa"l his dead borne in nnmbers from the field~ and the emb"l.rk-
ation of his wou.'1ded was attest ed by severnl, '.'Iho place th0se est imates 
upon the number. ':Ihe field itself bears unerrinr testimony to his se-
bare loss. I can only flay to you, goneral, that my troops acted firmly 
and enthusiustically during the whole fight; and, though the enemy num-
r 
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som 5000 to our 1500, th ey v:ere c('rtain1y well whigl)Pd.. Ii' 1 had had 
brA'1d for m~T me
'
l, ( Jome of \'.'hcm had rad nothinr ~o ear fer 30 hours) 
1 should have rpnewed the n.ction after night; but an enemy f"reater than 
the Lincolni tes (starvation) summoned me to reach a point where we 
might c6'btain food for man and horse." General Mar8hall was most i~ig-
.,}': 
nailt over the Union claim of a decisive victo~.!, insistinE that h~:8-
was the victory. Colonel Garfield W!O,s satisfied, however, as he had 
succeeded in attaining his object, -- to dislodge the 00nfederate force 
in ~astern Kentucky. (192) 
30me of the nev!spaper stories 0 f this figh t were very 
amusing. A great point was ~~de of the fact that the ~onfeder8te3 t1d 
cannon vmile the Unionists did not, -- in fact General.Buell had re-
fused to send any to Garfield, telling him it would only be in the way. 
Garfield himself, co,nments on the fact that most of the ~onfederate 
shells failed to explode. By way of proof, however, a 6 pound cannon 
(193) 
ball was sent to the edit or of the "Frankfort Commonwealth". In a let-
ter to the"Louisville Journal", o"'e of the soldiers in the 22nd Ken-
tucky ·wrote, "The rebels overshot all the time and their shells feU 
without exploding. Perhaps some Union man made them and filled them 
with law-dust to pay for the trick played off at ~'lashington. tI (194) 
Quite characteristic of the mountaineers as they are 
presented in fiction is this account, " The editor of the "Mt. Ster-
ling ';,hig has conversed with several young men who belonged to l..1ar-
shall's rebel army but made their excape. ~hey give a deplorable ac-
count of the sufferings of these troops. To use'the language of one 
of them, he says,"The boys will fight the devil when they h:,ive'Nhiskey, 
but when they have not got this, their condition :nakes them unhapp;! and 
miser~,ble and there is not much fight in them then.'" (195) 
Uarshall pursued his course next day to Martin's ]Jill 
on Beaver Oreek, 16 miles away,-- arriving there 3 days later. Eere 
he remained and conceived a new line of action, \~hich would £,i ve him 
the advantage of rivel' 'transportation for supplies, . ( held by the 
Unionists during the c~paign just finished), arid 'Vvhich would force the 
.... 
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Unionists overland. This was the oocupation of the line of the Ken-
tucky River above the 3 forks of that stream. He was starting to 
plaoe his troops on this line when he was ordered to fall back to 
Pound Gap on January 24th. (196) By Feb. 2nd, he was at the Gap, 
with all of his force out of Aentucky except Coli \Villiams command 
which has received permission to occupy the Kent-lck'J side of the moun-
tains in Letcher, Harlan or Pike counties. On the 13th, ,Japt. Witcher 
was also oriered back into Kentucky to observe the enemy around Pike-
ton. 
~:.'olford' 3 cavalry was moved to '::est liberty on Jan. 31st, 
to act as scouts towards 'iJhitesburg and Piketon and to suppress any up-
rising in Magoffin and the ad~acent count ies. 'The 14th kentucky re-
mained at PaintsvIlle to guard the stores and the rest of the force re-
moved to Piketon, except one squadron of cavalry which was waterbound 
at ?restonburg. (197) 
General Garfie ld, on hearing that General Marshall 
had ordered the militia of the Virginia count ies adjcining Pound Gap 
to muster at the Gap, started out to attack that place before the 
militia could come up. He took with him 6G infantry under 001. Cranor, 
Majors Pardee and Cook and 100 cavalry under Major McLaughlin and 
I 
started up the river. The detac~ment reached the,foot of the Cumberland 
range on the ni£'tlt of the 15th. lbe force of mounted men raised for this 
special service under Major Thompson still held the Gap. They had built 
some defenses on the top of the mountain and had blockaded the road on 
the Kentucky Side, according to oustom, by felling heuvy trees across it. 
Very early the next day Major Mclaughlin led his cavalry 
up the main road while the infantry were guided up a little used path 
about 1 miles to the left. Part of the infantry under Go1. Cranor \','ere 
sent enound the foot of the mountain to attack from the rear, co~nG up 
the mountain on the Virginia side. This road, outting off the retreat 
was missed. The other detachment of infantry under Col. Garfield was 
delayed beyond the tiMe set by the heavy snows, so ~nen Major MCLaughlin 
made his at tack in front, receiving no support. he w~ forced to fall 
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fected a surprise. V,'hen they were discovered the Confederates formed 
in line of battle but after about 6 rounas had been fired, retreated 
in some disorder. Major Thompson said the re-enforcing company got 
lost in the fog, and when they finally found themselves betweAn two 
colunms of the Union men, went down the mountain on the northern side 
and passed around the foot of the mountain to the Virgi.nia side. 
Receiving word at this time of Col. Cranor's attack upon the force 
left at the foot of the mountain on the Virginia Side, Major Thomp-
son, believing himself completely surrounded by a superior force, ordered 
a retreat by the afore-mentioned road, which the Federal troops had 
failed to guard. Major Thompson reported that he made a stand 4 miles 
away, but Col. Garfield reported that his force pursued the Confederates 
-
for 6 miles until they were all dispersed. 'l'hey retreated to .<\bing-
don. 
As everything had been abando,ned in the rapid flight of 
the Confederates, Col. Garfield burned the huts on the summit of the 
mountain and such stores as he could not immediately use for his men. 
No casualties were reported. (198) 
General ~arshall remained in Virginia and busied him-
self with raising the militia in the counties adjacent to Pound Gap 
i 
and ,':ith writing letters ano. 10~g reports. On March 26th all of the 
18th Brigade was 'removed from Eastern Kentucky except the 40th Ohio 
and the 15th Kentucky with the 1st Squadron Ohio Cavalry. Col. Cranor 
was placed in command with orders to move to Prestonburg on April 9th. 
~is orders particularly stressed the necessity for protection 'or the 
citizens of the valley. (199) 
When ~eneral Kirby Smith planned to invade Kentucky 
in the summer of 1862, he met ~nera1 Marshall at Knoxville- and it 
was decided that while one entered the State from East Tennessee, the 
other would come in from Virginia. General Marshall was delayed by 
General Loring,however, who deemed this expedition o~ Marsnall's part 
~ 
,mtimely and who desi~ed(t,;.he detain the Kentuckian's command to further 
his own plans of operation. The President intervened and Mar,shall was 
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free to take up his maroh. On the 19th of September, President Davis 
/wired him that he had expected General Marshall to be en route to Ken-
tucky before that time. (200) General Marshall took his old path 
through Pound Gap, Piketon, Prestonburg, across to Saylersville and on 
to Mount Sterling. General Kirby Smith ordered General Marshall on 
September 24th to pursue General George Morgan, making his way from 
Cumberland Gap to the Ohio River. (261' As stated above, General Mor-
gan waited two days at West Liberty expecting an attack by General 
Marshall but there was no information was to why this attack was not 
made. General Marshall would have a hard time in this modern age when 
co-operation is the watchword, for he was certainly an individualist, 
in warfare at any rate. He showed himself most unwilling to ac-
oept orders from anyone but the President t and his force was of li ttle ./ 
value, it seemed to me, in this concerted movement. After tte battle 
of Perryville •. General Marshall retired via Bryantsville, Har.,odsburg 
and Oamp Dick Robinson, then on through Richmond to Mt. Sterling. On 
October 15th, General Smith wrote General Bragg that he had gi ven 
,. 
General Marshall to go to Pound Gap, v~ Richmond, as the route through 
r 
Pound Gap was still open. (202) 
His only pursuers were 381 men recruited for the 14th 
Kentucky cavalry, who had with them 1 piece of artillery, the property 
of the citizens of Maysville, Ky., -- a volunteer crew of whom accom-
panied the troops. These left Maysville under Mr. Wadsworth Thursday, 
October 16th. On Friday night they reached Sharpsburg, near Mt. Ster-
ling and learned that General Marshall was at Tickt~m, 7 miles from 
Mt. Sterling on the Hazel Green road. On Saturday 17 of Marshall's 
men were captured at Mt. Sterling and Oapt. Wadsworth immediately sent 
his mounted men(70) with some Home Guards and volunteers from the cit-
izenry toward~ Ticktown. These captured 40 stragglers, but did not 
dare to attack Marshall, whose force numbered about 3000. The 22nd 
Michigan was ordered up to assist in the pursuit but was inmediately 
recalled. lIr. Wadswortp in his report of Oct. 29th, 1862. said, "I 
went on to Mount Sterling again to endeavor to protect mw distriot 
with the 392 recruits, not in the service of the United States, against 
Hu~hrey ~shall's horsemen. Marshall, with his train and artillery, 
and such of his infantry as di d no t desert, has eas ily escaPf ed, with-
o~t any pursuit except such as I have detailed, through Prestonbure, 
and on his way to Abingdon, Virginia. I should say 1000 to 1200 of 
his men had deserted him. I captured 150 and 50 horses, besides mus-
kets, pistols, etc. His horsemen remain behind in hentucky to plunder 
and ruin the people. On Saturday I heard of 600 under Witcher and 
400 under Camron in Morgan and Bath counties, and 150 in Powell, be-
yond Staunton, under Gay, Bradstaw, ~~d other thugs, murdering, plun-
dering and burning. (203) 
MarShall, with such of his command as he could per-
suade to leave Kentucky, retired to A.bingdon, Va. On ~Jovember 5th, 
Col. John Dils, whose regiment, the 39th Kentucky, was in process of 
formation, went to Piketon. Some Confederates, ( as far as I could 
learn these were a part of Marshall's men who remained in Kentucky), 
about 600 in number, had a camp at Coal Grove, which Col. Dils at 
once attacked. Although the force attempted to retreat at his ap-
proach, he captured 75 prisoners, 150 guns, some horsos and mules 
and camp equipaee. Some of the pris oners, who bad been in the Confed-
erate arrow refused parole, pref~~ring to take the oath of allegiance 
to the United States or to join the ynion arrow. Col. Dils was a fire-
eater. Ee claimed that his men had aaptured more men and property 
than any force ever sent up the 3ig Sandy and added .rNe challenge in-
vestigation." (204) 
His triumph, however, was short-livod; Jol. Jrunor was 
again appOinted cOlrmander of the force in the Sandy Valley, but Col. 
Dils refused to recognize his authority because his (Dils) regiment 
was not yet mustered into the service of the United States. On Dec. 3, 
without the knowledge or consent of Col. Cranor, Who had established 
the Headquarters of the District If Eastern Kentucky at Louisa,';ol. 
Dils ordered some push~boats down the river, loaded with commissary 
and quartermaster supplies for his regiment. Four miles below Pres-
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tonburg, 20<) of the 39th, who were act ing as escort for the boats, 
were attacked by about 806 Jonfederates, mostly mounted, under the 
cO;:J.1land of :'::01. Clarlcwn, of the Virginia. 3t2te Line Jnvalry. 
Aftnr a sqirited skirmish in which the Ijonfederates lost 2 men killed 
and 7 \'lounded .vhile the 39th lost 2 killed and 25 prisoners, tte 0on-
federates oaptured the boats, whose stores their Colonel valued at 
~Z50,OOO.OO.Jol. :':;nrnor "aid that oonsiderable of the stores tai<::en 
were recaptur~d as the Jonfederntes did not take the trouble to des-
troy them,. but :'::01. Jlark30n repDrtea. th:--ct they destroyed all that 
t!-:e men did not wnnt as :plunder.:':;ol. Jrmor sent out several de-
taohemtns to guard the stores and to reoapture them after they were 
taken,. but accordi ne to 001. Clark;;on, the only encounter after tlle 
oapture was \':ith 001. Dils that same night on the rond bety!ecn Pres-
to'lburC and Piketon. :;:the 'lirginia Oavalry occupied. l'iket 011 ala. thon 
moved on OV8r into their own state. (::0;;) 
GA.'1eral 1:arshall never achieved very :nuch in his in-
roads in the i.entucky mountains. !-lL;, idea, in operGtin[; that wny, 
was originally to send cavalry dashing i~to the Bluegrass on raids 
(206) 
such as those made famous by Morgan. His force.s never really e-
quip:ped by the Confedernte governcent for this service, but at least 
he had the aonmen to plan for it, long before ~,iorgan succeeded in do-
iYlg it. ~brshall hi::lself felt that he had not receivel the support 
he had been led to believe he mi ~'h t h2ve from tLe government and was 
SO!!HWlha t voci ferous concerni'1G this. ~~e ,':as no disciplin3rian and 
'1€vf'>r oTpani7.ed well the troOl)S at his disposal so :pprhn.:ps the·Jonfed-
erflte authorities were wise in not GrantinG all of his requests. He 
did. succeed, however, in keeping alive the enthusinsm for the 30uthern 
cmlse in the mountainous district ~f Eastern Kentu~~J. 
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Chapter II. 
Home Guards and Guerrillas in the Mountains. 
The information in regard to these two classes of 
fighters is so very meagre a~d scattered as regards the mountains 
that it is difficult to make any definite statements concerning them. 
In the report of the 1U11 tary Soard of Kentucky, Sept. 
3, 1861, in regard to the arms issued to State troops, it is reported 
that in the 4th Congressional District rifles and :!luskets have been 
issued to Home .Guard ccbmpanies in the following counties: 
r , 
Wayne 1 company of infantry 44 
Pulaski 2 companies of i nfnntry 88 
L1:1coln 1 company of infantry 
...M.-
'.:'otal 176 
In the same district, ar;1lS were issued to 3tate Guards only in Pulas-
i 
,.' ki county where 1 company of infantry received 40 !rlilskets and 6 swords. 
l 
, 
In the Sixth Jongressional District, :!luskets were i5-
sued at the rate of 44· to the one company organized in Knox COU'}ty and 
at the same rate to the one company organizod in I..!lay county. (207) 
There were no references anyv.'here to HOloo Guard com-
panios in Eastern Kentucky (mountains), in the year 1861. 
On September 16th, 18tH, Cieneral Anderson requested 
i 
Mr. Sa'1luel Gill, of the Military Joard of Kentucky, to order the Home' 
Guards to rendezvous at Lexington, Camp Dick Robinson and other con-
veniant places in order that they ~nieht be used against the C!ollfed-
orates, but chiefly thnt their arms might not fall into the hands of 
the 30utherners.' (208) The Home Guards of Barbourville were the 
first to make a st and against the advancbg army of ,'}eneral Zollicoffer, 
as stated above. On September 30th, another C,'1mp at Laurel 3ridge in 
Knox county was also attacked and the forces ronted. Ttese forces con-
sisted of the ~ome Guards under Gol. '3rown and part of :::01. '::01 ford 's 
cavalry. :~hey retreated to Camp ':lildcat, .':here theY,lroved a source 
of annoyance to Col. Garrard, as the problem of feeding them loomed 
. 
large and .'"!s they v;ere undisciplined and destroyed the soldierly s'ys-
tern in his camp. ~hey numbered over :::50, as Col. Garrard v:rote Gene:r;al 
Thomas that Gol. Brown had succeeded in enlisting 290 of twelve months' 
men. These, I presume, were enlisted for service in their onw 10ca1-
ities. 
That the Home Guards assisted the regular United 
States Volunteers in these early days in southeastern hentucky, is 
slaovm by the fact that 001. Hoskins collected the Home Guard~ of lin-
coln and Pulaski counties to aid him in his attack on the Confederate 
cavalry at Albany and Traversville, ~enn. ((209) Again, on Nove~ 
bar 6th,' General Schoepf reported from London, "The Home Guard re-
port to have had a skirmish with the enemy's scouts yesterday, getting 
., 
the advantage in several respects. (210) 
Vfuen General Zollicoffer moved over on the Cumberland 
at Mill Springs, his cavalry had frequent skirmishes in 2 of which 
Home Guards were mentioned. As these parties generally fired at 
each other across the river, it seems probable that tte Guards were 
not rendezvoused for this service. (2l1) 
General George MQrgan in his official report of the 
campaign against Cumberland Gap, March 26th to June 18th, lSol, 
makes no mention of any assistance from Home Guards. The "Louisville 
.J __ ...... A,.( 
JiVa.eI:", however, contained an interesting account of their part in 
the attack, '.':hich seemed worthy 'of notice. The account was in a 1et-
ter to the "Cincinnati Commercial" from a correspondent at the Gap. 
He wrote, "There was one little episode in the transactions of the 
last few days that I wish to relate, for the purpose of d~ing jus-
tice to a brave people, as also to a ~what malignant instituion7--
the Home Guard. It seems that Capt. Ferry, Quartermaster at Flat 
Lick, telegraphed General Morgan on the 15th for permission to take 
the convalescent soldiers in the hospit~ls and the Home Guards in 
Harlan and adjacent counties, and make a diversion in his favor in 
front of the Gap, whilst the General moved on the. rear. Permission 
was as readily granted as asked. No sooner did the brave and hardy 
mountaineers constitu~lng the Home Guard of this section know that they 
would be permi t ted togo on ~he expedi t ion than they commenced to as-
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semble by 3cores. It re·ninded me very much of· the storie3 I have read 
of Lexington, Ooncord and Bunker Hill. They left their plows in the 
furrows, their harvest, fields, their shops, and came with gun in hand 
to perform what they could and avenge the wrongs which they tad suf-
fered.I have no doubt a Fourth Avenue exquisite, ay, even yourself, 
would have laughed could you have seen the Captain's army, for tr~ly 
it was a motley affair, comprising 170 convalescent soldiers and 385 
20me Guards. ~he latter were without coats in a great measure, had 
on the much despised 'butternut breeches' and were as nondescril?t an 
assembly as the eye of mortal man ever rested upon. But they would 
fight •••••••• Capt. Ferry moved on the Gap as he was ordered, and en-
,. 
camped within 4t miles of it, after running in the rebel pickets, 
with the intention of making a demonstration soon in the morning. 
During the night a messenger wa3 sent to him informing him of the 
evacuation and occupation of the Gap by General Morgan. The men com-
posing the'Flat Lick arrow' were not a little disappointed at not hav-
ing a shot at the enemy at all events, b-.lt,it was willed otherwise." 
(212) 
When General Kirby 3mith moved over into AentuCky in 
AU~lSt, 1862, the Home Guards made numerous attacks upon his foraging 
parties and caused him considerable annoyance. (213) 
I In the Sandy Valley, the mountain counties did not or-
~~ 
! ~ ganize Home Guard companies so early as they did in the counties bor-
l 
it 
~ dering on the Tennessee border. When Col. Garfield was ready to 
~-:. 
1, 
~ leave the valle.y after his successful campaign against Humphrey Mar-
~-
shall, he aadressed a letter to the State Legislature Urging the form~ 
ation 0 f Home Guard companies in that district. He said, "There is 
now no organized force of the enemy in Eastern Kentucky, and if the 
,~ 
Union men could be furnished with arms and the militia thoroughly re-
organized the whole region could be easily rrotected in future. I 
believe there is no further danger of an invasion from beyond the bor-
, ~, 
.. ders of the State, but there wU1 be for a long time hereafter co.n-
""""y~,~~ 




t no other object than to rob and plunder. "(214) This letter was writ-
~ ten on March 6th, and on March 17th, just before it adjourned, the 
Legislature, with its usual habit of following the line of least re-
sistance, adopted resolutions askine the "commanding officer in East-
ern Kentucky" to lenve there a force sufficient to protect that part 
of the State. (215) 
'~he pAoIJ1e themselves seem to have had more initia-
tive, for some companies of Home Guards were organized. On ,l\1arch27th, 
the "Louisvil1e Jour~'1al" published a letter tellinc of the capture 
of some prisoners by the Home Guards of 'Nolfe county. It contained 
the following, "The Home Guards of Wolfe county, having recently ob-
tained some arms from the State, have b~en active in guarding the 
private passes which lead through the mountains southeast of Ut. 
Sterling, through which mountain passes the rebels from Kentucky 
hflve passed out to the South and returned to Kentucky at their pleas-
ure, visiting Humphrey 11arshall t s camp in ttJeir travE"ls. About a 
week ago one squad of these Guards took a couple of prisoners of Boone 
county, vmo had a large bag of letters taking out to Kentucky rebels 
and saddle baes stuffed as full as they could hc,ld of gold lace to 
be used on rAbeI uniforms. One of the men had a pass from the War 
Department at Richmond. ~he next 'day anothor squad of the same Guard 
arrested 3 other prisoners •••••• All five of the .prison~rs '.vere t~ken 
on Frozen Creek in the COU?lty of Breathitt •••• The Union men in ','':olfe 
and Brpathitt have had a hard time until recently when they procured 
some arms from the State and now they say that the rebels shall not 
pass through treir rerion of the mountains. The public roads 1ead-
ing out of Kentucky have been aband.oned by the rebels for some months 
as they were not safe in passing them. Their private ways seem now 
to be pretty well stoIJped." (216) 
In August, the Eome 8-uards of Pike .und Floyd co;mties 
fO'lght some bnnds of guerrillas. '~his will be discussed later. After 
the battle of Perryvillye, not only the valJey of the Sandy but all tr,e 
rest of the State wa~ overrun wi th small bands of marauders. ',';'hen 
Col. Cranor was orde~ again to the Sandy Valley, General Wright wrote, 
, .' 
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Abont this ssme time, General Marshall reported that Capt~ Caudill, 
who had been left with 9 companies of infantry in Letcher county at 
'libitesburg, had been oonstantly engaged with the Home Guards (numberting 
(00) and on the whole very successfully, though one party of 40 Home Guards 
had entered Whitesburg, killed several oitizens and burned the house of 
all Cfl.pt. ~il1's relatives, in addition to taking his wife off a:3 a 
pwisoner. (20:2:409) 
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"From this regiment (39th Ky) and from the Horre Guards of the various 
counties you will be able to draw much assistance. (Z17) '~his was on 
October 19th, 1852. 
A month later Jol. Ha\vkins, 5th Kentucky Reeiment, J. S. 
A., 'wrote to Governor Hawes concerning affairs in Ea1tern l~entuc:rl:y. 
urging that Confederate troops be organized for service in Kentucky 
r to compete, so to speak, with the Home Guards, now that the regular 
t, 
Confederate army had been withdrawn. He '7ives the most comprehen-
sive report I found concerning Home'}uards, ItJohn Dils, jr., tre 
leader against us in that country, has from 400 to 600 troops and 
Horne Guards on the Sandy. If to this !lumber the Home :iualds of ?ike, 
Floyd, Johnsoy!, la ... :rencA, :.!arter, RowaIJ., :,~organ, '.'lolf, "'\lgoffil1, 
Perry, 3reathitt, and Letcher :';ounties be add.ed, it Y;i11 swell the 
number to more than a full regiment, armed and equipped. ~heir pol-
icy is to organize these mountain coanties as speedily a3 possi ":)le 
afainst us. '.::'aki ng ad:;a.'1taee of our retreat from the St,::,te, they nre 
tryinf:; to convince the people t.tat we have e;i ven the State up. In 
tris way they seduce many ma.'1Y into their Rome Gaard organizations. 
They threaten others that they shall abandon the State unless ttey 
join them and take up arms aga.inst the 30uth. 1:1 this '\';ay they are 
fast subjugatinG' tte peoIlle, and, if permitted to par:;ue their pol-
icy ~md.ist',lrbed until sprinG', that whole count!"'J will be organized 
against us." (218) 
':;!hus it y;ould seem ttat many Horne Guard organizations 
owed their existence to the presence in the Sta.te of arlIlE'd bands of 
plunderers. Since almost all of tt e troops operating in the moun-
tainous district were forced at one time or another a..'1Q to a gre:1ter 
or les3 extent, to subsist off of the country, it is sometimes diffi-
cult to tell whether the reference is to organi~ed bands, operating 
as partisan ranG'ers under the military C!o:1trol ::lore or les3 of the 
United States and the :.!onfederacy, to reGUIGr trGo)s led. by la-,-:-abid-
inc officers, or to those mOll bent upon .!.JLl:1ier '::ho took advanta,-:;e of 
the civil strife to :'lrey upon an :mprotected por)ulation. It is a 
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recoenized fact that tr.e ~onfedf'rate '::ar Del)artme:lt sa:'1cti oned the 
orGanization of CO,1l1)ani(>3 for n:uerrilla i':arfare, Q-:.lring the early 
st:1res of the wo.r. "2h038 v:ere 8fterv .. ards referred to as "IJartis?.n 
troops II. (:::13) }enoral }eorre :,:orran org:mi:::ed one such c anr>any 
near ,~u!nberlar,d Gar> for rJ.errilla service, under Clift,an East '.:.'ennis-
ser leader. (220) '.~L:,t is the only reference to 3-:1Clc nIl orrani:m-
tion r001larly connected ~ith the i<'edoral service. 
W\o \-u.4t~ do io C\~ 
I:'ho situation differed sO!!lewhat in the tv:o districts, 
'"-:a<;tern Ae":tucky and. 30~lt'1ea'3tern ~~e'1tucky. In ~a3tern i:entncky 
the BilOrrilla5 at first were larc:el:r deserters fro:n :ieneral Z:arsr,all's 
force:>, or troo:ps organized under him who refused to leave r:entucky 
and stayed in Kentucky ':'ith or ';;itho'.lt the consent of the com:-::andin:s 
officer.:'brse ',':ere ]onfederate syr:1l)3thizers. :'he first C'Uerrilla 
deyn'p.dati'ons in 30~ltheastern ::entucky c" .. 'Ile fron aands of trccps Or-
ganized in the border coulties of :'e:me3ser, C2.l1r:l "independent COr.1-
[)anios" ani rrco':":lizinc no t:mthorit:r to s:peak of. later, whe:l the 
:Jo:::federates to k the Cou;ltr<J, many cf theTJnio21 l~len 10ft t:--"eir horn8s 
and 1ived in tte mou:lt-:ins, ret:liiatine 1.lpcn tl-_6 ·:':;o::federate troops 
b:,' [)lcrri 11a ::lot;: ods. 
A.n editori'11 in the "louisville :'::ourier" for .\l)ril 
'-'JAIl. :,:r. :'rentice \'.Tote: flSordAr ',,'arf'lI'l': ')i'icn :-:cllicof:cr r:u\de 
::':ill 3.rrin[:,s, thmse o'I'1ds hnd lJos5Pssion cf :'::li:ltO'l ec,mty ::tl1d '.'.'81'( 
O f' r'>v""'-', dec """;"Jl- ; "11 l' n 1 "r"e amr"nts, ~· .. l· J.' I-I. I:,~ ,_ ~t,. •• v.t. .. ..,;. V~V... -'-- t.. , .... vi. 
:.!r.ley ',vere 1"('oe15 :1Ct directl~T C o'11eeted '::i th ttc CO'lfeder:1t;e aLIlY, 8'clt 
in effect protected ~by it, as tLe~T were y;ithin its lilles. .d. ie1.ntu-
tion of ci ti zens waited. on .301licoffer ani i'Lforuin him of t!;(~ acts 





nott:nf to do '::ith them, thDt they were not a p:lrt of hi~ arm:? anJ. that 
therefore the citL,ens ;:Llst look els8\','here for trotecticn, t~lis, toc, 
after hi,~ llroch-:.mation th::.\t te Lid come into that pnrt of the state 
for the pUr:!Jose of protecting the people in their constitutional riF'hts. 
After the rebel rout at ~':'ill 3Ilrir1[s SO!:le of the citizens of tIe border 
the!':lselves against the soces3ion :naraclders who i';ere s:'ill iLl the 
:no;1l1toins aero.')" t.l~p state line, our troops h'lvir::: bee} ·,:it.hdra·,·;n ,:1d 
\\tl ich a nu:n~_;8r of me~1 have bep:l ld ll-,~d <it their hO:!lPS G'ld in s}:irmi shos. 
"'12 tave Learll it charf"Cd that our !:ome Guards under ~ircu:::3t8nces of 
gre8t and peculiar ,,-cgravation have resorted to retaliat or;;r ,ne:ls, .. res. 
and ::l'3dr:· e~{curs:ons intc ~ennessee seizinG propert.y a~ld aven:- inc the 
assassination of t.heir neichbors. ',:e silall not stop to ir1quire \",r:c7,her 
tLis is tr-.lC or not for it is certain that no a[zressions ';:err; 800-
mitted 'Oy l,e:ltuckians u?1til '';:ennesseans under PoL<_ a:ld Zollicofi'er in-
vsded o:u- 3tate." (:;::1) 
In the early uay,3 of the war. Jhamp Fere'ison, Jim Jhris-
man and a man named Art.hur, these last tv;o citizens of '::ayne and ••. .'10:-: 
county , respectively, were a'!lonc tr;e leaders of these banus, vbo re-
joiced in such !lar:lCS as the "Bull Pups" or "Willi Cats". (;:,23) 
l'ha t the Union men did. net hesi U,te to resort to the 
"aroo measures is 3ho\".'".'1 by a ~otice t!1a t "~irby 3!:lith posted. :2his read, 
~:e[~dquarters ~onf. Forces., 
Army of 3ast ~enn., 
A~l[l:tS t :::0; 18:32. 
:::'0 the ::atize:ls of ';:>10:<: Jeunty a'"11 t:ie Adjacpnt co:mtie3 of r~~T., 
"Findi:l[ tr:a: you hFive been deceived by the ;.1iSr8pre-
S"?1tations of our enemies an-j h:-:nre 'oee~ LId :tced by thf'm not· only to 
leave :lour !lO!:les b".lt :.also to resort to the co,\vclrdly :pr3.ctice of b'J.sh-
\··hacki~8', I no~: promise you tLat if you return quietly to ;','our ho:nes 
"1<) -
:7 .... 
aYld lpad orderly livf!s you ''-'ill not be disturbed b-:lt \':i11 be pro-
tected in your rights. 
If, on the contr:iry, :'TOU per.3i3t i:1 firi'1f,' upon:rry 
soldiers from tte woods you wi 11 be hung 'l.'hen you arG C3:1[::0; t and 
your home and property will be destro~!ed." (Z:':'4) 
At the ve17 end of the year 18GZ, Major John ~ason 
31'0\'.'11, 10th i:~y. cavalry, ·.Tote of tte citizens of .. _no:;.: a:ld. ·:.f~itle;f 
COUrlt i8S, tF.J:'hrdr only defflYlse agni ns t a pillaeing and :n uclcrinG foe 
is their riflG3 3ad an unconquerable love for their homes ahd their 
Governmen t. 1 was i:nlllorr'i by numbers of tr-.em to represent to 
head'1uarters tll.'.1t bushwhacking was v:ith them an inexorable necessity 
in their presellt :mas.,isted C ondi t ion, Yihieh could [lnd ','.'culd cease 
witL the presence of efficient aid." (225) 
';.'ow3rd the end of 1%2, ,}eneral ·':.-right 3btAd tta t 
3aste1'n J\.e:ltucky "has bef:n since tte cO'lX:lencement of the v;ar the 
scene of almost c on3tant 3"le1'ri11a .... iarfare and there is less in the 
""lay of 3ubsi''5tp:lce for ::In!1 or horse t:-a.'1 is to be :~aj irl otl-,p.r ::mJ. 
not :ncre '')roductive 3e~tions." (226) 
After 0el. Garfield had. succeeded in di sJ.ou.t,ing Gen. 
Ib.lnphrey 11arshall from Kentucky soil, he sent out ~ special expedi-
tions against small predatory bands. As none of these e11counters are 
i 
noticed in the vonfederate reports, it is to be presUl:leJ. that that 
these men were either deserters from the Jonfederate forces, or inde-
Ilendent bands orga.'1ized in the mountains. One ietacooent of 150 in-
fantry were sent from Garfield' 3 He;ldquarters at Paintsvi He to the 
quarters 
head~2t&Xg of the Little 3andy where two co~panies of rebels, accord-
inc toGarfield, were engaged i'11 phmderine. About the same time another 
detactment of 110 ..... :ere sent to Piketon "\':here ttey dispersed another ma-
raudi'11g band and captured several leading Secessionists. '~l:is was in 
January, before Jol. Garfield moved down to Piketon. Later, on :\1arch 
5th, Ja:)t Garrard of the 22nd Kentucky infantrJ was sent iov:n the road 
from Piketo!1 to ?ound Gap as far as Elkhorn ~reek, and then up the Jreek 
to its mouth. Eere a band of marauders under Ca]t. f;lenifee "ere rob-
bine the people and acting as scouts for General ~.Iarshall.(227) ~Io re-
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port of tte results of this expedition 'were given. Cariously enoLlgh. 
General l1arshall' himself complains of the action of ':':enifee in AUQ,lst 
, 1332, saying he will not h2ve an independent company enter the ter-
ri tory before his cOl'lr.la~d and terrify the people and destroy the prop-
arty. Fis aeita.tion may ha.ve been due to tr..e f;-lct thAt at this time 
,~enifee was reported to be recr-dting in ;{entucky for Gener31 Floyd's 
co:n.rnand, and (}eneral !.1arshall regarded Kentucky a." his o',';n Sl)ecial 
field for obtaini'1p accessions to the C:onfederate ar:ny. (2:"'S) 
Golonel 1.1arshall, of the 16th l':entucky infantry, !l1Clkes 
the only reference found to "Union euerrillas" by that name, altho'.lgh 
undoubtedly this type of ':.arf3.re was necessitated for them bil the f::;.ct 
that they .,-,'ere run out of the towns for the roost part. 001. Marshall 
wrote, "':/0 have some 12 or 14 prisoners in tte jai 1 Lere. :\monc them 
( 
is a se<>ecr: colonel by the name of I.lcJlellan; also 2 lieutenants out 
of that celebrated band of desperadoes under Japt. '!/i teher. :'hey 
"'ere t ..,1ren a ne . ~ rr-o b r t of Unl· on 0-;'6rri lIas." (~~'<!ll 
" , ........ , .l i'! a.ay~ at.) y i:l par Y L>~ --" 
Oaptain '.'Ii tcher v:as at that ti:ne, Apri 1 28, 186.2, a lJemoer of }ener-
al Marshall's brigade, yet he, Henifee and a Japt. Jemcins are 8ften 
referred to as the ring-leaders. _ ~d.;""~~ 
181.'2., 
2he following letter from the "Louisville JO'clrnal" for 
It 
June 2nd, is typic!)l of the r8p~rts of the depredatio'13 in the mO~A!ltains 
from enrly in 1852 on to thp end. of the ~rear: itA letter from ·;;oife coun-
ty se~!l by the editor of the Frankfort 80m.'1l0ll'l:ealth, gives tLe :la.'1les of 
the person carried off by the ro";)oer5 and m:lrderers in that 5ecticn.~tey 
\vere 3arnunl ::urst, his son ·':illiam :i:urst, John ',,'. H2zelriig ~nd Joel,. 
Gordon from Vie3t Libert:!. 'ltese. are as respectable men aJ an;! in that 
country and t hoir only offence is that the~T are Gnion men. :2hey carried 
off ',vi th thes.e men 15 others from Hazel J.reen and vicini t:r. 1}-,ey also 
broke into n store there and robbed it of its contents. They stole, 
moreover 18 horses from the neighborhood. ~his is bad enough but in addi-
tion they LlurLlered James Jarnet of 3reathitt C01l.'lty. James F,risoy of ~or-
gan county and others whose Da~es are not mentioned. 1he editor of the 
Jo:nmonwealth says he is a !Dan whose state::lAnts may be relied upon. Un-
til recentjy these oandits have contented themselves with horse stealing. 
l 
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but now they are growing bolder and are adding lourder to robbery. We 
hear of their o-atrages thro-aeh Bath, !:Iontgornery, Floyd, ''-'olfe and all 
along the line of their rendezvous in Virginia thro-agh the gaps in the 
Cumberland mountains. As to callinE' them soldiers, in any sense of the 
term, it is a misnomer, -- they have nothing soldierly either in action 
or purpose. '.;,'!;.ey may be c'}lled, instead. of guerrillas, gorillas, -- a 
sort of exagEer[:;ted rlcnkey recently discovered in tre interior cf ADt\.ica 
who have something of the human form, -- walk on 2 legs, have extraordin-
ary cU!lning and strength and seem to be the very incarnation of thE' devils 
who were driven into the swine and instead of being draowned seem to have 
made their escape into the wild deserts of Africa." (:::301 
One of the most famous encounters between Home Guards and. 
guerrillas in Eastern Kentucky took place in Aueust, 18G2. The 'I)est ac-
count found was in the "Lo-aiwille Journal" for August 14th, 1862. The 
:1rticle is entitled "The Guerrillas in Eastern Zentucky". ""I've have just 
conversed with a highly intelligent gentleman, a citizen of Piketon in 
Pike comty, recently driven out from home by the gaer1'111as ••••••••...• 
~here .... ,.[<s a skirmish at Piketon on 1101day of last week (Aug. 4th), be-
tween some of the Home Guards and a greatly superior force of the guer-
rillas, another on Tuesday near that place and a third on \~;edllesday at 
Peter Jreek on the edge of Pike county. At Piketon the Home Guards num-
bered only 65 bat drove out the rebels on Monday, none beine killed on 
either side. After the skirmish near that place on ~uesday, 9 rpbpl 
bodies were found upon the scene of conflict. Subsequently, however, tbe 
rehe1s mastered in much stronger forces and our Guards retreated from 
?iketon. On '::ednesday at Peter ;':reek, '3 Home Guards were killed, a.'1d a 
considerable nu.'Uber of e,uerrillas. ~he Guards at that point nu.'1lbering 
only 70 men, t\yice defeatp,d the rebels to the 'mmber of 150, but the 
strength of the enemy being incre::.sed. by rp.-cnforceme!1ts to 300, the 
Guards retreated. At Piketon, tr~e rebel:;, after ~he retreat of the Home 
Guard3, robbed 0,11' informant of property ...... :Grth from three to, five thoa-
sand dollars and took from other Union !!len the vihole of their stock, etc. 
A.'Ilong the guerrilla leaders were :;lenifee, r.:oore, ·::iteher and Harmon. :,~en­
ifee ''laS afteI"INar:.is 'seen lriving off a drove of stock a ~nile long to\':ards 
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tr_e Yirginia line." According to t:~e report s of General Marshall it 
seems that the Fifth Kentucky regiment ~ J. "). A., was in process of 
formatio"1 at this time. (Z30) In a letter to General 30yle from a :Tr. 
30wman, a oi tizen of Jatlettsburg, ;.:enifee, 7;itc,r.ier u.nd Jenkl!ls are rc-
ferred to as the ,g'-lerrilla leaders, the three cOf:l'TJanding a band of 000 
mounted men. :,ir. Bowman, writ1ne on .AuEust 26th, says the entire ferce 
at Piketon does not oxceed 1000 men. (231) 
After the bat tle of ?erryvi ~ Ie, Gerlernl ':.fars}", all r..a0.. 
freat uifficulty in persuading any .L~entucky troollS to cross over iltC 
Virginia with him. In fact, SO!!le he left in Kentuck:,' because he knew 
ttey would not leave, sone \',no had been in the 12 months' compa.'1ies }"e 
W2S forced to muster out of the service, a:1d others fr:mkly deserted. 
30me of his ne,,:: recruits went over into VirGinia, but of these four 
companies of i!lfant~J raised in 3ath county deserted so rapidly tLat by 
the time General I.brshall reached Uidile Creek there were not 20 of the!!l 
left. ~!r. "'lndsworth, -;;hose Eome Guards cO'1ducted the only pursuit cf 
General Marshall in his retreat from Eent".lcky, estimat cd that from 1000 
to 1200 of Marshall t s men, deserted, remainL1.g in i":entucky largely to 
plunder. ~'::e mentioned --:i tcher and ~a.'Ilron as leaders of ba~ds of 600 a'ld 
400 respectively. (23Z) On Xovenber 17th, 001. ':':ranor was assifned to 
\ 
the District of ~astern ~~e'1tucky ,'."ith oro.ers from Jeneral ":;right tooreak 
up the guerrilla br>nds. (23::) 
By the end of 18o~, the situation in ~oth southEastern 
and eastern Kentucky :night well be su!nmed up in the i":ords of Rumphrey 
:':arshall ','.110 v.'rote on ~rov. 18th of that year, "In trJe Dorder countie3 of 
Zentucky, the wall is deadl:{ and fi~rcAl;l waLed, althOUGh the partiCipants 
are all !!lount1ineers, and their numbprs ar£: cOffi:,arativel;;r small." (234) 
'2 
Ohapter III 
Condition of the Country. 
~he OoUdition of the O-Ountry. 
• 
The rugged and mountainous district known as the Ken-
tucky Mountains, a part of the Oumberlart4 Plateau, is threaded by five 
large rivers vmioh head in its territory, forming narrmv, steep-sided 
valleys between the winding ridges. The five large rivers which have 
their b~ginning in this region, n&~ely the 3ig Sandy, little Sandy, 
Licking, ~entucky and Oumberland, cover it with a network of streams, 
creeks and forks. Ridges separate these streams in their tortuous 
paths, while in the so~theast the Cumberland and Pine Mountains paral-
lel each other in a northeast-southwest direction 10 to 12 miles a-
part. The mountains between these two ranges are called the Log Uoun-
tainswest of Yellow Creek, and the Black Mountains east of the sa~e 
stream. These mountains range in height from 2500 to a little over 
4000 feet in places. In the most northern section and to the .... Iest of 
Pine Moa~tain, th~ ridges more often form a high plateau suitable for 
agricultural purposes, while in other places they are only wide enc~gh 
for the narrowest mountain road. In the valleys to the we~t, castel-
lated forms are ~erous as we see from the name of Rockcastle county 
and river. Fere sheer walls of rock rise, sometimes as high as ZOO 
feet straight up from the mountain stream and it is impossible to co~ 
munioate from valley to valley across the intervening ridge. In most 
of the district, however, the valley walls do not rise 50 precipitate-
ly and the bottoms which swing from side to side of the stream as it 
wends through the valley offer considerable level land along the rivers, 
though not along the smaller creeks. This then was the character of 
the country through v,hich the tramping sold.iers passed during the first 
two years of the war. (235) 
Since the Cu.~berland Gap and Ford were the scene of so 
many struggles at this time, it seemed fitting to include a description 
of both. This description of the Gap comes from a letter written by a 
soldier in General George Morgan's command and was published in the 
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"Louisville Journal" on July 4th, 1802. "Oumberland Gap is noted as 
the cornerstone of 3 States. Kentucky, Virginia and Tennessee. It is 
a low gap, flanked on both sides by high mountains, which are topped 
by heavy ledges of rock. The entrance to the Gap is through a most 
lovely portion of Powell's Valley which is almost a flat, with here 
and there a grove of willow trees and Lombardy poplars underneath one 
of which is an inexhaustible spring of sulphur water. There must at 
some time have been a watering ~lace here and maybe your older exper-
ience remembers it. One Spring, which is also sulphur, has been walled 
with marble and the ruins of neat cabins attest the fact that it was 
at least visited for its medicinal qualities. 
Ur. Oonnelley, who was barn in the Aentucky Mountains, 
has written a description ofOumberland Ford, where General Zollicoffer 
encamped in September, 1851. "Around this valley are three high moun-
tain peaks, 1300 feet. They rise above the river, overlooking the val-
ley and are joined to mountains that extend southeast and northwest for 
long distances through the country. At the southern end of this valley 
Oumberland River breaks through Pine Mountain forming two of these high 
peaks and flows in a half circle around the town(Pineville· to the 
north. This break. known as 'The Narrows' is only about 100 to 200 
feet wide, -- just wide enough f,or river and road beside it, with \":a11s 
of almost perpendicular height on each side. An arrow invadine the Gap 
region from Central Kentucky would necessarily have to pass up the river 
through the narrows to the Gap. 'i'wo miles north of the !~arrows at the 
northern end of the present town of Pineville, the mountains close in 
to within 1200 feet of each other. Here, on the brow of a hill that 
projects from the main mountain on the east side of the river and com-
mands a good view of this pass to the entrance of the valley from the 
north, strong breastworks were thrown up (by Z~:l1icoffer), .overlooking 
the present suburb of the town of Pineville known. as West Pineville. 
The breastworks are in good state of preservation even today,. Further 
up Cumberland River on the same side another foot-hill from the same 
mountain is wedged in betwee~ ~h! mouth of Straight Creek which flows 
it;~~:<.~ :. ,"' "'. ~ 
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into Cumberland River from the east, and the river, ,mich holds a co~ 
manding view of Cumberland Ford, the only suitable crossing place in the 
river for miles around. Breastworks were thrown up on this hill and 
from this fact it is known today as Breastworks Hill." (236) 
This Gap,a natural fortress, was the prize for which 
the Northern forces were striving in their campaign in Kentucky. The 
chief difficulty in achieving it was the absence of transportation fa-
ciliti~s. In winter, or the rainy season as some of the commanders 
called it, the roads through the moUntains were often impassable. Time 
and againtroops had tobe moved because it was impossible to get sup-
plies over the road. To obviate this condition, President Lincoln sug-
gested that a railroad be built, as a military necessity, to connect the 
loyal'regions of East Tennessee and western North Carolina with Kentucky. 
The President, in his message of Decemb~r 3, 1861, continued, "Aentucky 
no doubt, will cooperate, and, through her legislature, make the most 
judicious selection of a line. The northern terminus must connect with 
some existing railroad; and whether the route shall be from Lexington 
and 
~c Nicholasville to Cumberland Gap, or from Lebanon to the Tennessee line 
in the direction of Knoxville, or on some still different line can be 
easily determined. Kentucky and the general Government cooperating, 
the. work can be completed in a v~ry short time, and when dbne it will be 
not only of vast present usefulness but also a valuable permanent improve-
worth 
ment,rltlx its cost in all the future. "(237) A co:mnittee of Kentucky men 
was ap90inted to discuss the route ':Of sllch a railraod but that YJas as 
far as the matter progressed. (238) 
Meanwhile the military com~ders were having to detail 
men to work the roads so that supply trains could pass over them. Gen-
eral Buell said the only·w~ to improve the roads effectually was to cor-
duroy them or puncheon them 16 feet wide. On January l7th,1862, this 
was ordered done to the road between Danville and 'Somerset a.'ld four reg-
iments were ordered to push it forward as rapidly as possible.(23g, 
Generlil zol11ooi'fer attemr>ted to use the Cumberland River 




On July22nd, 1862, General George Morgan wired Colonel 
Fry, Chief of Staff for General 3uell:"Lieutenant Craighill, military 
enp;ineer, has telegraphed to General Totten strongly recommendin€;, that 
a milit3.ry ro~d be immediately constructed from Crab Orchard to this 
place (Cumberland Gap), and the quartermaster of this division be in-
structed to contract for working the same, at a cost not to exceed 
~150,000.00. The work should be unier the supervision of a United 
States engineer. '.7ithout such a road it will be impossible to held 
this position after the rainy weather sets in, as the country for 100 
miles to the rear is 10\,7 and the country in front wi 11 soon be en-
tirely exhausted." (240) 
----..---
Governor Andrew Johnson, whose unrelenting insistence 
upon East Tennessee regardless of the fate of the rest of the nation 
rendered him most obnoxious to all military commanders in the ",'est, 
wrote the Secretary of War four days later and said that G.eneral 110r-
gon was pressing very hard the question of construction a military 
"1"\. 
road. He added, "If the railroad you inteded to construct ,...nen I left 
" ~3shington had been then commenced it would have been now completed and 
the cost of construction saved in transportation, and. a connection with 
that portion of Tennessee formed which would ha'Ve segregated and de3-
troyed the unity of the contemplated Southern Jonfederacy.·t (241) 
In spite of the invasion of KentUCky by General 
Kirby Smith, General 110rgan did not lose sight of his road for on Aug-
ust 24th he again wrote, .... ~'e must gctin 3.bsolute possession of our line 
to Lexi~l£ton before we can c om:nence the construction of the military 
road." (24;::) AC,cording to ~ollins a mili tary notice was served on 
slave holders in Fayette and Madison counties on the 24th, ordcrinf, 
them to furnish at a stated time a specified number of ~b1~-bodied ne-
gro nen to be used by the United States governme~t in repairing the 
road between !.1t. "Ternon and Cumberland Gap_ General Boyle ).3 quoted 
as sayine that if th~ government will furnish the necessary materials 
. . 
he will impress enough negroes to build a railroad from Lexington to 
100. 
Jumberland Gap in two months.' (243) 'l'he \'!onfederate victory at the 
battle of Richmond and the subsequent events put all thought of road-
building from the minds of both General Morgan and General Boyle. 
In·the "'Taller.! of the Sandy, transportation facilities 
flrrnished the same problems. General Garfield moved his sup)lies on 
flat boats and later on ferry boats 11) the river. This, however, was 
only mavigable all the way up to Piketon at certain seasons of the 
year. ~ener:}l ~~elson left the region because it wa3 imLJossibie to ["et 
sup.:?lies to him. Genernl Garfield fo'1..'1d the roads so impassable trrlt 
he could r.ardly cet empty waeons over them. ',Cihen c;enerD.l Uorg3n 1'8-
treated from :Juf:lb",rland ~D.p up towards Greel:upsburg on the Ohio river, 
they were forced to construct a ne,;,; road part of the 'i;ay from ';:est Lib-
arty to Grayson, Ky. (24~~' .Zentucky's lack of roads was as la:D.ent:,:ole 
in'18ul and in 1921, and. snp, was prob::lbly stuck n little deCL)er in ne 
mud and. mire then than now. In every militnry rep"rt from ever..J mili-
tar~r CO!'1l:19nder on both sides t:~ere is cO!'lphlint of the condition of tll.e 
roads. 
~his lack of transportation facilities resulted in a 
lack of supplies which forced the armies to look to the country they oc-
cupied for subsistence. ~lthough General Zollicoffer evidently had ar-
ranged t~ secure supplies from Ea3t Tennessee, he yet depended upon the 
country for forage nnd some supplies for where are a nu~ber of reports 
of foraging parties, a'1d he is constantly reporting "the co;mtry is 
poor." Iir> left his position at London and Cumberland Gap and crossed 
over to Mill Springs, partly because he cou.ld drav. supplies from l;ash-
ville by boat but also because the counties of Yiayne, :Pulaski, Jumber-
land and Clinton offered the products of a river valley. He planned to 
secure supplies for other sections of the army as well as subsist his 
ovm troops. ';.'hen Mill Springs fel1 into the hands of the Federals after 
the 3attle of Logan Cross Roads,(or Mill 31)rings)-, the Union troops 
found immense quantities of supplies collected at that place. (245) 
the 
All ~tes1tIDnony poi~ts to the utter exhaustion of supplies 
in Laurel, Knox, Clay and Vfuitley counties. When General Carter moved 
" 
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back to London after the battle of Miss Springs, he several times wrote 
General Thomas of the impossibility of securing food for his men. And 
when General Morgan arrived in April to take charGe of the men, he found 
some of them with scurvy as they had had no meat for months. (240) 
',1hen :Jeneral Kirby Smith invaded Kentucky through the 
Gaps in the mountains west of Jumberland Gap, it was, of course, im-
possible for him to haul supplies over these aarrow mountain passes to 
subsist so large an army. He found the country absolutely destitute 
and wrote General Bragg that he would either have to fall back to East 
Tennessee or go on to LeXington where he could get supplies. General 
Morgan said that the Oonfederate forces would starve in 3 weeks, occupy-
ing the territory just north of the Gap (2471 and a newspaper correspon-
dent reported the Southern troops as living on parched corn and apples(248) 
!~ow as to the method of obtaininc supplies from th e 
country. From the records, it seems that the co~~anders on both sides 
had no desire to plunder the people but wanted to give value received 
Unfortunately, the citizens of Kentucky looked upon Confederate money 
and bonds as worthless. And, while '::;eneral Zollicoffer desired to con-
ciliate the people as far as possible, he did not hesitate to take what 
he needed whether they ,Jere pleased wi th the payor not. The Union com-
manders were in somemat the same position, as they had no money at 
their command in the early day& of September and October, 1861, and 
their promises to !)ay were not looked upon \';1 th any great amount of 
enthusiasm by a people who really needed their meagre supplies for them-
selves. General Schoepf reported that there were complaints from the 
inhabitants that the soldiers took what they wanted, and General Zolli-
coffer ordered an investigation of some depredations co!~itted by his 
men. (::43) General 3choepf explained the situation in a Letter from 
London, Kentucky, November 2nd, 1851: ttThe county of Laurel will not 
supply forage for more than 10 to 30 dRYS, and 8ven now the utmost dis-
satisfaction prevails among the inhabillants. Zollicoffer had already 
plundered the county to a large extent. and we are at thi s time virtu-
ally plundering the people of what little they have left. Our promises 
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to pay are looked upon by the people as a mere sham, amounting to noth-
ing. Y1e are taking at tr.e pOint of the bayonet what the citi zens real-
ly need for the support of their families, without returning to them 
anything available therefor; thus turning against us a public sentiment 
which we should endeavor to oherish." (249) 
But worse than the seizures of supplies by the two 
armies, far worse, VIere the depredations cO!!lIDitted by the guerrillas, 
for they plundered for the sake of the game as m".lCh as for need of 
the things taken. As General Green Clay Smith puts it, in August, 1862, 
speaking of the region of southeastern Kentucky, "There is not a par-
ticle of grain in the country. The rebels have consumed it all, 
in"many cases leaving farmers entirely destitute of fodder for their 
stock, '-- though this could not have ocoasioned mush inoonvenience, be-
cause guerrillas take both fo4der and stook. (250) 
If conditions were bad in Southeastern Kentucky, they 
were worse in the Valley of the Sandy. 3ere Col. '.'!illiams and Capt. 
Jack May began to collect troops in September and ther~ is no mention 
of any transportation of supplies in connection with the OonfederRte 
forces in this district until they. came back to Kentucky towards the 
end of 1861. General Nelson was forced to leQve because of lack of 
" 
subsistence. From the amount of stores left by General Marshall when 
he retreated from Brown's ffill, near Paintsville, early in January. 
it is evident that he had collected a large supply from the country 
through which he passed. These, of course, were burned by his order, 
and on their retreat from Kentucky they almost starved. General Mar-
shall, as has been stated, excused his retreat after the battle of 
Middle Greek on.the score of starvation. And he writes from Letoher 
county that they are taking away from their friends food that should 
be left for their ohildren and families. On February 2nd, General 
Marshall, writing from Letcher county, Just 6 m1~es fran Pound Gap, 
deseri bes condi tiona with a vi vidppen: "Yc"Qu can have no c'oncept ion 
of the state of affairs here General; starvation stares these people 
in the fact. They are most averse to parting with a peck of corn or 
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a pound of meat and daily the women beg for the retention of the means 
of sustaining themselves and their children. It is no sham or affected 
apprehension th~ feel. I much fear th~ only see what spring-time 
will startlingly reveal as a stern reality. (251) 
Garfield, travelling in the wake of humphrey Marshall 
found the country bare. On January 8th, he wrote from Paintsville, 
"The vicinity of the rebel camps present s a scene of utter desolation. 
They have appropriated and destroyed an imlnense amount of property." 
Prestonburg likewise was stripped of supplies and almost deserted. The 
Union men could not find fora.ge for a single day for their horses and 
were obliged to send them b3.ck to Paintsville. (252) In his procla!na-
tion to the "Citizens of the Sandy Valley", Col. Garfield said that tte 
United States waged no war of plunder, he invited the people to return 
to their homes, and invited any who had suffered from outrages of the 
Unhn'. soldiers to bring their complaints to him, that justice might be 
done them a.'ld the soldiers punished. (253) 
Added to the other difficulties of obtaining subsistence 
in Eastern Kentucky, on the 2~nd of February, 1862, Piketon suffered 
sever damage from the worst flood in the history of the valley. Not 
only were Col. Garfield's large quantities of government stores carried 
away, and much of the rest seriOusly damaged, but the citizens suffered 
fearfully. ~he steam saw-mill and flour mill at Piketon, the only one 
in the county, was carried away and Col. Garfield had to feed the people 
from the remaining gover~~ent supplies until they could obtain so~ aid 
from the surrounding country. (254) 
7/i th the ret reat of 1!arshall, as has been poi nted out, 
many remained behind to plunder and apIlarent ly the mole countrJ was a-
li ve wi th marauding bands. Ho property of any icind was safe and no 
supplies of any kind could be kept with security. 
A loud lamentation was sent up over the loss of grain 
and cattle in the Bluegrass during MDrgan's raids and during the occu-
pation by Generals 3mfth and Bragg, but proportionately the loss was 
as nothing compared to that of the mountains. It was literally their 
all that was ta~en. first by one side then b another, or if not,by 
,/ 
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worst thief of all, -- the guerrilla. 
3ut food and forage were not the only property taken 
or destroyed in the mountains during these eighteen months. Houses 
were occupied or burned, stores were pillaged, mills were oommandeered, 
and finally the salt works at ~anohester were destroyed. 
In the early months of September and Ootober, 1851, the 
newspapers abounded with stories of the depredations committed by Gen-
eral Zollicoffer's troops. Stories of houses entered and all sorts of 
household 
property wantonly destroyed, featherbeds ripped open, women's and ohil-
dren's wearing apparel slashed with swords or worn in rough horseplay 
by the men. Of stores entered and all their contents made way with. 
Of fine residences used to sts.ble horses, -- in short all of the usual 
plundering stories that are told by an invaded people. (255) ?iaturally 
there was no way of checking up on these stories which may have been the 
grossest exag~erations. The statement was also made that all the 
houses in Barbourville ','.cere "gutted" before the Southern troops moved 
across to Mill Springs. (25&) As these were the first reports made of 
conditions in an occupied territory, the reports were naturally more 
numerous and more detailed. 
Sometimes the destruction of property was brought about 
by the desire of the Union men to keep the Confederat~s from getting 
I 
possession of the'property. Such was the destruction of all the boats 
on the Cumberland River, first all the ferry boats near Csmp Hoskins, 
PulaSki county (257) a~d later for several miles along the river (258) 
~his was in iJovember and in December, Jeneral Sohoepf reported from 
30merset, "Having reason to believe that he(30llicoffer), contemplates 
going into the ooal business on the Cumberland, I shall send out a par-
ty tomorrow and destroy the boats alo~gshore to the coal banks." (259) 
One of the few objects of real interest to the ':::0!1feder-
ates, was the S3.lt works in ~.!anchester, 0la;v ooun~y. :;enerf_l ':ollicof-
fer sent un expedition to it, and. when General ,Zirby 3mith entered Ken-
tuCky his troops seized the wagon trains going from Lexington to Qumber-
;. 
land Gap'and then used the empty wagons to haul salt. This wa;:; one of 
, 
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the scarcest articles in the South and was $lch desired by all her 
army commanders. General Jruft was placed in charGe of the expedition 
sent to destroy the works and he reported t!1at over 1000 men were "Iorked 
in details for one night and a day and a half in handlinb' the salt and 
dismantling the works. Loyal citizells in the nieghoorhood, who de-
pended on this place for their salt were allowed to tfuce away consider-
able amounts :to that no suffering would result to them. ';enera.l Cruft 
s'1id the eonfederatAs had carl ied a'~:ay from 3500 to 4000 b'lshels of :Jan-
ufact 1lred salt a~ld there was every indication that they were planninG 
to send in for the existine supply and that their leaders counted upon 
these works as a re~lar source of supply. He therefore considers the 
demolition of them a military measure as the country arollld could not 
su.bsist the large number of soldiers that would be necessary to ~)rotect 
it from such incursio'ls. ::'he works were all the property of Union cit-
izeYls, one of the 5 belonging to 001. T. r. Garrard of the ~rd Kentu.cky 
infantry. A COllmission was appointed to determine upon the compensa-
tion to be received by the owners. 7his was not done until after the 
retreat of Generals Smith and 3ragg had been effected, -- Oct. 2::rd 
and 24th, 1862. 
In the Valley of the 3ig Sandy, the same sort of thing 
was taking place, with each side claiming to protect the rigf .. ts of the 
citizens while the other side was acc'.lsing it of d.estroying a11 sorts 
of property. On his return to Kentucky, after the removal of General 
Uelson's troops from Piketon, General H1unphrey Marshall wrote to the 
Adjutant General: "~he Army of the United States, invited here to de-
fend this people, talted at no excess. ~hey burned and ravaged the 
towns, insulted ~emales, stole weari~ apparel, and ~illed stock, and 
frequently deprived poor people of the means of sllbsistencn." (261) 
Two weeks later, Jolonel Garfield thus desoribed the aotivities of 
General Marshall's men: "These two forces (Col. 71illiams and a ':,Tirginia 
regiment), a~ollnting to from 2000 to 2500 men, increased by irregular 
bands of local rebels; mostly mounted, are now in Paintsville, and are 
throwing up works for defense and send.ing out marauding parties in va-
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rious directions, who are conmitting frequent murders, driving off cat-
tle, and destro:ling the property of Union men." (262) 
i In an agricultural district where the land is poor, 
~ l the farms small and the crops, for the most part, scanty, the seizure 
~ 
! of all food, forage, cattle and hogs, meant practically the seizure 
!-
of all the property. Coupled with the destructions of their homes, 
this spelled for the mountaineers, the loss of their little all. 
Probably in ao section of the state was the loss as proportionate. 
~here wns no section of Kentucky that was so constantly the the3tre 
of martial movements in 1801-[)2, as were the mountains, -- it was in-
evitnble, therefore, they should suffer most from the destruction of 
property, and loss of their crops and cat tIe. 
Chapter IV 
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Chapter IV. 
Attitude of the People • 
.. 
It has been largel¥ assUIOOd by all writers concerning 
the Kentucky mountains during the Oivil War, that the mountaineers 
were solidly for the Union. The investigation made in connection with 
this thesis would tend to disprove this assumption. Some parts of 
the mountains, it is true, were almost unanimous in their s,lpport of 
the Federal Government, but other parts were equally zealous for the 
Confederacy. 
The elections in Kentucky, 1851, are often 1uoted as 
showing by their results, the attitude of the people. A philosophical 
discusiion as to whether elections ever indicate anything might bring 
us to the conolusion that they cannot be accepted as a rpgister of 
public opinion, but since they are included by most of the historians 
of Kentucky as eVidence, they will be considered here. On June 20th 
an election of congressional candidates was held in Kentucky. A spe-
cial session of Congress had been called by the President for July4th, 
and it was necessary to hold a special election for Congressmen in Xen-
tucky. Only one of the mountain count ies, 11organ, voted the 30uthern 
Rights ticket, or rather voted a majority for that ticket in this elec-
tion. All the rest were carriedifor the Union. (263) 
An election for representatives in the State Legislature 
was held on August 5th, 1861. In that election the following counties 
in the mountains returned majorities far the 30utLern hights candidates: 
Morgan, ~olfe, Johnson, ~goffin, 3reathitt, Perry, Letcher, Floyd and 
Pike. (264) ~his evidently represented a ~ountainous district of consid-
erable size, devoted to the Secession cause. 
ro conclude the subject of election returns let us turn 
to th.e election of August,1852. On the earnest solicitation of General 
3uell (.265). General Boyle, the mili tary COllJDander- in Kentucky had pub-
lished an order forbidding and Southern Rights men to be can~idates for 
election. According ~o the"Louisville Journal", this order 'was strictly 
observed in most of the countie9, even where the Confeierate sympathizers 
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claimed to h~ve a ~ajority. Morgan county was the one county which paid 
no heed to the General's order. The morning of the election about 100 
mounted guerrillas made their appearance anil proceeded to run the elec-
tion with the result, that while there was a full Union ticket, it was 
beaten, 2 or ~ to 1, Confederate sym~athizers being elected to the of-
fices of Jounty, Judge, County Clerk, She:Hff, Assessor, Surveyor, Jail-
er, 00roner, etc.' (255) 
Everything seems to establish the fact that the counties 
just north of Jumberland Gap were for the Union. General Zollicoffer 
wrote from Cu.'l1berland Ford on September 21st I "The country in advance 
is so hostile it is difficult to obtain any information. The few 
friends we have among the country people think a larGe force is advanc-
ine upon us." A few days later he asked that any infoi-mat ion that had 
been secured at headquarters in regard to the strength or movements of 
the Unionists in front of him be forwarded as the pop-q.lation ahead was 
so generally hostile he couJd not even push spies through it. (257t 
In suggesting that he move his forces over on the Cumb-
erland River, after the battle of Rockcastle Hills, General Zollicoffer 
said, ttThe country is not so sterile throurh mich to make a forwnrd 
movement as the one in fron of me, called '-The ';'Jilderness of Kentucky," 
It cannot be more hostile. (258) 
Southeastern Kentucky received a great many refugees 
from East Tennessee ,vhere the policy of the State authorities seemsto 
have been to run out all of the Union s~)athizer3 possible. ~he 
stories told by these people doubtless influenced opinion near Cumber-
land Gape ~hen the movement of Genernl 3011icoffer on to their ovm soil 
. 
crystallized. se.J1timent against the Southerners. ~,\'hatever division of 
opinion may have existed before the Confederate army appeared was wiped 
away by the exigenchs of having G. foreign soldiery encamped upon their 
soil. This feeling Qf unit, that developed as a- result of invasion was 
shown by the county meetings held, where both political parties p~~mised 
to forget their differences and unite in driving the Tennessee troops 
from their soil. Report of a such a meeting in Lincoln county WFlS made 
in the "Louisville" lo~l'" for. September 21th, 1861. A comnittee had 
,~;;.mi~i;;$#4iitt:~'~~~;~k~!~;';;;&~~'~~h'~-';- '.;. 
109. 
been appointed to draw up resolutions v,hich pledged all the citizens, 
regardless of their political differences, to unite in guarding their 
homes afainst an invading fow, as well as against maraudinr: bands. And 
these resolutions were ordered printed in the neY15papers. 
That the Union leaders counted u~on the loyalty of 
the mountaineers in southe''l.stern .i:~entucky is sho'wn in a number of ways, 
for ex~rrple, in a letter from John Fisk, 3peaker of tte State Senate 
to ROi)ert Buckner, 3peaker of the HO:lse. :'!r. Fisk said, "Don't let Gen-
eral £homas send too much force against Zollicoffer, but let him open 
the 00vi:~l.gton a"Yld Lexington railroad promptly. Our r!Il.mitions must come 
that way. J:he mountaineers will whip Zollicoffer as S00n as they get 
ammunition. 3y all means send them, lead. lead. lead! " (269 
~.lost of the people fled before the approaching army. 
~he newspapers reported the Confederates in possession of the smaller 
to~ns and Jeneral 301licoffer himself says that there were practically 
no male inhabitants left in the country betileen Cumberland .B'ord and 
3arbourville. (270) ~he ne'wspaper said there were only 3 males left 
in Barbourville a'1d they we~'e allowed to re ',ain because they were 3e-
cession sympathizers. (271) 
':.'hen General ~ollicoffer moved back into ~ennessee and 
then advanced again thro'agh '\7ayne county, he reported that he fouCld the 
better class of citizens siding with him. (272) Za.rlier than this G 
:.Ir. McHenry had wri tten to General Albert 3idney Johnston that the 3cu-
thern iights men '::ere being forced "in Jumberland, Jlinton, Rus sell, 
Wayne and Pulasld counties to take the oath of allegiance at the point 
of the bayonet by the Federal forces and Ho:ne 8.aurds."(273) :.bo:lt the 
sa"!le.time in October, a ':'Ir. Gass, hnd written from near Livineston, :'enn., 
s::;yine:, If'~hero is a perfect reign of terror in Kentucky. :;:he 30uthern 
men are greatly in fear of their lives.:'he Lincolnites are swearinc 
in the citizens daily, and many of our friends are made to take the oath 
in order to s,~,ve thpir lives and property." (274) 
After ~he Oonfederate camp was established at .il.1ill Springs, 
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Colonel Hoskins wrote to General Thomas from his oamp in Pulaski county 
on the Oumber1and River, "1 am anxious to hold the position, believing 
as I do that it is due the country from the noble stand which they have 
taken in favor of the Union, and onoe they have possessed this point 
there is no point 0 f advantage for us to impede their maroh north until 
we reach the north side of the Kentucky River and I find their strength 
increasing by accessions of those, who, while we held pos3ession of the 
counties below this professed to be good Union men." (275) 
General Boyle wrote from Columbia in December that the 
Confederates were drafting the 10ya.1 citizens in Clinton· and Wayne 
counties. Two hundred reoruits had been reported as secured for the 
Confederates in ~ayne, which General Boyle felt had been conscripted. 
(276) 
When General I.lorgan' s men were enoamped in the moun-
tains prior to their campaign against Cumberland Gap, in May, 1862, 
the Journal Oorres:!.")ondent from their oamp said, "The mountaineers are 
true to the Union. They are opposed to any compromise of peace but re-
quire unconditional surrender. not peace then with the leaders, 
they must stampede or suffer the doem of traitors. It would be a cry-
to Heaven 
ing sin not to do so." (277) 
'" 7lhen General Ki~by Smith entered the State, lie met only 1/ 
the utmost hostility in his march through the mountains. He reported 
the people as openly and bitterly opposed to the Confederacy, and said 
. that if the sentiment on the other side of the mountains was not very 
different, nothing whatever could be expected from them. (278) 
A correspondent from Cumberland Gap wrote to the Jour-
aa1 about this time, "Poor Mountaineers; how sorry I am for them; and 
don't wonder at their hostility for their little homes are being deso-
lated. ':1heir potatoes and all kinds of vegetables are being taken by 
the rebel troops, their green corn, all destroye~t fr~it and evcry-
things that man or beast can subsist Uilon, \'7i 11 soen be gone. and I 
do'n't see hoi'.' they are to live f'or the next 12 months." (279) 
;v. 
All the rap,orts Of' the Union offioers operat ing in 
>'~~.::' ". - ,/;,.\ 
southeastern ..• ttest the unflinching loyalty and devo-
Ill. 
tion of the mO"'J.~t3ineers in this se~tion :0 the Federal cause. (2.30) 
I t is di fficul ty to asccrt::- in v;!lether such unan:imi ty of 
opinion characterized Eastern Kentucky a:> Yi:13 displayed in tbe mount'1in 
district of the sO".ltheast. :2hat i~ was a rccoplized section of 30'llthern 
tJ.~ t::''' lid j'.1 ,e (" , , 
'RiC~:ts sCl1til7lent in shoi'.'n by a letter fro!rl. ~en('ral .3. 3. ]uckncr to tIle 
A 
~nde abrigr-.dier-General, either for the .l.;"e:1tucky brigade or for H sep-
arate column, to be directed through the "stron[" sO"J.thern-rif~ht3 co;J.:!:l-
ties in 'Sn.3tern l:entucky." (281) 
len ha:l escaped from the 31negrass. ';enern,l L~ar:-:~"lall said that 1.1:: 
:':resto''10'J.rf t:--,ere '.','ere !1bO"lt 20GO :·:c11t~1.cky peOl)lc co1J.ectccl, but th[lt 
3. 
::: 01. ,'1'0:'111 "'1 llliams ~1ad 3ucceed.ed in ;n~{3 terin("" 30;:10. GO:) or 700 1:1b:· t:-, e 
October leth, 
GtD.tioned &t OlY;:l,pi::m 3 ... )rincs t wrote Gnneral .l.·el:;on t.h3-t t.hero ',"'ere 
several thoU3a:1J !:J.en nt the "rebel c?.Jnp" at ~)rC'3tClll::nlrc; ::illc1.. the;:,r v;er2 
c:.:]il~l rnc-"ivL1[ ~1.c0esGion from above and below. (;':'83) As ::elson ex-
pres sed it, !"~'h \vhole mo"ut8.in, ,,';hence we e:<pec ted t c ret ::w..n:y so::li (or's, 
is becorni::[; cor::rpletely demoralized, and the;, art~ enl13ti'1C u!ld.er .:il-
lL:i:ns.f! (284·) Z'-l.st o8forc :1:0 battle of Ivy .u.lo,mtain, triP 30crctary of 
..,;1 th t,,vo 7ircinia regiments. This in order "s"J.f:.nice a3 a nucleus to hold 
together t~e forces :ClOY.' at ?reston~.lurL and on th8 eve of ,lisl')cr:,irT,(lS 
we are i'lformed and 'to enable Jol. -::iEiams to succeed. in recri.li ti.rJ.'-
~ or 7: re;~iments ;jorp, th~13 forrninr- a fcr:c' c-:.tfficient to :prevo!lt the 
enemy from pass inp; into south't;;es tF~rn uir:=;inia by l)ound :ii~p. II (?[3;;) 
nfter:;els on I s troops had bepn re:noved fro:'J tr;(~ 3:J.::1d.;y Valley, said he 
\~'oulci start the cavalr~r on ahead to "ins~)irE:' our .friends ... ·;ho are said 
to be :nuch disspirited b~.r the insolent CQ'..lTS8 of tte enemy a-nj t.heir 
friends." (ZSG) He r.':~3 an:dous to set up county officers und.er the 
:'rovisional :}overnment of i.entucky and \yrote to ask for blank cO:::1."nis-
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sions for nagistrates, sheriffs anli constables. clel'ks and CO'.l·,t;:,' JUcl.Ces. 
(287) Ee neVer succeeded in settin~ up a Provisional Government in this 
district, -- or at any rate, no rnport of it was ever made. General 
f.1arshall also reported that recruiting '.va::; cominG' alone: "elegantly". 
(288) :'his '{!ould tend to shm'! that the :people '.':ere syr!Ipathetic to :,is 
cause. 
M!lrsball '3 precipitate flight seemed to clisconraf"e the 
mount ..unears, SOrne\'itat, however, and after h is departure, ~arfield re-
ported a :narked chanGe in the attitude of tte citizens. His policy 
was conciliatol'"'J, f)rOm~sing protection to all, of whatever IJolitical 
sym[Jathies, so long as ttey had not aided and abetted the enemy. F'ur-
therr.lore, the same protection was extenu.ed to all in ar!:lS agai:lst the 
f,overn!:lent if they vloaU lay do\',n their [lrms. His proclaa:ation to 
tLe citizens contained one bit of usual .n.en t"'J.cky Mount ain "local color" 
in ttat he ordered all the citizens to banish from among them all pri-
vate feuds. (239) As was asual in tte mo,lntains, tr~e people of 3o,lthcrn 
sympathies moved out with the arrival of the Union troops, but about a 
mOrlth later, -':olonel Garfield reported that 'aany of them "Yere returninG' 
to their homes, while !l1ln08rS of Marshall 's mount~)in soldiers ',':ere de-
serting, often in squads of 30 or 40 at a time. (290) :Jeneral :,1arshall, 
chagrined at the fact that his ca.'!lp i':as often visited by ~:':'?ntuckians 
of both ]jolit ical parties, ordered that all men who came over hlto Vir-
finia from .t~entucky should be arrested and placed in ca.'1lpS of iYlstruc-
tion if trJey did not enlist. (291) 
J'erhaps .i.larshall struck tr:8 keynote of the atti tide in 
the mountains when he said, "The IJeople hereabouts are perfectly terri-
fied or apparently apathetic."(292) Later when he waJ in Floyd CO'Xlt~l. 
::.fter the battle of :<iidJ.le Jreek he Virote, "My troops nOVi subsist by 
going to the fielus, sr.uclring the corn, shelling- it, takinS it to tLe 
illi 11, grinding the meal und then t3,kinC it to camp. '.2his has bepn the 
only way ttey could be fed. The people of the country will do nothinr. 
They will not assist to gather the corn !lor to 3hell it, nor will they 
let us have the use of their horses or a'l~!thint'" that is theirs, -- noth-
ing ei ther for love or money. ~hey I'd 11 not en ter the army on ei ther 
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side and seem t a be actually terror-strick.en. I have tried to shame 
ttem into a sense of ",vhat w~!s due to themselves and. their families, 
but it is of no use." (293) 
',','ben Oolonel Garfield turned the cOmP.land. of the De-
part':H!1t of Eastern Kentucky over to~olonel~ranor on i.larch 20th, l8B2, 
he wrote his successor a letter ~on~erninc the policy to be~mrs'J.ed in 
dealing ~'!ith the ~itizens. ~p said, "In rer;ard to citiz(-Hls, ""ho r.!WP 
bef'n disloyal I desire to h \ve the roliey C ontinned wh ieh 1 h'1Ve hor('-
tofore ende:ivored to preserve. ':ihile all force and rebellion ag:airlGt 
the Govern:nent must promptly be put dovm, it must also be remembered 
Hlat t~le people in this valley are to live together [1,3 fellov\-~iti3en3 
and neighbors aftel the war is over. All trat we can do to inm1f;urate 
peace alld concord amonc them w.hile the army is here should be done. 
~he people in this valley are, in the main, very ignorant, and eom-
pletely under the control of their party leaders. If those leaders 
in the different precL'1cts can be placed und.er 'bonds for their fature 
loyalty and peaceable cond.uct, and. will take the oath of alleeiance to 
the }overfJllient of the United States, thpy '."ill probably be efficient 
in keepine th e COUll try qui et and loyal." (294) 
Althoue;h 2 ree~ments of Gnion treops were left at 
Piketon and some i:O::1€ Guards v.'ere organi::ed, as has been seen, con-
di t ions "8ere not bettered and the inhabi ta~ts seem to have carried on 
the war amonr themselves ac~ol'dine to tteir own methods. '.n:e Oon-
federates continued to depend upon their loyalty as a v,hole, hoy/ever, 
one 
and only reference was found in an:! letters from Gonfederate leaders 
" 
assuming that Eastern .t~entucky was 10;;-al to the Union. :::'his was in 11 
letter from General Airby Smith right after }diS penntration limto l~en-
tucky where he had met "..:ith the hostility of the mOll!ltaineers in tr)e 
southeastern section. ~:e snid the universal hostility fie }:nu !:J.el ex-
tended through the mountain reeion of Eastern ,KentUCky. (:::;:15) 
After the bat t 113 of ?erryvil ~e and the retreat of the 
00nfederrtes, in spite of the fact thnt so m::Lny of his troops deserted, 
refusing to le~,ve their native hills, General ~.aarshall stated that the 
I 
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mountain counties of Aentu:;ky were as loyal to the 60nfederacy as the 
mountain counties of ,,'/estern Virginia. (:296) 
Perhaps t~e conditions in the Sandy Valley towards the 
end of 1862 are best set forth in ~ol. Hira..'n ::awkins' letter to G-overn-
or Hawes. "In this way ( by convincinf the people tt:lt tr:eJonfed.crates 
rl:we eiven up L"-entucky [mel p~rsuading them to join the Home Guard.s) the:; 
are fast subjugJting the people, and, if ~ernitted to purs~w their pol-
icy undistp'.ubed llntil sprint, that whole country will be orcanized a-
;::ainst us. ~hey have adopted the wise .!.Jolicy of bJyinr:: UI) our country, 
(~~~~) 
by payinG, feedinr;, and clothing these soldiers and. let ting them remain 
" in their native hills to hold them ap;ainst us, a..~d will succeed unless 
we check'nate them by a similar policy. ~hey cannot enlist them and 
J 
carry them from their cou..~try, and neither can we, ani leave the enemy 
in ~)ossession of it. '.7e hwe both tried this and failed.. I am, per-
haps, as 'well acquainted 'wi th these people as, and know the ir wants 
and what can be done with th em better than, any officer in the ar1'I\Y, 
for I have been vvith them more, in contnct with then oftener, and in 
CO!1."!lnnd. among them longer than any officer in the service, and I run 
convinced. th:<t they prefer to be with us, and figr:t for us; but they 
cannot quit their country ~md. le~ive it in the hllld3 of the enemy 'iYith-
out their families suffering, ma,ny of them turned out of loors, oth""lrs 
in penur:! and w':,nt, and surrounded by an insul ti DC :Hld bJrbarc,u5 foe 
--- the Rome Guards." (297) 
r~hese reports on tLe feeling in the 3andy Val] ey have 
been [;one into in some detail and nanoers of :1ctual quotntions have 
been given to substantiate the claim made in the beginning that the 
mountains were not solidly for the Union. 'i'he counties in the south-
eastern section never swerved in their loynlty and their love for the 
Federnl govern.'nE'Dt senmed to grow more intense voith their 3ufferings 
for it, but certainly in thn bee;innine of the Vi'ar the ea, tern ::iountain 
district demonstrated clearly its alleciance to the ~onfeder.acy. 
Jhapter V 





Soldiers from the Mountains. 
In the Adjutant-General's report of the soldiers en-
listing in Kentucky for the Union ar~, no report is !D1'l,de by counties, 
but the various muster rolls are given, with the place of enlistment 
of the various commands. As a great many of the mountaineers enlisted 
in the very beginning at Camp Dick Robinson, it is impossible to re-
port very accurately concerning them, for-theAl were soldiers mustered 
in at Camp Dick Robinson from other counties too. Hence it becomes nec-
essary to depend upon less valuable sources for information ,in regard 
to these enlistments. 
i'lhen General iJelson, then a Lieutenant in the navy, 
was ordered to Kentucky on July 1st, 1861, the only troops he was au-
thorized to raise in Kentucky were to come from the southeastern sec-
tion. ~e officers chosen >'ler'· selected from these counties and all 
the evidence points to the fact that the regiments of :::olonels '.Vo1-
ford (1st Kentucky cavalry), Bramlette (7th KentUCky infantry), Gar-
rard (3rd Ky. infantry) and Hoskins (12th Ky. infantry) carne from 
the counties lying just north of Cumberland Gap, Knox, Laurel, Rock-
castle, ?ulaski and ','Jayne. 
In Battle, K'liffin'and Perrin's "History of i.entucky", 
Mr. Kniffin, who served at Camp Dick Robinson in the autumn of 1801, 
wrote of the troops collected at the camp, "Recruiting in the country 
southward and eastward from the camp was comparat ively easy •. '.L'he coun-
try is mount 3inous and the inhabitants were on ey.ual terms with refer-
ence to wealth and soc ial standing. :l'here were few slave holders and 
the people accustomed to independence of thO;lght, word and deed, had 
exercised the right to form their own concl~lsions upon the question of 
secession. Ready to engage in an enterprise that promised relief to 
their loyal neighbors across the Tennessee border, whose persecution 
by the State authorities at this time had awakened a thrill of indigna-
tion throughout the country. they enrolled their names under the banner 
of their count17." (298) 1'!l'i 
, . i;tvasion by ~Ollicoffer, the newspapers 
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a storm of inJiguation in the mountains and brought do\vn upon their own 
heads numerous letters from the loyal citizens of that section, incenGed 
at the injustice done them •. ?he cause of their wrath was a published 
statement that the Honorable J:ohnJ • Crittenden ",~s ['oing to the mou.'l-
tains "to arouse the ·hardy mouYlt'lineers and ind-"lCe th~m to go into the 
service of the cO"'J.r1try." The protestors immediately asked how many 
soldiers were in the service from the venerable statesman's own district 
and then cited the troops already in camp from the mountains. rhey in-
ed 
dignantly sUg'cest that if the "bluegrass" people would fif)J.t a Ii ttle 
" 
more and talk less, the country would be the better for it.{Z93) 
One letter stated that lC'lcx, laurel, ':.bitley, Clay and Rockcastle counties 
each had," 2 companies enlisted; that Rockcastle county had 3 companies 
for 12 months' service, that Knox would provide ad..iitional companies 
and that the adjacent counties would still provide more men; in short 
that this d.istrict of the mountains now had more soldiers in the service 
according to their pop'..llation, than the same number of counties anywhere 
else in the state. {300} Another letter concluded with ""-,here did the 
soldiers, at Camp Robinson cane from? Ask them and more than 9/10 of 
them will tell you they are from the mountains. Old Pulaski has now 
abo~lt "00 or 800 soldiers in thl'< field and in two months she will have 
1200. (301) 
The only direct reference to the enlistment of 30ldiers 
for the Union army in the Eastflrn Zentucky cOlnlties was found in a let-
ter from 001. Sidney :;1. 3arnes, who wrote to General ~homa3 from ::still 
Springs, Septembe,r 2~rd, 1831, when his regiment, the 8th KentUCky in-
fantry was in process of formation, "'.','e are looking for another company 
fro:n Owsley County, this evening; a130 one from Jackson Gounty."(30Z) 
Undoubtedly the ranks of the several regiments raised in the ~ortheast-
ern section of the State at lIaysville, Jatlettsburg and Louisa v;ere 
s'\",-elled by accessions from the region around the loui3a Fork of tbF. 3ig 
Sandy, but the information necessary to a definite statemer.t is lacking. 
The troops raised from the mou',tains early in the war 
~ " did gallant service in meeting and holding back 'the army from Tennessee 
lIV· 
! 
uudnr }ener8l Zollicoffer. ~Uthough :1:my of them distinguished the~ 
sel ves in the later c ampai ens , . they never rendered the nation more val-
iant service tha.>1 they gave her as raw recruits as thf'y stood in t!:eir 
own hills a1.i valleys, holdine back the~onfederates u~,til help CaIne 
from the states acrOss the Ohio. 2hey helped save Kentucky for the 
Union ",!ith their undaunted cO~i.r;...ce in the face of sufferinc and pri-
vation a-1d with their determinatic'n to protect their cotmtry at all 
costs. 
':,ben General Hu.'IIphrey ~3.r3r,all jOi'1ed Jolonel ',7il-
liams at Pound Gap in l'Jovcmber, 1851, }~e found that 0010nel ',-;Uli3,:ns 
had about 800 men, Lu-gely dr--won f'ror:l the mountain counties, In tLe 
eastern part of the state. Ge~eral ~shall said they were poorly c 
clad ~nd poorly armed and knew nothin[ of discil)line or drill. Eow-
AVE'r he pronounced them ezcellent material.(303) 0!1 the return of his 
forces, to Kentucky, rf3cr-,li ting parties ,',ere sent out allover the :no~m-
tQins and even beyond, with the. result that by December 30th, Gol. ','jil-
Ii runs , regi~ent was recruited to the full 100Q'men and a second regi-
ment of infantry wa3 in process, of formation. (304) iUs success was 
shor,t-lived, however, for by Ja.'1uary 14th, 1852, he ·,crote the 7iarDe-
one 
partment from 3eaver Jreek, Floyd county, "The regir.ent no,; com.mnded . 
" 
by Colonel ~:lilliams f.:lS '::>een raised in the mount:;;.in country, but the' 
I • " 
Ih~li t seems to have been reached 'and the fact is that those who h;).'V'e 
not yet taken part, who ~re poor, v:ill not leave their families in or-
dor to 'fight anybody's battles on any side." (305) 
';,'hile the Union forces controlled the V;-,lley of the 
3andy, recruiting was, of·course, impossible, but ~eneral A~rshall con-
tinued to expect a rush of troops to his stand'lrd 'i'I4len he aGain appe:~red 
in his native state. 3ut he found that seclrring them was one ttinc ~nd 
persuading them to leave Aentucky wi th htm ... ;e~ two different matters. 
1 t vms reported that almost a thousand men deserted as he made his way 
to Pound Gape ~he 5th Kentucky, whose twelve manth.' service ~as up, 
demanded their ho~rabledisCharge. :;or· would the7 enlist again on the 
spot, though they erpressed an intention of so 4014g at some later date. 
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T;vo cO:!1panies of recruits were retained by Marshall anci the rest dis-' 
charged fran the service. ';01. Hawkins was stationed at Prestonburg 
i::1 orJ.er to receive re-enlistments from this set cf mountai::1eers. '.::'wo 
captains were at the same pln.ce, recruiting and had secured several 
hundred men,Japtain Caudill had raised 9 companies of infantry in 
','lhitesburg, Letcher county and on hearing that these men (600) would 
desert if ordered out of the state, ,}ener'3.1 1iarshall allowed. them to 
remain, he a130 recruited 4 mOlmted comparlies under 1.lajor Johnson. 
A.lthough General iJarshall regnrded his a.ttempt to 
bring infantry recruits out of Kentucky a signal fail:lre, yet he con-
sidered thnt he had,sived froD the wreck, as he put it, 3000 men, cav-
aIry and infantry together. Of these about 1200 hnd remained in hen-
tuck-J •. 800 of the KentUCkians '.'lith him had come from his ovm sect ion, 
making about 2500 from t~e mountains. AdO. to these the deserters, and 
the number mounts up from so sparsely populated a district. (30~) 
Oolonel Eawkins sai,l of enlistments from Eastern Aentucky, "As a proof 
that they prefer to be with us ana. fight for us, 1 need but state the 
fact thnt nl though the ene.::1Y ':~. s had his army in that country much 
longer ttan we, he has failed to enlist as many by half as we have. 
':le have enlisted men enough from that region to form a €ood brigade." 
General I;Iarshall "thought that v!hen the Southern armies 
"""" ~C\ _-4:. .~tJ. S.....,.~, It (0 "2. I 
first entered Ken tucky, they should have enforced conscription. General 
A 
Bragg, however, had suspended the lav: te~orarily, i"iarninf the Xentuck-
ians at the same time that Ilhis would be their last opportunity to '101-
unteer. General ~.:arshall, who encountered :clany difficulties in his deal-
ings wi th the mountain troops state4 that they had a violent antipat~ 
to anything that approached conscription. 30 far as could be found out, 
he never made [iny nttempt to enforce.it in the mountains. (307) 
Thus while the !!loantainAers i"'h one section were st:lrJd-
ing for the Union, those in another 'were flocking to thf! standar:l of the 
Jonfederacy. Equally brave and daring, the mcuntaineers coll ected. nnder 
Colonel Williams during the first months of the V:~Jr, suffered even more 
from privation and want than did the Union men. ~heirs were the real 
119. 
deprivations. Not only tents and the comforts of camp equipage were 
lacking, but food and ammunition as well. Col. Bramlette's men were 
without blankets or coats, but ·Colone1 Wil1i~ms' lacked even shoes. 
They too made a valiant effort for their adopted government and 
helped many Southern Rights men excape from Kentucky to the Southern 
army. They were unable to hold the tertitory, but at least they made 
the effort. 
These numbers of enlisted soldiers seem very :neager 
until we consider them in relation to the population. No county in the 
mountains had over IS,OOQ people in it in 1860, only 3 had 10,000 or 

















5 •. 343 
10. 259 
7,762 
3,603 (for 1870) 
...... ""r .. · .l!~I:Q.~lIli.l.Ull could not oontain so many men of 
respOn8e to call for soldiers was 
Conoludon. 
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C oncl us ion. 
In no o~her region of Kentucky was there so much suf-
fering frc·m the war, as was f01.IDd in the mountains of Kentucky. From 
September, 1861, until the end of December, 1862, the mountain coun-
ties of the east and southeast were almost continuously ocoupied by 
the armies of either one side or the other. And when, for a short 
time, they were freed from this, guerrilla wa~are cQused even more 
disaster. 
Due to lack of transportation facilities, the en-
camped armies were forced to depend upon the immediate country far 
much of their subsistence and storage with the result that the COUll-
try was time and again stripped of ev~rythinf, it ~ossessed. Grain, 
corn, fr~it, hogs, oattle, forage for same, all were taken from 
these unhappy people. 
Finding that they were not safe in their lives and 
property when the army whose views they opposed ocpupied their terri-
tory, the mountaineers from the beginning, moved out before an ap-
proaching army. For example, all of the Union men in Southeastern 
Kentucky left their homes before Gener,;l Zollicoffer'established his 
headquarters at Oumberland Ford, and when C!olonel Garfield took his 
troops down the river to Piketon, the Southern Rights men, often with 
their families, simply left the towns and took to the hills. The re-
suIt of this was that for months many of the mountain men lived the 
liv@@. of fugitive:::;, never sleeping in a house, rarely seping their 
families, a~d resorting to "bushwhacking" in their desperation. 
The fact that opinion was not unanimous in the moun-
tains tended to exaggerate conditions. Particularly was this the case 
in Eastern Kentuoky, where the sympathy was largely with the Confederate 
oause, but where, in 1862, Union men began to organize to resist these 
sympathizers. General Kirby Smith said there were 23 counties in East 
Tennessee, 6 of which were loyal to the Confederacy, whose supremacy 
their state reoogniz!d. In Kentucky, which remained in the Union, 
fully 9 of the 20 meuntain counties evinoed strong Confederate sympa-
thies. These 1l1ae "~,~11 together in the Eastern Kentucky- dis-
:j~;~~~>?t*1Zt -'j T~,~·-. 
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trict. They were Morgan, ';'lolfe. 3reathitt, Magoffin, Johnston, Floyd, 
Perry, Letcher and Pike. Certainly in the early years of the war, these 
counties ewe their allegiance to the Confederacy. 
Many his torians believe that the inhabi tants of the 
entire Cumberland Plateau are the descendants of the Scotch-Irish im-
migrants who sw",pt over the land about the middle of the eighteenth 
century, occupying the outposts in the wilderness and the pioneer coun-
try. If this be true, they brought with them and preserved the tradition 
of their own peculiar form of border warfare. It was fierce and deadly, 
with no quarter given. Any troops operating against them were forced 
to adopt the same method of i>ro cedllre. By the end of 1862, this 
mountain warfare was carried on with a bitterness of which these people 
only seemed capable. Although. the men were all mountaineers and the 
numbers of them comparatively small, the blows were swift and sure and 
they knew no quarter. Such was the condition in the KentUCky mountains 
after the departure of the regular armies whose disciplined soldiers con-
ducted no campaigns through the Kentucky hills after the year 1852. , 
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